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 The Integrated Circuit (IC) design flow follows a global business model. A global business 
means that the processes in the IC design flow could be outsourced, and consequently security 
threats have been introduced. Security threats on hardware include side channel analysis, reverse 
engineering, information leakage, counterfeit chips, and hardware Trojans (HTs).This work mainly 
focuses on HT attacks, which execute a malicious operation on the system when a trigger condition 
is met. Networks-on-Chip (NoCs) are a popular communications infrastructure for many-core 
systems, which have proved to be a more scalable option over the traditional bus interface. 
However, the high scalability and modularity provided by NoCs have introduced new 
vulnerabilities in the design, leading to hardware Trojans capable of causing several Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks on the network. 
 A 4x4 Mesh-topology NoC with a more robust router microarchitecture is presented with 
several innovations relative to the baseline. A collaborative dynamic permutation and flow unit 
(flit) integrity check method is proposed to thwart an attacker from maliciously modifying the flit 
content in the routers of a NoC. Our method complements other HT detection approaches for the 
NoC network interfaces. Moreover, we exploit the Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) structure 
and the traffic routing history to generate a unique key vector for each router to select one of the 
multiple permutation configurations. Simulation and Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) 
results are compared between the proposed NoC microarchitecture and four other existing solutions 




Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. The Security Issue in Hardware 
 The world is moving toward one that is more electronically driven, where a greater number 
of people are using computers and other electronics every day. The shift towards a world with more 
electronics leads to a greater demand for the production of the components that make up these 
devices. Most electronic devices use integrated circuits (ICs), which are single chip packages 
consisting of a collection of smaller circuits. ICs are used in practically every electronic device 
today, ranging from commercial applications such as cell phones and computers, to more critical 
applications like banking and military systems.  
 To address the supply demand of ICs, the semiconductor industry and has started to follow 
a globalized business model for the IC design flow. The IC design flow is comprised of several 
stages of design, fabrication, assembly, and test. The outsourcing of these processes has begun as a 
result of the global business model. Figure 1.1 introduces the IC design flow, and shows outlined 
vulnerabilities that are a result of outsourcing. The outsourcing of processes has led to an increase 
in hardware security threats as it hands over the design to 3rd party [1-6]. This limits the trust one 
can have in systems where the internal design was outsourced. Trusted hardware is especially 
needed for more critical applications where a single error may have a greater impact, such as 





Figure 1.1. Outlined Vulnerabilities of IC Design Flow following Globalized Business Model. 
 
1.2.  Different Hardware Attacks 
 Hardware attacks pose an issue to the security of systems. Attacks aimed at a system’s 
hardware can cause many adverse effects on the system. Internal memory values may be changed, 
secret keys can be leaked, or the circuit may degrade or even fail completely. Hardware attacks are 
different than software attacks, as the latter can always be removed. Software attacks that change 
the actual software may be reversed by overwriting the software with the original software again. 
However, this method cannot be applied to when a hardware attack on a system alters the actual 
hardware. Hardware attacks may linger with the system, or completely change the functionality of 
the system. Different hardware threats include fault injection, IC counterfeiting, 3rd party 





1.2.1.  Hardware Trojans 
 Hardware Trojans, which are malicious hardware modifications on the original chip, pose 
as a serious hardware security threat. This particular security issue arose directly as a result of the 
IC industry following a global business model. Figure 1.2 shows an understanding of the global 
business model, and gives an idea of how many countries may be involved in the design of a 
particular IC. HTs can be embedded during any stage of the IC design flow, and aim to deliver an 
attack on the system that can take on a variety of forms. HTs can be designed to deliver attacks such 
as Denial of Service, information leakage, data manipulation, and system degradation [7-11]. The 
malicious hardware is implemented in such a way to be hard to detect, either through being small 
enough to consume a negligible amount of power compared to the whole system, or by having a 
very small trigger probability. HTs implemented in Intellectual Property cores designed by third 
party vendors can introduce chip malfunctions and information leakage attacks on the system they 
are put into [11]. During the design stage, HTs can be embedded at the Register Transfer Level 
(RTL) in the design’s Hardware Description Language (HDL), or straight into the gate level netlist, 
leading to logical attacks on the system [9]. At the fabrication stage, design layouts can be modified 
to include a HT, changing internal circuit characteristics such as delay [12].  
 




 HT designs are becoming more complex and hard to detect, and have become capable of 
bypassing rigorous post-silicon tests. Due to the nature of HTs being triggered by a rare event, it is 
extremely difficult to detect HTs with conventional testing approaches [12]. HTs can activate 
through various types of trigger circuits, and deliver the respective attack via a payload circuit. HT 
trigger circuits are usually modeled as sequential [5] or combinational logic circuits [3] that activate 
after a specific condition is met. An example of how a HT with a sequential logic trigger circuit 
would become active is if the trigger circuit required a node to have a specific logic value X number 
of times. An example of how a combinational logic trigger circuit could activate would be if its 
trigger condition is to have X number of different nodes have specific logic values at the same time. 
There exist many hardware Trojan detection methods. Offline detection methods typically try to 
activate the trigger circuit to detect the existence of HTs. The switching probability of the trigger 
circuit is raised at the test time to increase the visibility of HTs [14, 15]. However, due to the hard 
to detect nature of HTs, trojaned ICs may still bypass offline detection methods, leading to residual 
HTs in designs. This is especially true for larger designs such as on-chip networks where complete 
coverage at test time is not practical.  
1.2.2.  Fault Attacks 
 Driven by malicious intent, attackers are impelled to extract the cipher key and thus 
compromise the cryptosystem through fault attacks. Fault attacks (FAs) compromise the cipher 
implementation and produce faulty ciphertexts for cryptanalysts to retrieve the secret key. FA can 
be executed through deliberate injection of faults into cryptographic devices by means of white 
light, laser beam, voltage/clock glitch, and temperature control. Existing fault-detection methods 
can effectively detect random faults in the cipher implementation, but yield a high fault bypass rate 
(FBR) under fault attacks. 
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1.2.3.  Counterfeit ICs 
 Counterfeit ICs are used or lower-grade chips that are repackaged and sold as new or higher-
grade chips. This security issue arose as a result of customers desiring ICs at cheaper prices, and 
the ramification is that systems become less reliable. The inferior chips may cause serious problems 
within the system where they are embedded. Typical problems that may arise from counterfeit ICs 
are not meeting timing constraints, or even total chip failure. If implemented in a critical electronic 
system, such as a military and or banking system, the likelihood that system will fail becomes 
greater. 
1.2.4.  Third Party IP Piracy 
 A third party foundry may produce an excessive amount of chips, corresponding to a 
particular IC design, than what was planned. The extra chips are then sold by the foundry over the 
gray market. This is done without the prior permission from the chip designer. 
1.3.  Thesis Contributions 
1.3.1.  Collaborative Dynamic Permutation and Flit Integrity Checking for NoCs 
 A new novel hardware Trojan mitigation method for Networks-on-Chip that works at run-
time was proposed. The proposed method was compared against four other existing methods 
proposed in other IEEE conference and journal papers. The baseline design was considered against 
our design, which was [34, 35], and the other three methods were R-Term [38], NI-Term [36], and 
R-AddrFilter [45].  
 We propose a collaborative dynamic permutation and flit integrity check method to thwart 
an attacker from successfully modifying the flit content, especially the critical flit bits, during the 
flit transmission over the NoC routers. The proposed gate-level method provides multiple 
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permutation configurations in each router, rather than in NIs. Our work complements the existing 
methods [32-35, 39]. As the permutation configuration changes over time, the success rate of a HT 
insertion is significantly reduced even if the attacker knows the countermeasure.  
 To dynamically change the permutation configuration, we propose a PUF-based key vector 
generation method. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are designs that are mathematically the 
same, but differ in practice due to process variations. The proposed PUF structure exploits process 
variations and the random content from the router’s round-robin register to generate a dynamic key 
vector for each flit permutation unit. As the process variations and the traffic conditions in each 
router are unique, key vectors for dynamic permutation units in different routers are different. Thus, 
the attacker is unlikely to trigger all of the HTs in the different routers, simultaneously. 
Consequently, a trojaned packet cannot be successfully transferred to the destination to complete 
the malicious task.  
 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that provides experimental results from 
the simulations of the gate-level NoC implementation. Quantitative throughput, link availability, 
traffic hotspot migration, bandwidth depletion, FPGA-based hardware overhead, and average 
packet latency of five methods are extensively compared. In addition to malicious destination 
addresses, this work further considers the loss of flit type information, which is induced by the 







1.4.  Thesis Organization 
The following chapters of the thesis are organized as described below: 
 Chapter 2 introduces background information on Hardware Security, Hardware Trojans and 
general IC security countermeasures, NoC security and countermeasures, and crypto-attacks and 
fault detection.  
 Chapter 3 introduces the basics of NoCs, as well as the building of the baseline NoC in the 
Verilog Hardware Description Language (HDL).  
 Chapter 4 introduces more on the proposed collaborative HT mitigation method and the 
Verilog coding of it.  
 Chapter 5 introduces the testing schemes used for the proposed collaborative HT mitigation 
method, as well as a comparison of results from the proposed method and the other existing 
solutions. 
 Chapter 6 implements the proposed method from Chapter 4 into an AES module, and it is 
shown whether the design can protect against crypto-attacks with a greater or worse success rate. 
 Chapter 7 discusses the main thesis contribution, the other relevant contributions, and finally 








Chapter 2. Background 
2.1.  Hardware Security 
 Unwanted changes and malicious additions to electronic circuit designs have become results 
of companies looking for cheaper ways to sell their high quality product, mainly due to companies 
looking for the cheapest foundries that will manufacture their product. These inclusions can be 
designed to be undetected and activate at almost random times or based on extremely rare events 
occurring in a particular order. The results of these malicious inclusions can be of a wide range, 
including resource hogging, system malfunctions, system degradation, data deletion, and even 
secret data leakage.  
 The five main stages of the Integrated Circuit (IC) design flow are specifications, design, 
fabrication, test, and package/assembly. Figure 2.1 shows the IC design flow and points out the 
stages that are considered trusted and those that are considered untrusted. The design stage is a 
viable option for insertion of malicious hardware, but this assumes an insider within the company 
designing the system. The fabrication stage is the most likely target to insert malicious hardware as 
the system’s design is already out of the hands of the one who designed it. These problematic 
additions to hardware during the fabrication process have become known as Hardware Trojans. 
Hardware Trojans can be inserted into each of the different abstraction levels of designs. The 
different abstractions include, the system, register transfer, gate, transistor, and physical levels. 
Figure 2.2 shows a basis of what must be done at a particular abstraction level to insert a HT. At 
the system level, an extra system with HTs can be inserted between physical systems that are 
already designed and built. At the system level, HTs can cause information leakage and 
manipulation of data flowing through the extra system. HTs can be inserted into the register transfer 
level by the modification of logic. This can include an extra parameter in a conditional statement. 
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HTs inserted at the gate level require the addition of extra logic gates. An example of a gate-level 
HT can be seen in Figure 2.3, which follows in the next section. Transistor abstraction level HTs 
are achieved by modifying parameters of the switches/transistors. This includes the modification 
(thinning or widening) of the transistors channels, or width/length ratios. HTs at the transistor level 
can cause problems such as an imbalance in current and a change in delay characteristics. Delay 
characteristics in digital circuits are important as setup and hold time constraints can be violated 
easily. The modification of a design’s layout, or physical abstraction, can cause HTs at this 
abstraction level. The modification of wire lengths/widths can cause several problems at the layout, 
including the widening of clock networks to change delay characteristics and 













































Figure 2.2. Insertion of HTs at different abstraction levels. 
 
 Hardware Trojans have become a serious issue in the ICs world today due to the wide usage 
of ICs in banking and military systems. If a banking system was to leak passwords or even fail, it 
is unknown what would happen to the currency supposedly safe to store there, meanwhile if a 
military system were to fail, unthinkable disasters could occur, leaving a level of damage done one 
would think is improbable. 
2.2.  Hardware Trojan Countermeasures 
 A lot of the previous work done on HT detection methods is done at the test-time. Offline 
detection methods presented in [14-16] aim to identify HTs by increasing the probability that the 
trigger circuit activates. The results of the offline tests are compared with a “golden model” to detect 
any abnormalities in the design. Figure 2.3 shows a basic understanding of a HT circuit model. If 
the HT model shown in Figure 2.3 is applied to a crypto-system, the end result may be look 
something like Figure 2.4. The HT payload in Figure 2.4 shows how a simple circuit can bypass a 





Figure 2.3. Basic Hardware Trojan circuit model. 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Hardware Trojan bypassing an example system. 
 
 Side Channel Analysis [17-21] is an effective offline method for the detection of HTs. This 
process works through the examination of side channel signals. Some side channel signals include 
electromagnetic radiation, delay characteristics, and power characteristics. The extracted side 
channel data is then compared to what it should look like via a golden model. As transistor size is 
constantly decreasing, it is becoming easier for side channel signals generated by HTs, such as delay 
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and power consumption, to be masked within the process variations of the system. This means that 
it will be harder to detect HTs during offline testing methods with the analysis of side-channel 
signals. The idea of a golden model is also unrealistic as process variations still exist and HTs can 
easily be masked within the deviation.  
 I/O ports and bit widths are also increasing in embedded systems. This leads to an increased 
testing time for system verification, making complete coverage of the system costly with respect to 
money and time. A typical attack would not include HTs in every IC, but to inject them into a 
random amount of ICs, to further reduce the detection probability. HTs that are difficult to trigger, 
or depend on large amount of combinational logical input conditions to be satisfied, are especially 
hard to detect with logical I/O testing. Automatic Test Pattern Generation (ATPG) [14, 15] is an 
effective method in detecting HTs that trigger with combinational logic conditions. ATPG is 
essentially an I/O test where, given certain input patterns, the output is logically compared to what 
it should look like given the respective input. ATPG becomes less effective when the logical trigger 
condition becomes more complex and depends on an increased amount of nodes.  
 IP core authentication can be performed by various techniques presented in [11, 27-29]. 
Recently, the Semiconductor Research Corporation (SRC) [27] concluded that one of the most 
challenging hardware security areas is the lack of HT detection methods at and before the Register 
Transfer Level (RTL). This requirement also applies to the Network-on-Chip (NoC) community. 
HTs maliciously inserted in a NoC can lead to information leakage, unauthorized memory accesses 
and denial of service (DoS) attacks, e.g. incorrect path routing, deadlock, and livelock [2, 10]. 
 At run-time, the time and economic cost for replacing components is impracticable. Instead, 
run-time solutions can provide a last level of defense for systems to mitigate the effects of HTs. 
Run-time approaches focus more on the effects of the HT payload that delivers the attack, as the 
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trigger circuit has already bypassed offline methods. In this work, HTs that are placed in the design 
netlist are specifically addressed, as advocated by SRC in [27], and a run-time solution with low 
performance overhead is provided for NoCs. 
2.3.  Fault Countermeasures 
 Fault-detection methods are typically used to ensure the integrity of the cryptographic 
process. When fault attacks become a security concern, conventional fault-detection methods are 
first chosen [48]. In the evaluation stage, the existing works [47, 55-57, 60, 62-65] only consider 
the scenario that faults randomly happen in the cipher implementation. As fault attacks are 
intentional, we need to rigorously consider the scenario that the attacker may inject faults that have 
potential to bypass the fault-detection mechanism. For instance, the fault-detection methods shown 
in Fig. 2.4 cannot detect the faults injected in the input, i.e. intermediate state registers. This is 
because both data paths receive the same faulty input, and no difference will be observed at the 
comparison stage. As a result, a faulty ciphertext can bypass the fault detection.  
 Moreover, each method has its own limitation. In the Double Modular Redundancy (DMR) 
method in Fig. 2.5(a), if the fault attack is performed at the same time and location on the two F(∙) 
functions, the DMR detection will fail. This kind of fault attack is feasible, as the two F(∙) copies 
are identical. For a lightweight cipher like SIMON, the reverse function for fault detection in Fig. 
2.5(b) is likely designed with a symmetric architecture. The reverse function may fail if the 
recovered intermediate state i is corrected by a symmetric fault before the comparison for fault 
detection. In the work [55, 56], the intermediate state is permuted before F(∙), as shown in Fig. 
2.5(c). As pointed out in [56], permutation can possibly fail because the permuted input bits may 
share the same logic value. Similar to DMR, the masking scheme shown in Fig. 2.5(d) cannot detect 
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faults injected at the same time and location in the two F(∙) functions. This problem cannot be 
resolved even if the order of masking is extended [13]. 
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Figure 2.5. Typical fault-detection methods. (a) DMR [3], (b) reverse function [11], (c) 
permutation [9, 10], (d) masking. F(∙) represents one round function for the cryptographic 
algorithm. 
   
2.4.  Introduction to the Network-on-Chip 
 As the number of transistors integrated on a single die grows, increasingly IP cores are 
connected with the Network-on-Chip (NoC) infrastructure. A basic understanding of a Network-
on-Chip can be seen in Figure 2.6. NoCs were designed as an effective communications 
infrastructure for many-core systems. IP cores, such as processing and memory elements, need to 
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communicate with each other to execute instructions. Mesh NoCs, like the one seen in Figure 2.6, 
communicate on a packet basis. Each packet is organized into several flow units, or flits. Each flit 
contains a header to let the NoC know if it is the start, middle, or end of a packet. The header content 
of a flit contains other important information such as which IP core it was sent from, or the source 
address, and which IP core the data is being sent to, or the destination address. Each IP core is 
connected to a respective Network Interface (NI). The IP core’s NI is responsible for packetizing 
the data that the IP core is sending, and depacketizing the data being received by the IP core. After 
packetization, the data is sent over the network, where it is moved by a series of routers, one at a 
time, toward its destination. Each NI is connected to one router, and the routers are connected in a 
mesh format. Routers interpret the header content of flits, and this is how they decide from what 
port the router must send the data out of. Each router has five input and five output ports 
corresponding to different port directions. A “local” port direction is assigned to the data being sent 
to and from the respective IP core. The other four port directions are cardinal north, south, east, and 
west. Source and destination addresses are assigned based on the router ID numbers. Each router in 
the network has its own ID number, which corresponds to where in the network it is. The routers’ 





Figure 2.6. Basic understanding of 4x4 mesh-topology NoC. 
 
 Figure 2.6 shows the traditional router ID naming standard. For the 4x4 mesh NoC shown 
in Figure 2.6, there are a total of 16 routers, meaning that with Eq. 2.1, the ID must take up 4 bits. 
Two of the ID bits are assigned to the X direction, and the other two bits are assigned to the Y 
direction. The ID bits are formed for a 4x4 mesh NoC in the format {YY, XX}, which happens to 
agree in binary as to what the router’s number is. The last part of the header content is the flit type.  
 
𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠𝐼𝐷 =  ⌈ log2(# 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠) ⌉   Equation 2.1 
 
 Depending on the size of the data being transmitted, the packet size may vary, which 
translates to more flits per packet. There are four types of flits; empty, payload, header, tail. Flits 
are given two bits to determine their type; 00 for an empty flit, 01 for a header flit, 10 for a tail flit, 
and 11 for a payload flit. Packets are organized by starting with a header flit to denote the start of a 
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packet, then several payload flits depending on the size of the data being sent, and lastly a tail flit 
to denote the packet being transmitted has ended. Figure 2.7 shows a basic understanding of the 
NoC packet format. Figure 2.7 also defines the critical flit fields which are the destination address, 
source address, and the flit type fields.  
 
Figure 2.7. NoC packet format with critical flit fields labeled. 
 
 The path that flits take along the network depends on the routing method used. An example 
of a routing method is XY Routing, where the packet will move from its source X address to its 
destination X address first, then will move from its source Y address to its destination Y address. 
YX Routing is another approach, but moves the packet in the Y direction first, then the X direction. 
For simplification, it is further assumed that simulations are run with the XY Routing approach.  
 Flits received at a router port will be stored in that port’s First-In-First-Out (FIFO) registers. 
Once the data leaves the FIFO, it enters the Full Crossbar, which interprets the header content of 
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the flit and determines flit type and the appropriate destination port from which to send this data 
out. Lastly, the data is stored in the output FIFO of the appropriate port to be sent out.  
2.5.  Countermeasures for On-chip Networks 
 Networks on Chip (NoCs) were introduced to be a solution for the scalability problem that 
Systems on Chip (SoCs) had with communications. Although an effective solution, these new 
communication structures came with their own problems, not least of which is security. Issues such 
as Denial of Service (DoS), illegal read accesses leading to extracted secret keys, and illegal write 
accesses leading to buffer overflow and overwritten data, have been introduced as security problems 
with NoCs. There exist general methods for the protection of Networks on Chip, just as is the same 
for Hardware Trojans, but no method exists to ensure complete security for the system. Some 
general methods for protection include the use of request verification through the use of look up 
tables (LUTs), exchanging secret information through the use of Virtual Channels, and dividing the 
network into secure IP core and non-secure IP core zones to allow only secure information to be 
sent to and from the secure zone, which is considered safe from malicious inclusions. Figure 2.8 
shows two cases where HTs inserted in NoCs can cause hardware attacks. 
 
Figure 2.8. HT payloads affecting NoCs. On the left, a HT inserted in the FIFO will overwrite 





 An architecture called a Data Protection Unit (DPU) is introduced in [34, 35]. The DPU is 
a hardware structure placed in the communication infrastructure of the NoC, particularly next to 
certain Network Interfaces (NIs). When a packet, the structure of data within NoC systems, is sent 
from an IP core, it enters its individual NI and is then transferred to the NI that belongs to the target 
IP core. The DPU will be placed within the NI of either the target or the sending IP core, in which 
it will read a part of the data within the packet and check its table to view the access rights of the 
packet’s operation and either block the transmission or allow it to be sent. This approach also claims 
to offer no latency added as the DPU’s operation is performed in parallel. 
 In [43], multiple design strategies of NoCs are presented to increase security. The division 
of a NoC into secure and non-secure areas increases security by separating crucial IP cores away 
from IP cores that may try to attack it. The first design strategy in strictly to prevent attacks that 
consume the bandwidth of the network. By implementing Virtual Channels, certain packets can be 
can be given a higher priority than other packets, allowing the higher priority packet to be allowed 
to complete its path before the lower priority packet. The non-secure areas of the NoC will generally 
send packets of lower priority and are allowed to enter the secure area, but will allow packets being 
sent in the secure area, which has higher priority, to complete their paths and not consume the secure 
area’s paths.  
 The second design strategy in [43] presents three different methods to separate the secure 
and non-secure areas of the NoC. The first separation method only has non-secure IP cores in the 
non-secure area, and nothing else. A packet that is sent from the non-secure area enters the secure 
area and is forced to go through a NI. The NI will filter packets with irregular target paths, helping 
to counter unauthorized read/write attacks, and gives the packet a path that will limit path 
interruption with other packets, which helps to block DoS attacks like bandwidth consuming. The 
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second method has NIs and routers in the non-secure area to allow non-secure area IP cores to 
communicate with each other. The secure area contains a filter that only allows packets headed for 
the secure IP cores into the secure area. This prevents deadlock and livelock errors by preventing 
non-secure IP core packets headed for other non-secure IP cores from entering the secure area and 
interrupting secure packets. The third method uses path instructions to find incorrect or malicious 
data within packets. When a packet is sent, it is given a path instruction that it must follow in order 
to reach the target IP. Upon arrival at the target IP, the instruction must read “end of path,” or else 
the packet is removed. Every router the packet passes checks the path instructions to ensure that the 
end-of-path instruction exists in order to avoid livelock and deadlock situations, and checks that the 
current instruction is not the end of path instruction. In either of those situations the router will 
remove the packet.  
2.6.  Chapter Summary 
 In this chapter, hardware security, Networks-on-Chip, hardware Trojans, and fault tolerance 
are discussed. Recent NoC security methods from IEEE conferences and journals were also 
presented. Although existing security methods address some attacks that can target NoCs, some 









Chapter 3. Networks-on-Chip 
3.1.  Baseline NoC Design 
3.1.1.  Design  
 To deploy our method, first we had to develop a Network-on-Chip testing environment. The 
testing environment was designed using the Hardware Description Language (HDL) Verilog. In 
Verilog, modules are made to represent hardware or logic. Lower modules can be interconnected 
within a top Module, to represent a larger circuit. A testbench is usually made that calls the top 
module and runs the design through given conditions preset by the user.  
 A 3x3 NoC was first designed given skeleton code provided by Dr. Qiaoyan Yu. The code 
had originally been for a 3x3 torus-topology NoC, but was ultimately modified to become a 4x4 
mesh-topology NoC. Many of the following module names have been slightly altered to fit different 
tests. Therefore, a basic name will be given to each module to help the reader understand which 
module we are currently talking about. A top module where the 9 routers modules are instantiated 
and connected is the main goal. Each router was made within its own module named “five-port 
router.” The five-port router module is an individual router for the network, and is made up of 
several smaller submodules. A basic understanding of the five port router structure can be seen in 
Figure 3.1. The router should have 5 data inputs but it also needs a few other input signals to 
determine integrity, and also determine the status of the network. Write request signals, or wrreq in 
the code, are needed to be logic high when writing data to an input FIFO. CurrentID sets the source 
address for each flit, which helps determine how the packet will be routed by comparing CurrentID 
of the current router with the source address of an incoming packet. The source address of an 
incoming packet will be the CurrentID of the router connected to the NI the data came. Therefore, 
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comparing the source address and CurrentID, the direction in which the data should exit depending 
on the routing algorithm, can be computed easily. AlmostFull_in is another input signal to the five-
port router. This signal allows the current router to see if it can send data to the surrounding routers 
based on knowing if the input FIFO of the router at the next hop is full or not. If this signal was not 
implemented, the network could be flooded and data could be overwritten before being sent out of 
the FIFO. The NoC routers are symmetric. Therefore, to have extra input signals being received at 
one router, this means routers must output more than just the data as well. Extra output signals 
include wrreq_out, which is connected to wrreq of a surrounding router and almost_full, which is 
connected to AlmostFull_in of a surrounding router. Lastly, every router is connected to the 




























Flow of Flit Data Control signals
 
Figure 3.2. Flow of data from beginning to end of one input/output port pair. 
 
 Figure 3.2 shows the path of one flit from an input port of the five-port router to an output 
port of the five-port router. Basic signal flow and design submodules are also shown in Figure 3.2. 
The Verilog code for the hardware modules can also be translated to a schematic using Synopsys 
Design Vision. The design is first analyzed and elaborated by Design Vision, then a schematic of 
the design is displayed. The schematic, which can be found in the appendix section, shows several 
submodules in their basic I/O form for simplification, but examining this, it lets us see an image 
that looks similar to Figure 3.2. The submodules of five-port router include “Info Extraction,” 
“Circular Output FIFO,” “Input FIFO,”  “Round Robin,” “Full Crossbar,” and “Port Admission.” 
 
3.1.2.  Submodules 
3.1.2.1.  Input FIFO 
 This module is the first that the flits enter. The input FIFO consists of 8 “stagereg31.v” 
submodules. Each stagereg31 module acts as 32 D-Flip-Flops (DFFs) in parallel. Therefore, the 
input FIFO has 8 “stages.” In order to write to the FIFO, the write request signal “wrreq” must be 
logic high. The DFFs will store the 32 bit data in parallel until the data is ready to be moved out of 
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the FIFO. Each stage can effectively hold one 32 bit flit of a packet. If the FIFO depth is greater 
than the length of a packet, then the FIFO may hold more than one packet at a given time. The basic 
I/O and internal circuitry of the input FIFO module can be found in the appendix section. 
 
3.1.2.2.  Full Crossbar 
 After a flit leaves from the input FIFOs, it enters the Full Crossbar module. In addition to 
its own functionality, the Full Crossbar module also has two submodules. These two submodules 
are the Info Extraction and Port Admission modules. The submodules are responsible for passing 
signals to the Round Robin module, which is the arbiter that will determine output port priority, and 
for translating the critical flit data. The critical flit data translation will be passed to the Full Crossbar 
to grant an input port a connection to an output port. The submodules’ basic I/O and internal 
circuitry for the Full Crossbar module can be found in the appendix section. 
 
3.1.2.3.  Info Extraction 
 The Info Extraction module looks at vital flit information and determines from which port 
the data should leave. Vital flit information are bits that, if altered, could cause adverse effects. The 
packet’s destination address, source address, and flit type are all vital to the packet. If the destination 
address is changed, the data will be sent to the wrong address. This can especially clog networks, 
as they expect some sort of format in which data are sent, and not abiding by these rules may lead 
to congestion. If the flit type is changed, then the network may be congested while waiting for a 
specific flit type. If a tail flit is lost, the packet’s transmission may become endless [45]. This is 
because another submodule’s signal grants permission for the Full Crossbar to dedicate a single 
input-port/output-port pair to a packet once a header flit is detected. This will cause the input-
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port/output-port connection to be locked, and it cannot be released to allow other packets to use that 
output port. The basic I/O and internal circuitry of this submodule can be found in the appendix 
section. 
 
3.1.2.4.  Port Admission 
 The Port Admission module grants permission for the Full Crossbar to connect an input data 
port to its respective output data port. Port Admission passes router input signals and Info Extraction 
output signals to its submodule Round Robin. The Round Robin module grants priority based on 
direction to the incoming/outgoing flits. The basic I/O and internal circuitry of the module can be 
found in the appendix section. 
 
3.1.2.5.  Round Robin 
 The Round Robin module is the router’s arbiter. This module grants priority to certain ports 
over other ports in race conditions. This module calculates the Port_Ad internal signal, which is 
required for the crossbar to route data. Port_Ad determines the output port to which each input port 
with incoming data gets connected. This will make the Full Crossbar lock the connection between 
the input port and output port until a tail flit is detected. The basic I/O and internal wiring for the 
Round Robin module can be found in the appendix section. 
 
3.1.2.6.  Circular Output FIFO 
 The Circular Output FIFO module is used for the output buffers of the router. This module 
is responsible for reading the tail flit and determining if it should set the wrreq_out bit to. Wrreq_out 
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will act as the input wrreq to an adjacent router. Similar to the input FIFO module, inside the 
Circular FIFO module there are 8 parallel 32 bit shift register stages made using the stagereg31 
element. The difference between the output and input FIFOs is that the output FIFO has a circular 
design element. The circular element of this FIFO is for NACK signals. The basic external I/O 
schematic and the internal schematic of the Circular FIFO module can be found in the appendix. 
3.1.3.  Top Module 
 Once the five-port router module and all of its submodules were verified to work, a top 
module was made to connect the 3x3 Mesh NoC. The top module should consist of 9 five-port 
router submodules. The routers should be connected appropriately to the surrounding routers. A 
basic router node can be seen in Figure 3.3. For simplicity, just the incoming and outgoing data are 
shown in Figure 3.3. The data for each router was named in the fashion shown in Figure 3.3. The 
data’s appropriate name takes the form of “data_{[Router#],[Direction]}.” The router number is 
just the ID number of the router in decimal. The direction bits are given as follows: leaving east = 
0, leaving south = 1, leaving west = 2, leaving north =3, and leaving local = 4. Therefore, for router 





Figure 3.3. Basic I/O ports of a five-port router 
 
 To connect multiple routers, the I/O ports were connected based on Figure 3.4. The west 
port output of router R1 becomes the input of the east port of router R0, and the east port out of 
router R0 becomes the input of the west port of router R1. Data_12 will be a new input into router 
R0, and other input signals such as wrreq will need to be connected in this same way. Other inputs 
and outputs that are vectors of bits are named in a similar fashion as incoming and outgoing data. 
Therefore, input signals such as wrreq and data_in into the east port of router R0 will be named 
wrreq_12 and data_12. Output signals such as wrreq_out and dataout are named this way as well.  





Figure 3.4. Configuring routers together to create the NoC topology. 
 
 





3.2.  FPGA Implementation for 3x3 NoC 
 The 3x3 mesh NoC was synthesized to a Nexys 4 Artix-7 Field Programmable Gate Array 
(FPGA) to report the hardware cost of the design. A picture of the FPGA used for synthesis can be 
seen in Figure 3.6. Table 3.1 shows the FPGA slice/register utilization numbers.  FPGA synthesis 
of designs is important, as it directly shows if the design can be implemented into hardware or not, 
and utilization numbers provide a designer with knowing how a design compares with others. 
Comparison of slice and register utilization will directly lead to the knowledge of area overhead, 
which can also give rise to knowledge of power consumption and possibly delay characteristics.  
 
      
Figure 3.6. FPGA used for logic synthesis and measurement of area overhead. 
 
Table 3.1. FPGA Logic Slice Utilization of 3x3 NoC design. 
 Utilization Available Utilization (%) 
Slice LUTs 11150 63400 17.59 




3.3.  Testing the Baseline NoC 
 Once the 3x3 NoC was finished, both Mentor Graphics ModelSim and Cadence NCVerilog 
were used to compile and elaborate the design. NCSim was used to generate timing diagrams of 
each signal of interest. The testing and functionality of the design was verified using the signal 
waveforms generated during the simulation time. Next, the ability to send packets was tested by 
sending pseudo packets manually through the network and verifying that the packets reached the 
destination. This was done by manually injecting 32 bit flit vectors into the local port of a specific 
router. An initial statement of the testbench was used to inject the flits at certain times using delays. 
Initial statements execute once during a simulation time and are usually used to set initial conditions 
of signals. Initial statements are also not synthesizable. To generate a packet, first a header flit was 
injected, then several payloads, and then lastly a tail flit. Each flit is injected a clock cycle apart, as 
this is the minimum time that can be used to inject a single flit. An “Always" statement in Verilog, 
which activates whenever the value of its statement toggles, was added to the testbench to detect 
the presence of a received flit at the local output port of all routers. Any time the value of a local 
output port register was greater than 0 (any other 32 bit output flit besides all zeros), would trigger 
the “always” statements. The statement then extracted information such as flit type, source address, 
destination address, and how many cycles it took to get to the local port from when it was latched 
into the input FIFO from the source router’s NI. This information was then written to a dedicated 
.txt file for a router receiving the flit. This allowed one to observe if a sent packet was received at 
the target router or not. This would prove especially helpful when inserting hardware Trojans into 
the design later, where we visibly see packets arriving at incorrect destination addresses. Many 
conditions were tested, such as multiple packets arriving at a destination router at the same time to 
test priority, and multiple packets crossing a single router at the same time.  
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 As the end goal of this research was to use a 4x4 mesh NoC, the number of routers was 
increased to 16. The final 4x4 NoC takes the form of the one seen earlier in Figure 2.4. As the 
number of nodes increased, it was found that it would be too difficult to check waveforms manually 
to observe outcomes. A lot of automation was built into the testbench to read and write data to and 
from text files. Text files were eventually used to read traffic trace files to determine input packets. 
Traffic trace files are with respect to the input local port of a router, and were generated using a 
custom built MATLAB script that would randomly pick destination addresses of other routers. A 
second clock was used to perform read operations from the trace files to read a destination address. 
The read destination addresses were of the form in Figure 3.7, where a read of 100 would 
correspond to a destination address of router R0, while a read of 1600 would correspond to a 
destination address of router R15.  
 
 
Figure 3.7. Format for trace file reads. 
 
 Once a destination address was read, a loop would be triggered that would latch the read 
destination address into the header flit of a new packet. The header flit is then sent out and the loop 
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would properly inject a predetermined amount of payload flits, and then finally a tail flit. Each flit 
is injected one clock cycle apart from one another. The clock period of the clock that sends out the 
packets has to be a fraction of the primary clock’s period in order not to cut off packets midway 
through generating them. For N flits in a packet, the clock period relation can be seen in Eq. 3.1. 
     Equation 3.1 
 
 There is an offset of 1 in the denominator that can be attributed to an empty flit (all zeros) 
placed after every tail flit of a packet. This was necessary to reset the write request signal from the 
local input port FIFO between packets to ensure the control signals operated properly. Equation 3.1 
can be rearranged as seen in Eq. 3.2, where lambda is defined as the packet injection rate.  
 
      Equation 3.2 
 
 Different packet injection rates were used to vary the amount of stress on the network due 
to traffic. The packet length N was chosen to be constant at 4 flits to ease the verification processes 
of using the waveforms. In testing, we used 9 different injection rates that varied between 0.0769 
and 0.2 were used.  
 NoC traffic was monitored by recording the number of flits being transmitted over the links 
between the routers. This value once during each clock cycle and the value was written to a .txt file 
with each injection rate having a different file. This was done with a method similar to the one used 
to detect flits at the local output port. At the negative edge of every clock cycle, the testbench would 
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record how many links had values that were greater than 0, denoting there is currently a flit being 
transmitted over those links. This helped define the metric link availability, which is defined as the 
number of links not transmitting data during a clock cycle.  
3.4.  Chapter Summary 
 The basics of on chip networks, coding of the baseline NoC, FPGA synthesis of the NoC, 

















Chapter 4. Proposed Collaborative Dynamic Permutation and Flit Integrity 
Checking 
4.1.  Big Picture of Proposed Method 
 The proposed HT mitigation method aims to detect and mitigate the HT attacks that (1) 
modify the flit type, (2) change the legal destination address to an unauthorized destination, and (3) 
sabotage the integrity of a packet.  

























Figure 4.1. One proposed input and output port pair for hardware Trojan detection and mitigation. 
Solid blocks highlight our innovations over the generic router architecture. 
 
 
 A generic mesh-NoC composed of five-port routers is assumed, as shown in Fig. 3.18. One 
pair of input and output ports (shadowed area in Fig. 3.2) is used as an example to present the 
novelty of the router design developed for this thesis. As highlighted in the solid blocks in Fig. 4.1, 
seven changes were made to the generic router shown. To direct a packet to its original destination, 
the critical flit fields (i.e. source/destination address and flit type bits) cannot be altered. Hence, it 
is proposed to first encode the critical flit fields with a 1-bit Error Control Code (ECC) to address 
the HT-induced flit integrity loss. Next, a Dynamic Bit Permutation technique is applied to the 
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packet buffers so that critical information bits in a packet are ‘randomly’ stored in the buffer from 
the adversary’s point of view. The randomness is achieved by adding a key vector, which is 
dynamically generated by the Local Key Generation Module. As the key vector varies over time, 
the permutation configuration is uncertain at the static analysis time and thus the adversary cannot 
easily place HTs to perform successful attacks at the design time. Symmetrically, the Dynamic Bit 
De-Permutation is applied at the output port. After de-permutation, an ECC decoder (DeECC) 
facilitates the router to detect and correct all 1 bit errors on the critical flit content. The Proposed 
Route Computation unit is designed to interpret multiple versions of the permutated flit content 
into a request to use the correct output port for the next routing hop. To reduce the hardware cost, 
it is proposed to use Partial Bit De-Permutation and DeECC to correctly interpret important 
internal and external signals such as write request and FIFO buffer status signals. 
4.2.  Innovations over the Baseline 
It is proposed to integrate a key-based dynamic permutation mechanism with an error 
control codec to address HTs inserted in the router. The overview of the proposed collaborative 
method is shown in Fig. 4.1. To minimize the hardware cost and maximize the error correction 
strength, only the critical flit bits (i.e. header, tail and destination address bits) are encoded with the 
flit ECC encoder. Together with the non-critical flit bits, the codeword from the ECC encoder is 
permuted before being stored in the input FIFO. The proposed route computation unit processes the 
critical flit bits by partially de-permuting and partially error control decoding before the normal 
route computation. This is because the partial de-permutation and decoder outputs are only used to 
generate a valid output-channel request. If the loss of flit integrity is detected, the flit, if correctable, 




The flit permutation technique obfuscates the flit content to a certain degree, so that the 
attacker cannot easily implement a HT to modify the flit content. In addition, the permuting 
mechanism may distance the positions of the target bits of a DoS attack; as a result, not all critical 
flit bits are modified by the HT. The distributed error bits can allow the use of a simple error 
correction code to reconstruct the critical flit bits and prevent the depletion of bandwidth 
accordingly. The error detection and correction capability available in our router provides a second 
line of defense to thwart HTs if the attacker successfully bypasses the dynamic permutation.  
As shown in Fig. 4.1, the local key applied to the flit permutation (FP), flit de-permutation 
(FDP) and partial flit de-permutation (PFDP) is the same. To further reduce the overhead induced 
by the key utilization, one can share one key with five pairs of input and output ports per each 
router. The proposed method can be extended to dynamically change the permutation configuration 
once an error is detected in the critical flit field bits.  
4.2.1.  Permutation 
 It is proposed to permute the flit bit positions before storing the flit to the input buffer, and 
de-permute the flit after the output buffer. The principle of this permutation is as expressed in Eq. 
4.1.  
 
 ),,(),,,(),,( jitkeyjitflitjitflit dpdp         Equation 4.1 
 
 The variables i and j in Eqs. 4.1 and 4.2 are the router ID and the input port ID, respectively. 
Variables flit(t) and flitdp(t) are the original flit and the flit after dynamic permutation at the time t, 
respectively. The function Φdp[] stands for our proposed dynamic permutation algorithm, which is 
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a function of the incoming flit(t) and the key vector generated at run-time. Like other data 
permutation methods, the permutation algorithm itself is a linear mapping process. Figures 4.2 and 
4.3 show two example cases of permuted bits given different key vectors.  
 To add a non-linear property to the permutation, we configure the permutation mapping 
with an unfixed key vector, Key(i, j, t). The key vector is the output of a PUF-based structure and 
varies with process variations and the dynamic challenge vector X, as expressed in Eq. 4.2. The 
challenge vector X(t, i, j) depends on the routing history in each router’s output port. More about 
the PUF-based controller follows in section 4.2.2. 
  jitXVariationrocessPfjitKey ,,,),,(         Equation 4.2 
 



























Figure 4.2. One example of using a multiplexer network to permute bits, which is decided by a 



































Figure 4.3. Another example of permuted bits given a different key vector. 
 
4.2.2.  PUF-based Local Key Generation 
 The key bits determine which permutation algorithm for the flit permuting and de-permuting 
modules to use at the current time. To prevent the attacker from attacking the permutation 
mechanisms, we proposed to dynamically change the key for the permutation algorithm at run-time. 
The key is generated locally in each router. As shown in Fig. 4.1, each pair of input and output ports 
needs to have one proposed local key management module. No central key management is needed. 
This further hardens our method against the adversary as the local router keys will differ at run-
time. As the flit permutation configuration in each router is different, cracking one router would not 
guarantee the malicious packet to have full network access to successfully reach its destination.  
 We exploit the PUF-like structure [41, 42] and the traffic-pattern-dependent content saved 
in the round-robin register to generate a random key vector. As shown in Fig. 4.4, the PUF-like 
network is made up of multiplexers that propagate a flit bit along a path determined by the 
multiplexer challenge vector. Due to process variations, the propagation delays between multiplexer 
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inputs are slightly different. Thus, each multiplexer will have two different inputs. The challenge 
vector controls which multiplexer inputs propagate to their respective outputs. The output of the 
multiplexer is latched by the key registers at the key clock edge (KeyCLK in Fig. 4.4). The period 
of the user-defined key clock pulse should be longer than the time needed for all packets left in the 
input and output buffers to move to the next hop. If eight permutation algorithms are sufficient to 
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Figure 4.5. Challenge vector generation circuit. 
 
 Besides the process variation, the proposed method further dynamically changes the 
challenge vector using the internal value of the Round-Robin Registers (RRReg) in each router. As 
the RRReg value is set based on the output port requests from the real-time packet traffic, different 
routers will have unique RRReg values at a given time. Moreover, the RRReg value varies with 
different traffic traces extracted from the NoC application. It is proposed to exploit the time 
differential concept to design the RRReg-based challenge vector generator. Equations 4.3-4.5 
express how the RRReg content at different clock cycles is used to generate the challenge vector 
X, where RRReg0[n] is the value of the 0th RRReg bit at clock cycle n, and RRReg0[n-2] is the 0
th 
RRReg bit stored at clock cycle (n-2). D Flip-Flops were used to create shift registers that store the 
RRReg history, as shown in Fig. 4.5. In addition, the key depends on the incoming flit, thus it cannot 
be predicted at the design time. This unpredictability further increases the difficulty to execute a 




























 nRRRegnRRRegnX      Equation 4.5 
 
4.2.2.1.  Dynamic Key Update 
 The time relation of the key vector generation and internal router signals is shown in Fig. 
4.6. When it is time to change the key, we wait until a tail flit arrives, signifying that a full packet 
has been received. As shown in Fig. 4.6, upon arrival of the tail flit (1), the input buffer controller 
forces the input buffer full signal to be high, in order to stop more flits from entering the input 
buffers. Once the input buffer full signal is forced to high, transition (2) happens, and the key 
generation network is turned on and allows an incoming flit bit to enter the key generation unit. As 
soon as all of the router’s output buffers are emptied, transition (3) occurs. Transition (3) leads to a 
clock pulse for the key generation unit that is generated to latch the random key vector at the current 
time (4). The negative edge of the clock pulse leads to transitions (5) and (6), which turn off the 























Figure 4.6. Example timing diagram of how dynamic key updates itself. 
 
4.3.  Proposed NoC Design 
 The proposed method mainly differs from the baseline design in the five-port router module. 
A system block diagram for the proposed five-port router module can be seen in Figure 4.7. The 
flit encoding, flit decoding, flit bit permutation, flit bit de-permutation, local key generation, and a 
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Figure 4.7. Block level schematic of the proposed five-port router, with flit flow. 
 
4.3.1.   Proposed Submodules 
 The addition of several submodules was needed in order to represent the hardware additions 
made over the baseline design. The five-port router submodules for the proposed method include, 
“Permutation,” “De-Permutation,” “Partial Flit De-Permutation,” “Hamming(15, 11) Encoder,” 
“Hamming(15, 11) Decoder.” Many of the baseline submodules had to be edited as well, as an Error 
Correction Code (ECC) is part of our proposed method, and the 4 ECC parity bits increase the bit 
width from 32 to 36. As the ECC is on both ends of the router, all bit widths inside the router are 
36 bits, and the bit widths over the external links remain at 32 bits.  
4.3.1.1.  Hamming(15, 11) Encoder 
 This module is responsible for applying the ECC to the incoming data. The ECC used was 
a Hamming (15, 11) code, which can correct all one bit errors.  
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 When data is transmitted, the zone where the data is transmitted, between the transmitter 
and receiver, is called the channel. Channels differ and can be modeled in several ways, but usually 
the point of modeling a channel is to express the rate of error to which the transmitted data is 
exposed.  A simple data communications scheme can be seen in Figure 4.8, where the message u is 
sent over the channel, and the message ?̂? is received on the other side. A hat is used over the received 
message to denote that there may be a change with respect to the input u.  
Channel
 
Figure 4.8. Basic understanding of data communications over a channel. 
 
 With an original message without coding applied, upon arrival at the receiver there is no 
way to tell if that received message is actually what was sent. In channel coding, the goal is to detect 
and correct errors in the received message to increase the integrity of the data. This is done by 
concatenating additional bits into the message to create a codeword. The additional bits are formed 
from the parity subsets of the message bits. For a Hamming (n,k) code, where k is the message 
length, and n is the codeword length, the amount of parity bits m that are concatenated is equal to n 





Figure 4.9. Codeword length (n) vs. Message length. 
 
 For a Hamming code with m parity bits, the message length and codeword length can be 
found in the equalities seen in Eqs. 4.6 and 4.7: 
          Equation 4.6 
         Equation 4.7 
 The addition of redundancy to the message lowers the effective rate of the code, as seen in 
Eq. 4.8.  
        Equation 4.8 
 
 The m parity bits of a codeword are calculated using the generator matrix of the particular 
code. The generator matrix G, is a k x n matrix that encodes any message u into a codeword v. Eq. 
4.9 expresses that any message u multiplied with the generator matrix G, will result in a 
corresponding codeword v.  




 The generator matrix consists of two submatrices, a k x k identity matrix and a k x (n – k) 
submatrix formed by the code’s parity check equations. This deduces that there are m parity check 
equations. The first submatrix places the original message into the codeword, and the second 
submatrix is responsible for tagging on the redundancy bits to the codeword. Eq. 4.10 shows the 
systematic form of a generator matrix. 
 
           Equation 4.10 
 
 
 Given a Hamming(15, 11) code, where codeword length is 15, and message length of 11, 
we therefore have 15-11 = 4 bits of redundancy. With m = 4, we have four parity check equations, 
which, for a Hamming(15, 11) code, are expressed in Eqs. 4.11-4.14 below: 
     Equation 4.11 
     Equation 4.12 
     Equation 4.13 
     Equation 4.14 
 
 Finally, the generator matrix for a Hamming(15, 11) code can be seen below in Eq. 4.15. 
To implement the encoder in hardware, only XOR gates are needed because they act perfectly as a 
bitwise modulo-2 addition operation. An equivalent circuit that generates one of the redundancy 




    Equation 4.15 
  
 




 A length of 11 un-coded bits was chosen, as we care mostly about the 10 bits in the critical 
flit field of each header flit. For our 4x4 implementation, the critical flit field bits consist of the 4 
bit destination address, 4 bit source address, and 2 bit flit type. The flit structure for header, payload, 
and tail flits can be seen in Figure 4.11. The LSBs in this case are the critical field flit bits, 
meanwhile in real applications the MSBs correspond to the critical field flit bits.  
 
 
Figure 4.11. New 36 bit Flit Structures. 
 
4.3.1.2.  Hamming(15, 11) Decoder 
 This module removes the ECC redundancy bits that were concatenated into the flit, and also 
corrects one bit errors in the information bits. To correct errors, the module uses correction circuits 
based off of each error vector’s syndrome. As any codeword can be made up by linearly adding 
other codewords, for a given error vector the set of all of the possible received codewords is made 
up of the Galois Field 2 (GF(2)) addition (also known as modulo-2 addition) of the error vector 
with the set of all of the possible generated codewords. Due to this linearity, all received codewords 
with a given error vector will exhibit the same syndrome. This means that each output bit has a 
dedicated correction circuit that will always flip and correct the corresponding output bit when the 
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specific syndrome is present that corresponds to an error on that bit. This decoding method is next 
examined in detail. 
 From the generator matrix seen in Eq. 4.10, one can obtain another matrix which is defined 
as the parity check matrix. The parity check matrix definition can be seen in Eq. 4.16: 
          Equation 4.16 
           Equation 4.17 
           Equation 4.18 
           Equation 4.19 
        Equation 4.20 
 
 The expressions seen in Eqs. 4.17-4.20 are also true for Hamming codes. The variables r, v, 
e, and s, in Eqs. 4.18-4.20, correspond to the following: v is a valid codeword generated by Eq. 4.9, 
e is an error vector, r is the received codeword which is a modulo-2 sum of a valid codeword and 
an error vector, and finally s is the syndrome. The H matrix used in this work can be seen in Eq. 
4.21. As Hamming codes are both perfect and linear, rather than equating v to a specific codeword 
and e to a specific error vector, one can instead generalize both of these variables to a set of all 
possible codewords and error vectors respectively. Another interesting property of linear codes is 
that by combining two valid codewords, one can create another valid codeword, and this is how a 
set of all possible codewords can be made. This linearity means that in Eq. 4.20, all valid codewords 
will give the same syndrome, and all received codewords that incur a specific error vector will 
generate the same syndrome. Generalizing, all one bit errors on the same bit position will trigger 
the same syndrome, and detection of this syndrome can lead to the detection of an error on that 
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position, and then the bit error can be corrected. To correct a bit error on a given position, the 
corresponding syndrome can be used to create an error-correcting circuit for that one bit position. 
An example error-correcting circuit for a Hamming(15, 11) code is shown in Figure 4.12.  
Data[2]* Data[2]
 [1      1      0      0 ] = Syndrome[3:0]
 
Figure 4.12. Example of error correction circuit. The AND gate will only have an output of one 
when the corresponding syndrome is met. When that syndrome is met, the output of 1 from the 
AND gate, will flip the respective bit using with the XOR gate. 
 
  Equation 4.21 
 
4.3.1.3.  Permutation 
 The Permutation module is responsible for permuting the input data. For the method 
presented here, 8 different permutation configurations were used as this provided “good enough” 
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flit bit obfuscation. The permutation method works as explained in section 4.2.1. The permutation 
module was originally designed for 32 bits, but was extended to 36 due to the ECC parity bits. 
4.3.1.4.  De-Permutation 
 The De-Permutation module is responsible for de-permuting the output data, prior to 
decoding. For the method proposed here, 8 different permutation configurations are used and 
therefore 8 de-permutation configurations were needed. The de-permutation module works as the 
dual of the permutation module, and acts to permute the data back to its original position before 
permutation. 
4.3.1.5.  Partial Flit De-Permutation (PFDP) 
 The Partial Flit De-Permutation module is a submodule within in the Circular FIFO and 
Info Extraction modules. This module provides permutation for an output of shorter length than the 
length of the input. The number of MUXes needed is equal to the amount of outputs. Still, the 36 
bit (extended because of parity) flit data is needed as an input to the module due to the flit content 
being able to be permuted to any other position in the flit.  
4.3.1.6.  PUF 
 The PUF module is responsible for dynamically updating the key vector that controls the 
permuting modules. The PUF network accepts a bitstream, and that bitstream propagates along 
MUXes with different delays on the lines. The MUX lines are controlled by the challenge bits 
generated by the hardware seen in Figure 4.5.  
4.4. Chapter Summary 
 In this chapter, the main design of the thesis was presented. Submodules that build upon the 
baseline NoC to create the proposed method were also introduced. In the next chapter, the proposed 
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method presented here will be tested and compared to existing NoC security methods. Several 





















Chapter 5. Testing of Multiple NoC Methods 
5.1.  Attack Model and Experimental Setup 
The primary focus of this thesis work is at the router level, therefore the techniques proposed 
here address the hardware Trojans that perform Denial of Service (DoS) type attacks in NoC routers. 
The consequence of DoS attacks includes bandwidth depletion, incorrect path routing, deadlock 
and livelock [7]. More specifically, hardware Trojans in routers can maliciously change the 
source/destination address or flit type information of a packet that has left the transmitter NI. If a 
Trojan payload modifies the destination address of a packet, that packet could be directed to an 
unauthorized IP core. A drop of the header flit or tail flit will result in the incomplete packet being 
retained in the router until some operation arrives to reset the router. In the rest of this section, all 
methods above suffering those HTs which are injected between the Input FIFO and the route 
computation module, are evaluated. Three HT types—destination address (i.e. DEST HT), header 
bits (i.e. HEAD HT), and tail bits (i.e. TAIL HT) — were considered in the experiments presented 
in this section. The HT injection spots were on routers center routers R5 and R9, and corner router 
R0. HTs were injected into the middle routers as the incurred effects should be more detrimental 
for routers with more traffic passing through. A corner router was chosen as another injection spot 
to view the effects of a HT inside a router with fewer I/O ports. 
The proposed method was compared with existing methods [34, 36, 38, 43]. The work in 
[34] presents a data protection unit (DPU) in detail to address the potential hardware Trojans 
attacking the NoC NI. Saponara et al [44] follow a similar idea to detect if the memory access is 
out of the secure memory range in the NI. It is assumed that address filtering should always be done 
at the network interface. Hereafter, DPU is referred to as Baseline in the rest of this work. In [36], 
a counter-based traffic adjustment NI is presented to address the packet loss and thus bandwidth 
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depletion due to hardware Trojans. Here to this method is refrred to as NI-Term. When a packet 
without a tail flit is left in the NoC network, that packet cannot move forward and will block future 
packets entering the network, thus resulting in the network bandwidth depletion. Timeout 
mechanisms [45, 46] are typically utilized to resolve the bandwidth depletion induced by deadlock 
or link faults. Similarly, the work [38] uses a counter to terminate the current packet transmission 
if malicious behavior is detected. In this thesis he timeout mechanism is applied to the router by 
manually inserting a tail flit after a pre-determined time in order to terminate the transmission of 
the current packet. This method is referred to as R-Term. The data protection unit [34] and the 
wrapper method in [36] are not designed for router level hardware Trojan detection. The work [45] 
proposes to investigate the feasibility of applying address filters to NoC routers. Despite minor 
differences, the key principle for the DPU and Wrapper methods is to check whether the pair of 
source and destination addresses carried in the header flit matches to the table of legal source-
destination pairs. If the address pair is not legal, that packet is filtered out by the router. Hereafter, 
this method is referred to as R-AddrFilter. 
5.2.  Generation of Test Scripts, Traffic Patterns, and the other NoC Designs 
 A lot of time and effort was put into recreating the NoC designs to which the proposed 
methods of this thesis are compared with. The baseline design presented in Chapter 3 was used as 
the DPU design. This is fair in the sense that this design’s protection method lies in the NI and 
anything that happens over the NoC fabric will not be observed until the receiver NI. Therefore, all 
of the designs, including those proposed here, use the DPU method in the NI. Again, this is fair 
because it is NI-level protection, and does not directly affect NoC-level protection, as will be shown 
in section 5.3. The NI-Term, R-Term, and R-AddrFilter methods were all built on top of the baseline 
method to create separate testbenches.  
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 As packet injection rate, the type of HT, and the number of HTs injected into the system, 
there were many tests involved. This is because each of the possible cases should be tested for each 
design. A total of 108 simulations of each design were generated, as this equates to 3x4x9, which 
represent HT cases (DEST, HEAD, TAIL), injected HT numbers (0-3), and the 9 packet injection 
rates used. As there are a total of 5 different designs, a minimum of 540 simulations were needed 
to generate the data presented in 5.3. Each simulation could take several minutes to do, and 
parameters in the code would have to be changed manually, so it was unrealistic to manually record 
the data of all 108 cases. Therefore, a bash script was developed to test multiple Verilog designs 
using a bash script. The bash script is also able to compile modules and change internal parameters, 
which would prove helpful. The use of Define functions in Verilog enabled the scripts to change 
internal parameters of the module with external commands. Each script contains 108 sections, with 
each section having many lines and a small change compared to the others. Python was used to 
generate the testing scripts for each design, as this would prove more efficient than manually writing 
the thousand plus lines in each script. 
 To be consistent with the other methods, the new NoC designs were tested in the same way 
as the reference designs. It was decided to split the NoC into two zones as the other methods do; 
secure and non-secure zones. A basic understanding of the two zones can be seen in Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1 also shows the injection sites of the HTs. These two zones are based on the integrity of 
the IP cores to which the routers are connected. There is no functional difference between any of 
the routers in either the secure or non-secure zones. A new traffic trace had to be generated to allow 
only the secure zones to send packets to each other and vice versa for the non-secure zones. 
MATLAB’s random number generator (RNG) was used to generate all of the traffic traces needed 
for both debugging and testing the designs. This would allow for a proper, yet random, distribution 
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of the destination routers of each traffic trace file. For instance, router R0 has the same probability 
to send a packet to router R1, R4, R5, R10, R11, R14, or R15. 
 
Figure 5.1. NoC split into secure and non-secure zones for testing. 
 
5.3.  Results 
5.3.1.  Throughput 
The throughput of different methods was compared by examining the total number of valid 
packets received by the NoC NIs in the given simulation time. A valid packet was considered as 
one that eventually reaches its original destination address rather than a modified destination. By 
comparing the performance shown in Figs. 5.2 (a), (b), and (c) one can see that the proposed method 
receives the same amount of valid packets for the same traffic injection rate, regardless of how 
many HTs are inserted. In contrast, other methods drop significantly in the number of received valid 
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packets as more HTs are inserted. The traffic injection rate, λ, was 0.2 packets per cycle per node. 
For the single DEST HT scenario, the proposed method improves the number of received packets 
by up to 6.4%, 70.1%, 14.3%, and 11.5% over the baseline, NI-Term, R-Term, and R-AddrFilter, 
respectively. For the three DEST HTs scenarios, the proposed method achieves even better 
throughput performance than other methods. The proposed approach can successfully receive 
43.1% more packets than R-AddrFilter. The proposed method is better than the other methods for 
the DEST HT scenario because it is able detect and correct a 1 bit change to the destination address.  
 In Fig. 5.3 the impact of HEAD HTs on the number of received packets is shown. Again, 
our method outperforms other approaches. This is because when a header flit is dropped, the other 
methods cannot recover that flit, and the packet is lost. The throughput of the proposed method 
remains unchanged with the introduction of HTs. The other methods, however, receive 43.3% fewer 
packets in the three HEAD HTs case than the zero HEAD HT case. In addition, the throughput of 
the R-Term, R-AddrFilter and baseline methods will remain equal, as no protection is provided by 
those methods against HEAD HTs. This is different than the throughput performance shown in Fig. 
5.2. 
 When the TAIL HT causes tail flit losses, a more radical change in the number of received 
packets is observed than in the prior HT cases. As shown in Fig. 5.4, the proposed method 
outperforms the other methods by receiving more valid packets when TAIL HTs are introduced. 
The proposed method achieves the same throughput in the TAIL HT cases as in the HEAD HT 
cases. The impact of the different HT types on the throughput of the other methods is more 
significant. For instance, as shown in Fig. 5.4(b), the R-AddrFilter method receives 94% fewer 
packets than the proposed method. This performance drop is more than what was observed in the 
HEAD HT case. The performance drop is more detrimental because the absence of tail flits will not 
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allow all routing paths to release, resulting in the network bandwidth depleting rapidly. The R-Term 
method is designed to handle TAIL HTs after a pre-defined waiting period. As the number of 
inserted HTs increases, multiple routers waiting for the timeout to insert tail flits will block new 
packets from being injected to the network, thus resulting in a significant decrease in the number of 
received packets. 
 Compared to the baseline method, the proposed method improves the throughput by 6.4% 
(for 1 DEST HT case) and 43.12% (for 3 DEST HT case) at the greatest injection rate. When the 
HT controls the header flit bits of the NoC packet, the proposed method provided 11.6% and 
43.67% increases in throughput over the baseline method for 1 HEAD HT and 3 HEAD HTs, 
respectively. If the HT compromises the tail bits of the NoC packet, the proposed method achieves 
up to a 98.8% improvement in throughput for the 3 TAIL HTs scenario over the baseline method. 
 





Figure 5.3. Number of valid packets received. (a) No HT, (b) 1 HEAD HT, and (c) 3 HEAD HTs. 
 
 




5.3.2.  Link Availability 
Variation in the number of received packets shown in Figs. 5.2-5.4 demonstrates, from a 
throughput perspective, how different methods are intended to mitigate bandwidth depletion if a 
HT is present. In this section the effectiveness of each HT mitigation method from a link availability 
point of view is examined. The link switching activity of each NoC link is recorded throughout the 
simulation, and the total number of idle links at each clock cycle is accumulated. Given a traffic 
trace, a smaller number of idle links indicates a more severe level of bandwidth depletion.  
In equation 5.1, the network bandwidth availability as the ratio of the number of cycles that 




tyAvailabili        Equation 5.1 
     
The subplot (a) depicted in each of Figs. 5.5-5.7 shows the link availability of the baseline 
NoC without a HT insertion. Figure 5.5 shows the bandwidth availability of the NoC given a 
specific HT mitigation method against three DEST type HTs injected into the NoC router. If the 
histogram plot displays a peak towards more idle links for a higher availability, then the 
corresponding HT mitigation method successfully manages the presence of HTs. In contrast, if the 
peak is shifted more toward a smaller amount of idle links, then the method may be suffering more 
from the depleted link bandwidth. As shown in Fig. 5.5, the R-AddrFilter and NI-Term methods 
exhibit less link availability than the baseline, R-Term, and proposed methods if the DEST HTs 
appear in the routers. The proposed method achieves a 19.1% and 22.5% higher average link 
availability than the R-AddrFilter and NI-Term methods, respectively. 
The impact of three HEAD HTs on the link availability achieved by different methods is 
next examined. Comparing Figures 5.5 and 5.6, one can see that only the proposed method obtains 
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the same link availability with that of the baseline without any HTs. This is because the proposed 
method detects the HEAD HT and reconstructs the packet header flit in the same clock cycle, while 
the other methods lack protection against HEAD HTs. With three HEAD HTs injected in the NoC 
routers, the average number of idle links for the baseline, R-Term, and R-AddrFilter methods is 
reduced by 10% over the baseline NoC with the 0 HT case. The NI-Term method suffers from a 
29.8% decrease in the average number of available links over the 0 HT case. The decreases in the 
link availability of the other methods are a result of the extra payload and tail flits propagating into 
the router FIFOs, hindering the network performance as those flits will waste the FIFO buffer space. 
If three TAIL HTs are injected to the NoC routers, the proposed method is the only one that 
follows the trend of the baseline without HTs case, as shown in Fig. 5.7. Due to the HT payload 
effects, the other methods show signs of bandwidth depletion as certain links have data stuck on 
them for extended periods of time. The proposed method improves the average link availability by 





Figure 5.5. Link availability comparison among methods that suffer from DEST HTs. 






Figure 5.7. Link availability comparison among methods that among methods that suffer from 
TAIL HTs. 
 
5.3.3.  Traffic Hotspot/Coldspot Migration and Bandwidth Depletion 
The arrival activity of new flits at each output port of the routers was monitored to estimate 
the switching activity (thus power consumption) of each router throughout the entire simulation. 
The total number of different flits transferred through each router is accumulated and then plotted 
in a node-type plot, as shown in Figs. 5.8-5.10. Each square in the figure represents the switching 
activities of one router with the corresponding coordinates in the physical NoC implementation. 
The color of each square indicates the intensity of the number of output port switching operations 
occurring over the entire simulation period. Figures 5.8-5.10 show the impact of two DEST HTs, 
two HEAD HTs, and two TAIL HTs on the router switching activities, respectively. The tile plots 
of each method were compared to the baseline NoC without HTs in the network, which is subplot 
(a) in each figure.  
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Compared to the tile plots in Fig. 5.8, the proposed method exhibits the closest activity 
compared to the baseline with 0 HTs. The proposed method has more intense switching on two 
routers over the baseline due to a measurement error, which whenever correction occurred it 
counted as two switching operations instead of one. Less switching of the routers in the other 
methods is either because the contaminated packets are filtered out by the HT mitigation method 
(e.g. R-AddrFilter), or because the packets are transmitted based on a counter (e.g. NI-Term). The 
baseline NoC with 2 DEST HTs differs from the 0 HT case at a few routers due to data being routed 
to the wrong local port. Another example is router R1 (X=2 and Y=1) in the baseline NoC, which 
exhibits more switching activity with 2 HTs than with 0 HTs. This is because R1’s neighbor routers 
R0 (X=1 and Y=1) and R5 (X=2 and Y=2) are the HT injection sites. Traffic mitigation due to the 
DEST HTs can also be seen on router R4 (X=1, Y=2).  
The tile plots for the HEAD HT case are shown in Fig. 5.9. As all of the methods, excluding 
the proposed method, cannot prevent the effects of the HEAD HTs, those methods will have less 
link usage at the affected routers. This is an indication that the R-Term, Baseline, R-AddrFilter, and 
NI-Term methods receive fewer packets than the baseline NoC without the HT case, which is 
confirmed by the results in Fig. 5.3. Note that the NI-Term method receives the least number of 
packets as the total traffic for the simulation is less than that of the other methods due to the counter-
based traffic adjustment.  
Figure 5.10 shows the tile plots for the traffic condition of the NoC with different HT 
mitigation against two TAIL HTs. Only the R-Term and proposed methods can mitigate TAIL HTs, 
and therefore the other methods will suffer from bandwidth depletion. The proposed method 
corrects the tail flit if a HT is detected. On the contrary, the R-Term method depends on a counter 
to release the suspended packet transmission. The counter-based waiting process eventually makes 
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the network halt. This is why the overall switching activity for the R-Term method is low for this 
case, even though this method provides some protection against TAIL attacks.  
 
 




Figure 5.9. Traffic hotspot migration and bandwidth depletion induced by HEAD HTs. 
 




5.3.4.  Effective Average Packet Latency 
The packet latency is the time interval from the moment when the packet is completely 
injected into the network to the time when the tail flit of that packet arrives in the packet destination. 
Figure 5.11 shows the average packet latency of the proposed method, which does not increase with 
an increasing number of DEST HTs. When the traffic injection rate increases, the average latency 
variation is within only 2.2%.  
 As some HTs in the other methods can make designs have erratic latency results (for 
instance, infinite latency), the average latency would become meaningless. Therefore, an effective 
average latency metric is used to compare the latency performance among different methods. As 
expressed in Eq. 5.2, the effective average latency (i.e. Avg. LatencyEffective) is the product of the real 
average latency for all valid packets and the ratio of the valid packets received by the baseline 









*..        Equation 5.2 
  
 Using this effective latency, we are able to consider the impact of HTs on latency fairly, 
given that some methods will never receive the packets affected by HTs. As shown in Fig. 5.12, the 
proposed method improves the effective average latency by up to 63.4%, 68.2%, and 98.9% over 





Figure 5.11. Average packet latency for a wide range of traffic injection rate and different number 
of HTs. 
 
Figure 5.12. Effective average packet latency. 
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5.4.  Probability of HT Attack Success (PAS) 
5.4.1.  PAS for the Case of Countermeasure Unknown 
 The probability of attack success (PAS) was used as a metric to evaluate the obfuscation 
efficiency of the proposed bit permuting mechanism. PAS is defined as the ratio of the number of 
cases that the hardware Trojan successfully selects the bits belonging to the flit field of interest over 
the total number of test cases. If the attackers do not have sufficient knowledge of the specific 
permutation configuration, they will simply overwrite the interested field at the position that they 
blindly guessed.  
 Figure 5.13 shows the PAS achieved by the proposed permutation method against tail bit 
attacks for NoCs with flit sizes of 32-bits, 64-bits and 128-bits. Without the permutation, it is 
assumed that the hardware Trojan can always successfully control the tail bit, i.e. PAS will be 1. 
Since the permutation configuration is dynamically chosen by the key vector, in the proposed 
method PAS is less than 1, as shown in Fig. 5.13. The impact of the flit width on the PAS for the tail 
bit attack. Simulation results show that the average PAS of the proposed method are 0.0206, 0.0104, 
and 0.0053 for 32-bit flits, 64-bit flits, and 128-bit flits, respectively.  
 Figure 5.14 shows the probability of partially or completely identifying and replacing the 
exact flit-field positions with intended malicious content. The flit field of interest has a binary vector 
that may have overlapped bits with the malicious intention bits. Even if the adversary does not 
correctly guess all of the target bits, they still may change the target field to a different malicious 
vector. As shown in Fig. 5.14, the attacker can successfully perform an attack by changing one of 
the destination address bits with a probability of 82.2%. The successful change of 3 destination 
address bits occurs with probability of 1.37%, which is over one order of magnitude lower than the 
1-bit cases. The probability for 6-bit changes on the destination address is zero among one million 
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test cases. Figure 5.14 indicates that the proposed error control code can obtain a PAS below 10
-6 
even if a 5-bit malicious vector is injected by the attacker.  
5.4.2.  PAS for When the Adversary Knows the Countermeasure  
 The goal of the HT countermeasures in [36, 38, 39] and the proposed approaches is to 
minimize the HT attack success rate (PAS). A lower PAS means a more secure design. Previous work 
[36, 38, 39] assumes that the attacker does not have the knowledge of the HT countermeasure 
mechanisms used in the design. Unfortunately, this assumption is not always valid if the attacker 
has access to the design details. The methods in [36, 38, 39] yield a PAS of 1 when the applied HT 
countermeasure is known to the adversary. This is because the adversary may be able to change the 
restricted memory range and mute the counter for HT detection. In contrast, the proposed method 
assumes that the adversary may know the bit permuting mechanism in the design, but they do not 
know the exact key vector. This is because the key vector is uniquely generated at each router at 
run-time. As shown in Fig. 5.15, PAS significantly decreases with the increasing number of 
permutation configurations used. The nonlinear trend line is predicted by a power function 
y=0.4887x-1.402. As predicted, if the number of permutation configurations available in the router 
is equal to 16, the proposed method achieves a PAS 1.04*10-2 in the case that the countermeasure 
is known to the adversary. The proposed method PAS is two orders of magnitude less than that of 





Figure 5.13. Success rate PAS of tail bit attacks for different number of permutation 
configurations available in a router. 
 
 
Figure 5.14. Statistical pie chart for the number of valid bits that an adversary modifies on 
















Figure 5.15. Probability of attack success PAS of the proposed method if the adversary knows the 
permutation configurations applied in the router. 
 
5.5. Randomness of Challenge Bits 
The randomness of the dynamic permutation configuration is achieved by the following two 
factors: (1) the PUF structure implemented in each router produces different select bits due to 
process variations, and (2) the challenge bits from the round-robin table depend on the real-time 
traffic injection rate and traffic pattern. As a result, the selection of the dynamic permutation 
configuration is unknown at the design time. In each NoC router, eight configurations of dynamic 
bit permutation were implemented. Figure 5.16 shows the occurrences of different PUF challenge 
vectors over 21,000 clock cycles. As can be seen, each router demonstrates a unique characteristic 
of the occurrence frequency for the permutation configurations. Figure 5.16 clearly indicates that 
the round-robin table based dynamic permutation can make the permutation configuration 



































Figure 5.16. Occurrence numbers of PUF challenge vectors for different NoC routers. The X-axis 
is the decimal number of each dynamic permutation configuration ID. The Y-axis is the number 
of occurrence times of that challenge vector in the total simulation period. 
 
The traffic traces for Figure 5.17 were the secure and non-secure zone cases shown in Fig. 
5.1, with a traffic injection rate of 0.143 packets per cycle per node. The impact of different traffic 
injection rates and traffic traces on the occurrences of different challenge vectors were also 
examined. As shown in Fig. 5.17, different traffic injection rates for the same traffic trace can lead 
to significant differences on the occurrence frequency of different challenge vectors. For instance, 
the configurations 0 and 5 yield -73.9% and +141.4% occurrence changes, respectively, when the 
traffic injection rate λ varies from 0.143 to 0.2 packets per cycle per node. As the uniform traffic 
trace is injected into the network, the frequencies of some challenge vectors (e.g. 1 and 7) are more 





Figure 5.17. Impact of different traffic injection rates and traffic traces on the occurrence of 
different PUF challenge vectors for the dynamic permutation configuration. 
 
5.6. Area Overhead/FPGA Synthesis 
 Each of the five designs examined here was synthesized to the FPGA seen in Fig. 3.21. The 
resource utilization (which relates to the area of the device) was measured for each design, and can 
be seen in Table 5.1. The biggest impact on area most likely comes from the permuting mechanisms, 
and the decoders. 





Baseline Slice LUTs 42.77% 
Slice Registers 16.99% 
NI-Term Slice LUTs 52.00% 
Slice Registers 17.37% 
R-Term Slice LUTs 48.59% 
Slice Registers 18.03% 
R-AddrFilter Slice LUTs 57.24% 
Slice Registers 17.80% 
Proposed Slice LUTs 65.74% 
Slice Registers 19.11% 
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5.7. Chapter Summary 
 Results obtained through Verilog and MATLAB simulations were presented in this chapter. 
The Verilog results were compared between the proposed new method and four other methods. It 
was found that the proposed method outperformed the other methods when HTs were introduced 


















Chapter 6. AES Power Obfuscation with Dynamic Permutation 
6.1. Introduction 
 In an Internet of Things (IoT) application, sensors, actuators, and simple data collection 
devices are connected through the internet. Among those connected devices, at least one data 
computation chip is needed to analyze the massive amount of data and make a corresponding 
decision. Due to the important role that the computation chip plays, it is assumed that some 
cryptographic algorithm (at least a lightweight one) will be applied to that chip. It is proposed to 
exploit the dynamic permutation method, which was presented in Chapter 4, to protect the 
processing unit from hardware attacks, more specifically hardware Trojan insertions and side-
channel attacks simultaneously.  
 Dynamic permutation changes the original order of the information received from the 
sensor. As the processing unit handles a dynamically permuted message, the attacker cannot 
precisely execute a hardware Trojan attack at a pre-defined condition. Multiple possibilities of 
permutation patterns increase the search space for the attacker to successfully reverse engineer the 
processing unit, or execute a meaningful attack. Even if the attacker has certain knowledge of the 
processing unit design, the dynamic aspect of the permutation method makes it harder to precisely 
launch an attack. A random number generator or the cryptographic module can control the 
dynamicity. If the cryptographic module detects an invalid message, a new permutation 
configuration will be requested. With this framework, the processing node is obfuscated by the 





6.2. Experimental Setup 
 Data collection and transfer devices are also typical IoT devices. As a case study, we use a 
router for a Network-on-Chip (NoC) is used to explain in detail how to design the dynamic 
permutation to thwart hardware Trojan insertions and also make side-channel attacks harder to 
execute.  
 The main function of a router is to interpret the header information of a data packet from 
other NoC nodes and then direct that packet to the next routing hop. In a generic NoC router, each 
pair of input and output ports is composed of input and output FIFOs, FIFO controllers, a crossbar, 
and an arbiter. As shown in Fig. 4.1, the proposed dynamic bit permutation is placed before the 
input FIFO, while the dynamic bit de-permutation is appended after the output FIFO. To detect 
whether any hardware Trojan changes the packet integrity, an error control coding method can be 
applied to the packet. The route computation is executed only when the packet integrity is sustained.   
 The critical component in this router design is the permutation configuration module. The 
dynamic aspect of the permutation method is achieved by a random number generator followed 
with modulo operation, as opposed to the PUF method used in chapter 4. It is assumed that the 
router has a unique identifier, RID, and the dynamic selection bits for the permutation unit are 
defined as DPSEL. A random DPSEL is obtained through Eq. 6.1 below.  
 
DPSEL (t)  =  RNG (t) % (β ∗  RID)       Equation 6.1 
 
where RNG(t) is the random number generated at the moment t, which typically is an integer times 
the minimum clock period. The symbol ‘%’ stands for modulo operation. If the range of the random 
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number generator is sufficiently large (compared with RID), the choice of DPSEL is evenly 
distributed in the range of [0, β * RID-1]. The parameter β is the bit width ratio between DPSEL and 
RID. Normally, the DPSEL is updated after a given period. Once the alarm signal from a 
cryptographic module arrives, the DPSEL is promptly modified to mitigate the hardware Trojan 
attack. As a hardware Trojan is triggered by a specific condition, a new DPSEL is very likely to lead 
that Trojan triggering condition to vanish.  
6.3. Results 
 An advanced encryption standard (AES) module with a 128-bit key and the proposed router 
were implemented in Verilog HDL. The HDL codes were synthesized in Xilinx ISE 14.6 and then 
downloaded to the SAKURA-G FPGA board, as shown in Fig. 6.1. With the assistance of Python-
based ChipWhisperer [85] software, the power traces were captured for side-channel analysis 
attacks.  
 
Figure 6.1. Experimental setup for SCA attack. (a) SAKURA-G board with an OpenADC 
mounted. (b) ChipWhisperer interface capturing one power trace. 
 
 






6.3.1. Crypto Key Retrieval Speed 
 The goal of the power-based side-channel attack is to retrieve the cipher key used in the 
cryptographic module. The leak of a cipher key leads to the loss of security assurance provided by 
the cryptographic module. As dynamic permutation potentially changes the power consumption 
profile for the processing unit, the proposed method makes it more difficult to retrieve the key. The 
increased difficulty is due to the obfuscation of the power waveform due to the dynamically 
changing permutation configuration. The average partial guessing entropy (APGE) is used as a 
metric to evaluate the speed of the cipher key retrieval [80]. It is assumed that all subkeys are 
retrieved when APGE falls below 10 [81].  
6.3.1.1. Impact of Processing Unit Area on Speed of Key Retrieval 
 A side-channel analysis attack is able to retrieve the crypto key if one has a sufficient 
number of power traces. As shown in Fig. 6.2(a), the APGE for the AES reaches below 6, and this 
indicates that all of the subkeys for AES have been found. The combination of the AES module and 
a processing unit, router or NoC in our experiment results in the noticeable increase in the 
corresponding APGE of the processing unit with AES protection. The baseline router and the 
corresponding NoC are for a generic 4x4 mesh NoC. The proposed method is built in the generic 
NoC with dynamic permutation and its run-time configuration unit. Fig. 6.2(a) shows that the 
proposed processing unit design increases the APGE by factors of 82.3, 5.8, and 3.6 over AES, 
AES-Router-Baseline, and AES-NoC-Baseline, respectively. This means, if the proposed method 
is applied, more power traces are needed to find the complete key vector. This can also be 
interpreted as the proposed method makes it more difficult to retrieve the subkey bytes through 
correlation power analysis (CPA). Fig. 6.2(b) shows the speed of subkeys retrieval over the number 
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of the power traces. As can be seen, the proposed method yields fewer subkey bytes than the AES 
one given 7000 power traces. 
 
Figure 6.2. Impact of the size of processing unit on the key retrieving speed. (a) APGE and (b) the 
number of retrieved subkey bytes. 
 
6.3.1.2. Impact of Selection Randomness on the Speed of Retrieving Keys 
To reduce the hardware cost, a modular counter (CNT) was implemented to mimic RNG(t). 
The result of CNT(t) % (β * RID) allows for some randomness in the run-time selection of the bit 
permutation configuration. As the width of RID is as same as DPSEL in this experiment, β is equal to 
1. The results in this subsection are based on the processing unit including an AES module and a 
proposed router. The width of the modular counter was varied from 0 to 10 bits. The 0-bit CNT 
means a fixed permutation pattern. A modular counter with more width generates a larger data 















































Figure 6.3. Impact of the selection randomness on the key retrieving speed. (a) APGE and (b) the 
number of retrieved subkey bytes. 
 
As shown in Fig. 6.3(a), the 10-bit counter successfully makes the crypto key almost 
irretrievable, as the APGE remains nearly flat with the increasing number of power traces. The 
number of retrieved subkey bytes, shown in Fig. 6.3(b), also confirms that only two bytes of subkey 
are found for the 10-bit CNT case. However, the obtained benefit on key retrieval does infinitely 
increase with the size of the counter. As shown in Fig. 6.3(a), the variation of APGE for 3- to 10-
bit CNT cases is not significant. This indicates that a small variation on the selection of different 
permutation patterns can effectively thwart power-based side-channel attacks. 
6.3.2. Area Overhead (FPGA Results) 
 The hardware cost of the XC6SL75 FPGA implementation is shown in Table 6.1. The AES-
Router-Proposed (i.e. static permutation) method increases the number of occupied slices by 33.9% 
over the AES-Router-Baseline. If one introduces a 5-bit counter to dynamically permute the bit 
order, this method costs 88.5% more FPGA area. For security-critical application, this amount of 
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5-bit CNT 10-bit CNT
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Table 6.1. Hardware Cost in FPGA Implementation. 
 
 
6.4. Chapter Summary 
 To protect the processing unit in AES applications used for the IoT, it was proposed to use 
the collaborative method presented in chapter 4 to provide obfuscation of the data being processed. 
It was seen that the proposed method can effectively help protect the processing unit from HT 
insertions and side-channel attacks simultaneously. The dynamic aspect of the permutation method 
helped protect the processing units by delaying the time it takes to retrieve a given key for AES by 






























769 1184 5,620 11,263 1,497 2,059 2,688 2,656
Number of
Slice LUTs




828 1034 4,934 6,912 1,385 1,366 1,949 1,957
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Chapter 7. Discussion 
7.1.  Summary 
 The globalization of the business model used by the IC industry has helped reduce the costs 
of supply. Outsourcing of the fabrication, assembly, and manufacturing stages have proved to 
reduce the production cost of chips, but have also introduced several security issues in electronic 
hardware. Hardware attacks that aim to change design functionality, steal design secrets, and cause 
information leakage have all been introduced as a result of the globalized business model.  
 A prevalent type of hardware attack that was introduced directly from outsourcing, is that 
of the Hardware Trojan. General methods exist to detect the presence of Hardware Trojans in 
designs at test time, but with the complexity of these malicious circuits increasing, it is becoming 
harder to detect them with conventional methods. Although general detection methods exist, there 
is a lack of detection methods for on-chip networks. Trojans in on-chip networks can cause Denial 
of Service, information leakage, and design trade secret leakage. To thwart Hardware Trojans in 
Networks-on-Chip, a run-time method, as opposed to conventional offline methods, is proposed 
and provides active mitigation of Hardware Trojans that cause Denial of Service attacks.  
 In chapter 4, a novel method to mitigate residual HT attacks is introduced. This method is 
different than existing offline approaches as it is assumed that residual HTs have already bypassed 
the offline detection methods. The basis of the proposed method is that it provides integrity to 
packets traveling over the NoC, and it also lowers the chance that an attack affects the targeted area. 
To provide packet integrity, Error Control Coding, in the form of a Hamming Code, is used not 
only to detect errors present in the packet flits, but to also correct vital instructions that may have 
been maliciously changed. To lower the probability of a successful attack, a bit permutation method 
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is proposed that rearranges the bits going into a NoC router. Within the router, extra hardware is 
added so instructions can still be interpreted correctly. A collaborative method combines the prior 
two methods to detect multiple bit errors and trigger a change in the bit arrangement to effectively 
spread out the multiple bit error.  
 In chapter 5, the proposed method is compared to four other methods that aim to increase 
the security of NoCs. Each of these methods is from recent IEEE literature. Results are presented 
that compare the packet throughput, effective average latency, link availability, and link usage of 
the five different methods. For packet throughput, the number of valid packets received by a 
particular design is compared with that of the others. A valid packet, is defined as one that is 
received at the target IP core to which it was originally sent. Any other packet that arrives at a local 
port that is illegal or incorrect with regard to the original destination is considered an invalid packet. 
The results presented in 5.3.1 show that the proposed method outperforms the other methods with 
regard to throughput, providing an increase of 6.4-43.12%, 11.6-43.67%, and up to 98.8% for 
DEST, HEAD, and TAIL HTs respectively. The interval of an increase in throughput depends on 
the number of HTs that were injected into the system.  
 For link availability, the amount of data on the NoC links between routers was measured at 
every clock cycle of the simulation time. This enabled a view of the amount of traffic on the links 
at a given simulation time, and this variable was plotted this data over the entire simulation time in 
the form of histogram plots, seen in section 5.3.2. It was seen that that the proposed method 
outperforms the rest for link availability, and an in-depth analysis of the improvement over the other 
methods can be found in section 5.3.2. 
 Results for link usage, which can be found in section 5.3.3, show of a graphical 
representation of the traffic flow in the network over the entire simulation time. Migrations of hot 
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spots in the network, compared to an ideal “no HT” model, mean that the network has been 
rerouting traffic the wrong way due to HTs that affect the destination address of a header flit. Cold 
spot migration shows that a zone of the network is undergoing depleted bandwidth, due to extra 
flits probably missing their header flit. Dropping the tail flit will also cause bandwidth depletion, 
but in this case the depletion is due to paths not being freed up to other packets requesting 
permission to use that path. It was seen that the proposed method exhibits the most similar plot to 
the ideal case.  
 In section 5.3.4 the effective latency was examined for each HT mitigation method. The 
proposed method achieved an average effective latency between 63.4-98.9% better (smaller) than 
the existing approaches.  
 In chapter 6, the proposed collaborative method was exploited to protect the processing 
units in an AES application against HT insertions and side-channel attacks simultaneously. The 
permutation method, and the dynamicity provided by it, helps to obfuscate the data within the 
processing unit. This will help delay the time it takes to retrieve a given key for AES by increasing 
the amount of power traces needed.  
 The limitations of the proposed method lies in its area overhead. In Tables 5.1 and 6.1, it is 
shown that the proposed method incurs the largest area overhead of the designs with which it was 
compared. This is most likely due to the large networks of MUXes that comprise the permuting 
modules, as well as the increase in internal bit widths in routers for the ECC parity bits. The increase 
in bit width also means that extra registers are needed in the FIFOs, and other modules require extra 




7.2.  Other work 
 While working at the Reliable VLSI systems lab at UNH, several other papers were worked 
on, including the strengthening of crypto-systems by creating a more robust fault detection method, 
and by using an emerging technology (memristors), in place of traditional CMOS gates. 
7.2.1. Crypto-system Security 
 Security is a crucial concern for the development of trustworthy embedded systems. 
Cryptographic algorithms are commonly used to ascertain security of the system. Driven by 
malicious intent, attackers are impelled to extract the cipher key and thus compromise the embedded 
system. As embedded systems are typically hardware constrained and are used for critical and 
potentially sensitive contexts, lightweight ciphers are preferred for security. Hence it is imperative 
to explore effective fault-detection methods for lightweight ciphers. 
 We propose a new microarchitecture to thwart fault attacks that place symmetric faults on 
the two encryption data paths. To further reduce the FBR for SIMON, we propose a new fault-
detection algorithm that integrates operand permutation and masking techniques. Closed-form 
expressions for de-permutation and de-masking in SIMON are provided in this letter. Our method 
is assessed under two fault attack scenarios (random and symmetric fault injections) with bit-flip, 
stuck-at-0, and stuck-at-1 fault models. Simulation results show that our method minimizes the FBR 
to zero with the fault attack scenarios of symmetric fault location and stuck-at-0 fault injections. 
Overall, the proposed method outperforms the existing fault-detection methods in multiple fault 
attack conditions, at the cost of 5% more area overhead than the most hardware-efficient fault 




7.2.2. Memristor-based SIMON Cipher 
 The fourth fundamental circuit element, memristor, attracts increasing attention because of 
its memory characteristic. The special memory behavior of the memristor has been exploited to 
design control systems, memory arrays, logic gate, and security primitives in previous work. 
However, the power characteristics of the memristor have not been widely studied yet. In this work, 
we used a memristor model that is suitable for circuit simulation to investigate the power 
characteristics of the memristor itself and memristor-based logic gates. Our simulation results 
indicate that memristor has different power characteristic compared with CMOS devices. The peak 
power of memristor-based gates does not monotonically increases with input voltage amplitude; 
instead, the combination of input period length and voltage amplitude determines the occurrence of 
power peak. The reason is that the power consumption of memristors depends on the effective 
memristor width, which is controlled by the input. We further examine the feasibility of utilizing 
memristors to implement a new block cipher, SIMON. Our studies show that the unique power 
characteristic of memristor based SIMON may add extra challenges for extraction of the secret key 











[1] S. King, et al. “Designing and implementing malicious hardware,” in Proc. the 1st Usenix 
Workshop on Large-Scale Exploits and Emergent Threats (LEE’08), Article 5, 2008. 
[2] N. Potlapally, “Hardware Security in Practice: Challenges and Opportunities”, in Proc. 
HOST’11, pp. 93–98, 2011. 
[3] R. Chakraborty, S. Narasimhan and S. Bhunia, “Hardware Trojan: Threats and emerging 
solutions,” in Proc. HLDTV, pp. 166–171. 2009.  
[4] R. Karri, J. Rajendran, K. Rosenfeld and M. Tehranipoor, “Trustworthy Hardware: 
Identifying and Classifying Hardware Trojans,” IEEE Computer, vol. 43, no.10, pp. 39–
46, Oct. 2010. 
[5] H. Liu, H. Luo, and L. Wang, “Design of Hardware Trojan Horse Based on Counter,” in 
Proc. ICQR2MSE’11, pp. 1007–1009, June 2011. 
[6] X. Wang, M. Tehranipoor, J. Plusquellic, “Detecting malicious inclusions in secure 
hardware: Challenges and solutions,” in Proc. HOST’08, pp. 15–19, 2008.  
[7] J.-P. Diguet, et al., “NOC-centric Security of Reconfigurable SoC,” in Proc. NOCS’07, pp. 
223–232, May 2007. 
[8] H. Wassel, et al. “Networks on chip with provable security properties,” IEEE Micro, vol. 
34, no. 3, pp. 57–68, 2014. 
[9] Y. Jin, N. Kupp and Y. Makris, “Experiences in Hardware Trojan design and 
implementation,” in Proc. HOST’09, pp. 50–57, Jul. 2009. 
[10] S. Adee, [online] The hunt for the kill switch, http://www.spectrum.ieee.org. 
89 
 
[11] X. Zhang and M. Tehranipoor, “Case study: Detecting Hardware Trojans in third-party 
digital IP cores,” in Proc. HOST’11, pp. 67–70, June 2011. 
[12] M.Tehranipoor and F. Koushanfar, “A Survey of Hardware Trojan Taxonomy and 
Detection,” IEEE Design & Test of Computers, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 10–25, Jan.-Feb. 2010. 
[13] H. Salmani, M. Tehranipoor, and J. Plusquellic, “New Design Strategy for Improving 
Hardware Trojan Detection and Reducing Trojan Activation Time,” in Proc. HOST’09, pp. 
66–73, July 2009. 
[14] S. Bhunia, et al, “Hardware Trojan Attacks: Threat Analysis and Countermeasures,” in 
Proc. of the IEEE, vol.102, no. 8, pp. 1229–1247, July 2014. 
[15] J. Rajendran, O. Sinanoglu, and R. Karri, “Regaining Trust in VLSI Design: Design-for-
Trust Techniques,” in Proc. of the IEEE, vol. 102, no. 8, pp. 1266–1282, July 2014. 
[16] M. Banga and M. Hsiao, “VITAMIN: voltage inversion technique to ascertain malicous 
insertions in ICs,” in Proc. HOST’09, pp. 104–107, 2009. 
[17] S. Narasimhan, et al., “Improving IC Security Against Trojan Attacks Through Integration 
of Security Monitors,” IEEE Design & Test of Computers, vol. 29, no. 5, pp.37–46, Oct. 
2012. 
[18] Y. Jin, and Y. Makris, “Hardware trojan detection using path delay fingerprint,” in Proc. 
HOST’08, pp. 51–57, 2008.  
[19] Y. Jin, and Y. Makris, “Hardware trojans in wireless cryptographic integrated circuits,” 
IEEE Design Test of Computers, vol. PP, no. 99, 2013. 
[20] J. Rajendran, E. Gavas, J. Jimenez, V. Padman, R. Karri, “Towards a comprehensive and 
systematic classification of hardware trojans,” in Proc. ISCAS’10, pp. 1871–1874, 2010. 
90 
 
[21] L. Lin, W. Burleson, and C. Paar, “Moles: malicious off-chip leakage enabled by 
sidechannels,” in Proc. ICCAD ’09, pp. 117–122, 2009.  
[22] R. Torrance and D. James, “The State-of-the-Art in IC Reverse Engineering,” in Proc. 
CHES, vol. 5747 of LNCS, pp. 363–381, Sept. 2009. 
[23] D. Agrawal, S. Baktir, D. Karakoyunlu, P. Rohatgi, and B. Sunar, “Trojan detectionusing 
ic fingerprinting,” in Proc. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 296–310, 2007. 
[24] S. Vangal, et al., “An 80-tile sub-100-W TeraFLOPS processor in 65-nm CMOS,” IEEE 
Journal of Solid-State Circuits, vol. 43, no. 1, pp.29–41, 2008. 
[25] W. J. Dally and B. Towles, “Route packets, not wires: On-chip interconnection networks,” 
in Proc. DAC’01, pp. 684–689, Jun. 2001. 
[26] L. Benini and G. De Micheli, “Networks on Chips: A new SoC paradigm,” Computer, pp. 
70–78, Jan. 2002. 
[27] R. S. Chakraborty, and S. Bhunia, “HARPOON: An Obfuscation-Based SoC Design 
Methodology for Hardware Protection,” IEEE TCAD, vol. 28, no. 10, pp. 1493–1502, 
2009.  
[28] J. Rajendran, Y. Pino, O. Sinanoglu, and R. Karri, “Logic encryption: a fault analysis 
perspective,” in Proc. DATE'12, pp. 953–958, 2012. 
[29] G. K. Contreras, M. T. Rahman and M. Tehranipoor, “Secure Split-Test for Preventing IC 
Piracy by Untrusted Foundry and Assembly”, in Proc. DFT’13, pp. 196–203, 2013. 
[30] H. Wassel, Y. Gao, J. Oberg, T. Huffmire, R. Kasterner, F. Chong, and T. Sherwood, 
“SurfNoC: A low latency and provably non-intetfering approach to secure Networks-on-
Chip, “ in Proc. ISCA’13, pp.583–594, 2013. 
91 
 
[31] L. Fiorin, S. Lukovic, G. Palermo, “Implementation of a reconfigurable data protection 
module for NoC-based MPSoCs,” in Proc. IEEE. Intl. Symp. Parallel and Distributed 
Processing, pp. 1–8, Apr. 2008.  
[32] J. Porquet, A. Greiner, and C. Schwarz, “NoC-MPU: a secure architecture for flexible co-
hosting on shared memory MPSoCs,” in Proc. DATE’11, pp. 1–4, 2011.  
[33] J. Sepulveda, et al. “Hybrid-on-chip communication architecture for dynamic MP-SoC 
protection,” in Proc. SBCCI, pp. 1–6, 2012. 
[34] L. Fiorin, G. Palermo, S. Lukovic, V. Catalano and C. Silvano, “Secure Memory Accesses 
on Networks-on-Chip,” IEEE Trans. on  Computers, vol. 57, no. 9, pp. 1216–1229, Sept. 
2008. 
[35] L. Fiorin, G. Palermo, S. Lukovic, and C. Silvano, “A Data Protection Unit for NoC-Based 
Architectures,” in Proc. CODES+ISSS, pp. 167–172, Sept.-Oct. 2007. 
[36] S. Baron, M.Wangham, C. Zeferino, “Security mechanisms to improve the availability of 
a Network-on-chip,” in Proc. ICECS’13, pp. 609–612, 2013. 
[37] G. Gebotys, and R. Gebotys, “A framework for security on NoC technologies,” in Proc. 
ISVLSI, pp. 113–117, 2003. 
[38] Y. Wang and G. Suh, “Efficient timing channel protection for on-chip networks,” in Proc. 
NOCS’12, pp. 142–151, 2012. 
[39] L. Kim, J. Villasenor, and C. Koc, “A Trojan-resistant system-on-chip bus architecture,” 
in Proc. Military Comm. Conf. pp. 1–6, 2009. 
92 
 
[40] Semiconductor Research Corporation, “Reliable needs for secure, trustworthy, and reliable 
semiconductors,” [Online]: https://www.src.org/calendar/e004965/sa-ts-workshop-report-
final.pdf.  
[41] G.E. Suh and S. Devadas, “Physical Unclonable Functions for Device Authentication and 
Secret Key Generation,” in Proc. DAC’07, pp.9–14, June 2007.  
[42] Herder, C.; Meng-Day Yu; Koushanfar, F.; Devadas, S. “Physical Unclonable Functions 
and Applications: A Tutorial,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 102, no. 8, pp. 1126–1141, 
2014. 
[43] S. Evain, and J.-P. Diguet, “From NoC security analysis to design solutions,” in Proc. IEEE 
Workshop on Signal Processing Systems Design and Implementation, pp.166–171, Nov. 
2005.  
[44] S. Saponara,T. Bacchillone, E. Petr, L. Fanucci, R. Locatelli, and M. Coppola, “Design of 
an NoC Interface Macrocell with Hardware Support of Advanced Networking 
Functionalities,” IEEE Trans. On Computers, vol. 63, no. 3, pp. 609–621, Mar. 2014. 
[45] Q. Yu and P. Ampadu, “Dual-Layer Adaptive Error Control for Network-on-Chip Links,” 
IEEE Trans. on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems, vol. 20, no. 7, pp. 1304–
1317, 2012.  
[46] N. Matveeva, Y. Sheynin, and E. Suvorova, “QoS Support in Embedded Networks and 
NoC,” in Proc. 16th Conference of Open Innovations Association FRUCT, pp. 51–59, 
2014. 
[47] A. Moradi, M. T. M. Shalmani, and M. Salmasizadeh, “A generalized method of 
differential fault attack against AES cryptosystem,” in Proc. CHES, 2006, pp. 91–100. 
93 
 
[48] H. Bar-El, et al., “The Sorcerer’s apprentice guide to fault attacks,” Cryptology ePrint 
Archive, Report 2004/10, 2004. 
[49] G. Di Natale, et al., “A reliable architecture for parallel implementations of the Advanced 
Encryption Standard,” J. Electronic Testing, vol. 25, no. 4, 2009, pp. 269-278.  
[50] A. Aysu, E. Gulcan, and P. Schaumont, “SIMON Says: break Area Records of Block 
Ciphers on FPGAs,” Embedded Systems Letters, vol. 6, no. 2, 2014, pp. 37-40. 
[51] J. Blomer and J. P. Seifert, “Fault based cryptanalysis of the Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES),” FC 2003,LNCS 2742,pp.162-181, 2003 
[52] T. Korak, M. Hoefler, “On the effects of clock and power supply tampering on two 
microcontroller platforms,” in Proc. Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in 
Cryptography (FDTC), 2014, pp. 8-7. 
[53] G. Bertoni, et al., “Error analysis and detection procedures for a hardware implementation 
of the Advanced Encryption Standard,” IEEE Trans. Computers, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 492–
505, 2003. 
[54] A. Barenghi, et al., “Fault injection attacks on cryptographic devices: Theory, practice, and 
countermeasures,” in Proc. IEEE, vol. 100, no. 11, 2012, pp. 3056–3076. 
[55] M. Mozaffari-Kermani, et al., “Fault-resilient lightweight cryptographic block ciphers for 
secure embedded systems,” IEEE Embedded Syst. Lett., vol. 6, no. 4, Dec. 2014, pp. 89–
92. 
[56] X. Guo and R. Karri, “Recomputing with permuted operands: A concurrent error detection 
approach,” IEEE Trans. Computer-Aided Design Integr. Circuits Syst., vol. 32, no. 10, Oct. 
2013, pp. 1595–1608. 
94 
 
[57] Ramesh Karri et al., “Concurrent Error Detection of Fault-Based Side-Channel 
Cryptanalysis of 128-Bit Symmetric Block Ciphers,” In Proc. DAC, pages 579–585, 2001. 
[58] M. Joye, P. Manet, and J. Rigaud, “Strengthening hardware AES implementations against 
fault attacks,” IET Info Security, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 106-110, 2007. 
[59] V. Lomne, T. Roche, and A. Thillard, “On the need of randomness in fault attack 
countermeasures—Application to AES,” in Proc. FDTC, pp. 85–94, Sep. 2012. 
[60] Xiaofei Guo, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay, Chenglu Jin, Ramesh Karri,” NREPO: Normal 
basis Recomputing with Permuted Operands,” in Proc. HOST, pp. 118-123, 2014 
[61] H. Tupsamudre, S. Bisht, and D. Mukhopadhyay, “Differential fault analysis on the 
families of SIMON and SPECK ciphers”, in Proc. FDTC, pp. 40–48, 2014. 
[62] X. Guo, D. Mukhopadhyay, C. Jin, and R. Karri, “Security analysis of concurrent error 
detection against differential fault analysis,” in Proc. J. Cryptogr. Eng., vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 
153–169, 2015. 
[63] M. Mozaffari Kermani and A. Reyhani-Masoleh, "Parity-based fault detection architecture 
of S-box for Advanced Encryption Standard," in Proc. DFT , pp. 572-580, October, 2006. 
[64] M. Mozaffari Kermani and R. Azarderakhsh, “Efficient fault diagnosis schemes for reliable 
lightweight cryptographic ISO/IEC standard CLEFIA benchmarked on ASIC and FPGA,” 
IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron., vol. 60, no. 12, pp. 5925-5932, Dec. 2013. 
[65] M. Mozaffari Kermani and A. Reyhani-Masoleh, “Concurrent structure-independent fault 
detection schemes for the Advanced Encryption Standard,” IEEE Trans. Comput., vol. 59, 













[72] X. Chen, L. Sun, H. Zhu, Y. Zhen, and H. Chen, “Application of internet of things in 
power-line monitoring,” in Proc. Cyber-Enabled Distribute Computing and Knowledge 
Discovery (CyberC), pp. 423–426, Oct 2012. 
[73] O. Monnier,”A smarter grid with the Internet of Things,” Texas Instruments, 2013. 
[74] Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Christian Wachsmann, Michael Waidner, “Security and Privacy 
Challenges in Industrial Internet of Things,” in Proc. DAC'15, pp. 1-6, Jun. 2015. 
[75] Brier, E., Clavier, C., and Olivier, F., “Correlation power analysis with a leakage model,” 
in proc., Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3156, pp. 16–29. Springer, Berlin, 2004. 
[76] P. Kocher, J. Jaffe, and B. Jun, “Differential Power Analysis,” in Proc. Crypto’99, pp.388-
397, 1999. 
[77] S. Adee, “The hunt for the kill switch,” IEEE Spectrum , May 1, 2008. 
96 
 
[78] Subhasish Mitra, “Stopping Hardware Trojans in Their Tracks,” IEEE Spectrum, January 
20, 2015.  
[79] John Markoff, “F.B.I. Says the Military Had Bogus Computer Gear,” May 9, 2008 [Online] 
Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/09/technology/09cisco.html?pagewanted=print 
[80] H. Pahlevanzadeh, J. Dofe, and Q. Yu, “Assessing CPA Resistance of AES with Different 
Fault Tolerance Mechanisms,” to appear in the Proceedings of 21st Asia and South Pacific 
Design Automation Conference (ASP-DAC), Jan. 2016. 
[81] O’Flynn, C., Chen, Z.D, “Synchronous Sampling and Clock Recovery of Internal 
Oscillators for Side Channel Analysis,” Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2013/294.  
[82] Dave Evans, “The Internet of Things How the Next Evolution of the Internet Is Changing 
Everything,” Cisco White Paper, April 2011. 
[83] M. Rostami, F. Koushanfar, and R. Karri, “A Primer on Hardware Security: Models, 
Methods, and Metrics,” in Proc. the IEEE, vol. 102, no. 8, pp. 1283–1295, 2014. 
[84] McAfee, “Rootkits,Part 1 of 3: The Growing Threat,” White Paper, Apr. 2006. 
[85] C. O’Flynn and Z. Chen, “Chipwhisperer: An opensource platform for hardware embedded 
security research,” in Proc. Prouff, pp. 243–260, 2014.  
[86] A. P. Johnson, R. S. Chakraborty, D. Mukhopadyay, ”A PUF-enabled Secure Architecture 
for FPGA-based IoT Applications,” IEEE Trans.on Multi-Scale Computing Systems, pp. 
1–14, 2015. 
[87] Gang Qu, Lin Yuan, “Design THINGS for the Internet of Things — An EDA perspective,” 
in Proc. ICCAD, pp. 411–416, 2014. 
97 
 
[88] F. Courbon, P. Loubet-Moundi, J. J. A. Fournier, A. Tria, “A high efficiency Hardware 








APPENDIX A – Module Schematics  
1. Submodule schematics 
a. Five-port router 
 
















b. Input FIFO 
 
Figure A.3. External schematic for the input FIFO module, showing I/O pins. 
 
 





c. Full Crossbar 
 











d. Info Extraction 
 
Figure A.7. External schematic of Info Extraction module, with I/O ports. 
 
 









e. Port Admission 
 
Figure A.9. External schematic of Port Admission module, with I/O ports. 
 
 







f. Round Robin 
 
Figure A.11. System level schematic of Round Robin module 
 
 






g. Circular FIFO 
 
Figure A.13. System level schematic of Circular FIFO module 
 
 








APPENDIX B - Verilog Code 
a. Top Module (Testbench) 
`timescale 1ns/1ps 
//This testbench is to test all HT cases on the HT mitigation method of filtering illegal address 
/* 
This testbench is used to test the impact of HT numbers, location, and types on the NOC performance 
@Yu & Frey, 12/14/2015 
`define HT0 // 
`define HT1 //Router 0 
`define HT2 //additional Router 5 
`define HT3 //additional Router 10, the HT definition is accumulated 
`define HT32 //additional Router 15, the HT definition is accumulated 
`define CENTER_ROUTER 
`define BOUNDARY_ROUTER 
`define MULTI_ROUTER //if this is not defined, single router is controlled by HT, otherwise, 




//define those parameters on the ncverilog command line 
*/ 
//Define which HT type, and which case (0-3HT) 











parameter filename0 = "SecureZoneTest0.txt"; 
parameter filename1 = "SecureZoneTest1.txt"; 
parameter filename2 = "SecureZoneTest2.txt"; 
parameter filename3 = "SecureZoneTest3.txt"; 
parameter filename4 = "SecureZoneTest4.txt"; 
parameter filename5 = "SecureZoneTest5.txt"; 
parameter filename6 = "SecureZoneTest6.txt"; 
parameter filename7 = "SecureZoneTest7.txt"; 
parameter filename8 = "SecureZoneTest8.txt"; 
parameter filename9 = "SecureZoneTest9.txt"; 
parameter filename10 = "SecureZoneTest10.txt"; 
parameter filename11 = "SecureZoneTest11.txt"; 
parameter filename12 = "SecureZoneTest12.txt"; 
parameter filename13 = "SecureZoneTest13.txt"; 
parameter filename14 = "SecureZoneTest14.txt"; 
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parameter filename15 = "SecureZoneTest15.txt"; 
parameter filename16 = "SecureZoneTestBandwidthAndCycles.txt"; 
parameter filename17 = "SecureZoneTestCycles.txt"; 
parameter filename18 = "SecureZoneTestBandwidth.txt"; 
parameter filename19 = "SecureZoneTestPacketInfo_placeholder.txt"; 











integer links0, links1, links2, links3, links4, links5, links6, links7, links8, links9, links10, links11, 
links12, links13, links14, links15, links16, links17, links18, links19, links20, links21, links22, 
links23, links24, links25, links26, links27, links28, links29, links30, links31, links32, links33, 
links34, links35, links36, links37, links38, links39, links40, links41, links42, links43, links44, 
links45, links46, links47 ;  
integer code0, code1, code2, code3, code4, code5, code6, code7, code8, code9, code10, code11, 
code12, code13, code14, code15; 
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integer op_file0, op_file1, op_file10, op_file11, op_file12, op_file13, op_file14, op_file15, op_file2, 
op_file3, op_file4, op_file5, op_file6, op_file7, op_file8, op_file9, op_file16, op_file17, op_file18, 
op_file19; 
integer r_file0, r_file1, r_file2, r_file3, r_file4, r_file5, r_file6, r_file7, r_file8, r_file9, r_file10, 
r_file11, r_file12, r_file13, r_file14, r_file15; 
integer rpackets0, rpackets1, rpackets10, rpackets11, rpackets12, rpackets13, rpackets14, 
rpackets15, rpackets2, rpackets3, rpackets4, rpackets5, rpackets6, rpackets7, rpackets8, rpackets9; 





























































































































































































wire [31:0] data_00; 
wire [31:0] data_01; 
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wire [31:0] data_02; 
wire [31:0] data_03; 
wire [31:0] data_04; 
wire [31:0] data_10; 
wire [31:0] data_11; 
wire [31:0] data_12; 
wire [31:0] data_13; 
wire [31:0] data_14; 
wire [31:0] data_20; 
wire [31:0] data_21; 
wire [31:0] data_22; 
wire [31:0] data_23; 
wire [31:0] data_24; 
wire [31:0] data_30; 
wire [31:0] data_31; 
wire [31:0] data_32; 
wire [31:0] data_33; 
wire [31:0] data_34; 
wire [31:0] data_40; 
wire [31:0] data_41; 
wire [31:0] data_42; 
wire [31:0] data_43; 
wire [31:0] data_44; 
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wire [31:0] data_50; 
wire [31:0] data_51; 
wire [31:0] data_52; 
wire [31:0] data_53; 
wire [31:0] data_54; 
wire [31:0] data_60; 
wire [31:0] data_61; 
wire [31:0] data_62; 
wire [31:0] data_63; 
wire [31:0] data_64; 
wire [31:0] data_70; 
wire [31:0] data_71; 
wire [31:0] data_72; 
wire [31:0] data_73; 
wire [31:0] data_74; 
wire [31:0] data_80; 
wire [31:0] data_81; 
wire [31:0] data_82; 
wire [31:0] data_83; 
wire [31:0] data_84; 
wire [31:0] data_90; 
wire [31:0] data_91; 
wire [31:0] data_92; 
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wire [31:0] data_93; 
wire [31:0] data_94; 
wire [31:0] data_100; 
wire [31:0] data_101; 
wire [31:0] data_102; 
wire [31:0] data_103; 
wire [31:0] data_104; 
wire [31:0] data_110; 
wire [31:0] data_111; 
wire [31:0] data_112; 
wire [31:0] data_113; 
wire [31:0] data_114; 
wire [31:0] data_120; 
wire [31:0] data_121; 
wire [31:0] data_122; 
wire [31:0] data_123; 
wire [31:0] data_124; 
wire [31:0] data_130; 
wire [31:0] data_131; 
wire [31:0] data_132; 
wire [31:0] data_133; 
wire [31:0] data_134; 
wire [31:0] data_140; 
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wire [31:0] data_141; 
wire [31:0] data_142; 
wire [31:0] data_143; 
wire [31:0] data_144; 
wire [31:0] data_150; 
wire [31:0] data_151; 
wire [31:0] data_152; 
wire [31:0] data_153; 
wire [31:0] data_154; 
 
wire [4:0] empty_0; 
wire [4:0] empty_1; 
wire [4:0] empty_2; 
wire [4:0] empty_3; 
wire [4:0] empty_4; 
wire [4:0] empty_5; 
wire [4:0] empty_6; 
wire [4:0] empty_7; 
wire [4:0] empty_8; 
wire [4:0] empty_9; 
wire [4:0] empty_10; 
wire [4:0] empty_11; 
wire [4:0] empty_12; 
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wire [4:0] empty_13; 
wire [4:0] empty_14; 
wire [4:0] empty_15; 
 
wire[31:0] data_in0, data_in1,data_in2, data_in3, data_in4, data_in5, data_in6, data_in7, data_in8, 
data_in9, data_in10, data_in11, data_in12, data_in13, data_in14, data_in15; 
reg inreq0, inreq1, inreq2, inreq3, inreq4, inreq5, inreq6, inreq7, inreq8, inreq9, inreq10, inreq11, 
inreq12, inreq13, inreq14, inreq15; 
reg[13:0] Count; 
reg[7:0] ID0, ID1, ID2, ID3, ID4, ID5, ID6, ID7, ID8, ID9, ID10, ID11, ID12, ID13, ID14, ID15; 
reg[9:0] Info0, Info1, Info2, Info3, Info4, Info5, Info6, Info7, Info8, Info9, Info10, Info11, Info12, 
Info13, Info14, Info15; 
reg[4:0] Dest0, Dest1, Dest2, Dest3, Dest4, Dest5, Dest6, Dest7, Dest8, Dest9, Dest10, Dest11, 
Dest12, Dest13, Dest14, Dest15; 
integer Destr0, Destr1, Destr2, Destr3, Destr4, Destr5, Destr6, Destr7, Destr8, Destr9, Destr10, 
Destr11, Destr12, Destr13, Destr14, Destr15; 
reg[3:0] D0, D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6, D7, D8, D9, D10, D11, D12, D13, D14, D15; 
reg[3:0] src0, src1, src2, src3, src4, src5, src6, src7, src8, src9, src10, src11, src12, src13, src14, 
src15; 
integer spackets0, spackets1, spackets2, spackets3, spackets4, spackets5, spackets6, spackets7, 















































 .TailHT_Trigger(zerotail), //HT triggers 
 .HeadHT_Trigger(zerohead), 



























































































































































































 .TailHT_Trigger(fivetail), //HT triggers 
 .HeadHT_Trigger(fivehead), 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































assign data_in0 = {Count[13:0],D0[3:0],ID0[3:0],Info0[9:0]}; 
assign data_in1 = {Count[13:0],D1[3:0],ID1[3:0],Info1[9:0]}; 
assign data_in2 = {Count[13:0],D2[3:0],ID2[3:0],Info2[9:0]}; 
assign data_in3 = {Count[13:0],D4[3:0],ID4[3:0],Info4[9:0]}; 
assign data_in4 = {Count[13:0],D5[3:0],ID5[3:0],Info5[9:0]}; 
assign data_in5 = {Count[13:0],D6[3:0],ID6[3:0],Info6[9:0]}; 
assign data_in6 = {Count[13:0],D8[3:0],ID8[3:0],Info8[9:0]}; 
assign data_in7 = {Count[13:0],D9[3:0],ID9[3:0],Info9[9:0]}; 
assign data_in8 = {Count[13:0],D10[3:0],ID10[3:0],Info10[9:0]}; 
assign data_in9 = {Count[13:0],D3[3:0],ID3[3:0],Info3[9:0]}; 
assign data_in10 = {Count[13:0],D7[3:0],ID7[3:0],Info7[9:0]}; 
assign data_in11 = {Count[13:0],D11[3:0],ID11[3:0],Info11[9:0]}; 
assign data_in12 = {Count[13:0],D12[3:0],ID12[3:0],Info12[9:0]}; 
assign data_in13 = {Count[13:0],D13[3:0],ID13[3:0],Info13[9:0]}; 
assign data_in14 = {Count[13:0],D14[3:0],ID14[3:0],Info14[9:0]}; 
assign data_in15 = {Count[13:0],D15[3:0],ID15[3:0],Info15[9:0]}; 
 
 
 initial  
 begin 
 `ifdef HT1 
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   `ifdef DEST_HT 
     begin  
     fivetail <= 1'b0; 
     fivedest <= 1'b1; 
     fivehead <= 1'b0; 
     zerotail <= 1'b0; 
     zerohead <= 1'b0; 
     zerodest <= 1'b0; 
     sevenhead <= 1'b0; 
     seventail <= 1'b0; 
     sevendest <= 1'b0; 
     end 
   `else 
     `ifdef HEAD_HT 
          begin      
     fivetail <= 1'b0; 
     fivedest <= 1'b0; 
     fivehead <= 1'b1; 
     zerotail <= 1'b0; 
     zerohead <= 1'b0; 
     zerodest <= 1'b0; 
     sevenhead <= 1'b0; 
     seventail <= 1'b0; 
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     sevendest <= 1'b0; 
     end 
           
     `else 
       `ifdef TAIL_HT 
         begin      
     fivetail <= 1'b1; 
     fivedest <= 1'b0; 
     fivehead <= 1'b0; 
     zerotail <= 1'b0; 
     zerohead <= 1'b0; 
     zerodest <= 1'b0; 
     sevenhead <= 1'b0; 
     seventail <= 1'b0; 
     sevendest <= 1'b0; 
     end //tail lost 
       `else 
           begin      
     fivetail <= 1'b0; 
     fivedest <= 1'b0; 
     fivehead <= 1'b0; 
     zerotail <= 1'b0; 
     zerohead <= 1'b0; 
156 
 
     zerodest <= 1'b0; 
     sevenhead <= 1'b0; 
     seventail <= 1'b0; 
     sevendest <= 1'b0; 
     end 
       `endif //TAIL_HT 
      `endif //HEAD_HT 
    `endif //DEST_HT 
 `else 
    `ifdef HT2 
  `ifdef DEST_HT 
      begin      
     fivetail <= 1'b0; 
     fivedest <= 1'b1; 
     fivehead <= 1'b0; 
     zerotail <= 1'b0; 
     zerohead <= 1'b0; 
     zerodest <= 1'b1; 
     sevenhead <= 1'b0; 
     seventail <= 1'b0; 
     sevendest <= 1'b0; 
     end 
    `else 
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      `ifdef HEAD_HT 
        begin      
     fivetail <= 1'b0; 
     fivedest <= 1'b0; 
     fivehead <= 1'b1; 
     zerotail <= 1'b0; 
     zerohead <= 1'b1; 
     zerodest <= 1'b0; 
     sevenhead <= 1'b0; 
     seventail <= 1'b0; 
     sevendest <= 1'b0; 
     end//header lost 
      `else 
        `ifdef TAIL_HT 
           begin      
     fivetail <= 1'b1; 
     fivedest <= 1'b0; 
     fivehead <= 1'b0; 
     zerotail <= 1'b1; 
     zerohead <= 1'b0; 
     zerodest <= 1'b0; 
     sevenhead <= 1'b0; 
     seventail <= 1'b0; 
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     sevendest <= 1'b0; 
     end //tail lost 
        `else 
     begin      
     fivetail <= 1'b0; 
     fivedest <= 1'b0; 
     fivehead <= 1'b0; 
     zerotail <= 1'b0; 
     zerohead <= 1'b0; 
     zerodest <= 1'b0; 
     sevenhead <= 1'b0; 
     seventail <= 1'b0; 
     sevendest <= 1'b0; 
     end 
        `endif //TAIL_HT 
       `endif //HEAD_HT 
     `endif //DEST_HT 
    `else 
  `ifdef HT3 
   `ifdef DEST_HT 
       begin      
     fivetail <= 1'b0; 
     fivedest <= 1'b1; 
159 
 
     fivehead <= 1'b0; 
     zerotail <= 1'b0; 
     zerohead <= 1'b0; 
     zerodest <= 1'b1; 
     sevenhead <= 1'b0; 
     seventail <= 1'b0; 
     sevendest <= 1'b1; 
     end 
     `else 
       `ifdef HEAD_HT 
         begin      
     fivetail <= 1'b0; 
     fivedest <= 1'b0; 
     fivehead <= 1'b1; 
     zerotail <= 1'b0; 
     zerohead <= 1'b1; 
     zerodest <= 1'b0; 
     sevenhead <= 1'b1; 
     seventail <= 1'b0; 
     sevendest <= 1'b0; 
     end//header lost 
       `else 
         `ifdef TAIL_HT 
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   begin      
     fivetail <= 1'b1; 
     fivedest <= 1'b0; 
     fivehead <= 1'b0; 
     zerotail <= 1'b1; 
     zerohead <= 1'b0; 
     zerodest <= 1'b0; 
     sevenhead <= 1'b0; 
     seventail <= 1'b1; 
     sevendest <= 1'b0; 
     end//tail lost 
         `else 
      begin      
     fivetail <= 1'b0; 
     fivedest <= 1'b0; 
     fivehead <= 1'b0; 
     zerotail <= 1'b0; 
     zerohead <= 1'b0; 
     zerodest <= 1'b0; 
     sevenhead <= 1'b0; 
     seventail <= 1'b0; 
     sevendest <= 1'b0; 
     end 
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         `endif //TAIL_HT 
        `endif //HEAD_HT 
      `endif //DEST_HT 
                 `else 
     begin      
     fivetail <= 1'b0; 
     fivedest <= 1'b0; 
     fivehead <= 1'b0; 
     zerotail <= 1'b0; 
     zerohead <= 1'b0; 
     zerodest <= 1'b0; 
     sevenhead <= 1'b0; 
     seventail <= 1'b0; 
     sevendest <= 1'b0; 
     end 
  `endif//HT3 




 links0 = 0;  
 links1 = 0;  
 links2 = 0;  
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 links3 = 0;  
 links4 = 0;  
 links5 = 0;  
 links6 = 0;  
 links7 = 0;  
 links8 = 0;  
 links9 = 0;  
 links10 = 0;  
 links11 = 0;  
 links12 = 0;  
 links13 = 0;  
 links14 = 0;  
 links15 = 0;  
 links16 = 0;  
 links17 = 0;  
 links18 = 0;  
 links19 = 0;  
 links20 = 0;  
 links21 = 0;  
 links22 = 0;  
 links23 = 0;  
 links24 = 0;  
 links25 = 0;  
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 links26 = 0;  
 links27 = 0;  
 links28 = 0;  
 links29 = 0;  
 links30 = 0;  
 links31 = 0;  
 links32 = 0;  
 links33 = 0;  
 links34 = 0;  
 links35 = 0;  
 links36 = 0;  
 links37 = 0;  
 links38 = 0;  
 links39 = 0;  
 links40 = 0;  
 links41 = 0;  
 links42 = 0;  
 links43 = 0;  
 links44 = 0;  
 links45 = 0;  
 links46 = 0;  
 links47 = 0;  





 always @(data_00  or almost_full_00)  
begin  
  if((|data_00 >0) | (almost_full_00)) 
     links0 = links0  + 1;  
  else  
     links0 = links0 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_01  or almost_full_01)  
begin  
  if((|data_01 >0) | (almost_full_01)) 
     links1 = links1  + 1;  
  else  
     links1 = links1 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_10  or almost_full_10)  
begin  
  if((|data_10 >0) | (almost_full_10)) 
     links2 = links2  + 1;  
  else  
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     links2 = links2 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_11  or almost_full_11)  
begin  
  if((|data_11 >0) | (almost_full_11)) 
     links3 = links3  + 1;  
  else  
     links3 = links3 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_12  or almost_full_12)  
begin  
  if((|data_12 >0) | (almost_full_12)) 
     links4 = links4  + 1;  
  else  
     links4 = links4 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_20  or almost_full_20)  
begin  
  if((|data_20 >0) | (almost_full_20)) 
     links5 = links5  + 1;  
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  else  
     links5 = links5 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_21  or almost_full_21)  
begin  
  if((|data_21 >0) | (almost_full_21)) 
     links6 = links6  + 1;  
  else  
     links6 = links6 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_22  or almost_full_22)  
begin  
  if((|data_22 >0) | (almost_full_22)) 
     links7 = links7  + 1;  
  else  
     links7 = links7 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_30  or almost_full_30)  
begin  
  if((|data_30 >0) | (almost_full_30)) 
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     links8 = links8  + 1;  
  else  
     links8 = links8 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_31  or almost_full_31)  
begin  
  if((|data_31 >0) | (almost_full_31)) 
     links9 = links9  + 1;  
  else  
     links9 = links9 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_33  or almost_full_33)  
begin  
  if((|data_33 >0) | (almost_full_33)) 
     links10 = links10  + 1;  
  else  
     links10 = links10 ;  
end  
 




  if((|data_40 >0) | (almost_full_40)) 
     links11 = links11  + 1;  
  else  
     links11 = links11 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_41  or almost_full_41)  
begin  
  if((|data_41 >0) | (almost_full_41)) 
     links12 = links12  + 1;  
  else  
     links12 = links12 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_42  or almost_full_42)  
begin  
  if((|data_42 >0) | (almost_full_42)) 
     links13 = links13  + 1;  
  else  
     links13 = links13 ;  
end  
 




  if((|data_43 >0) | (almost_full_43)) 
     links14 = links14  + 1;  
  else  
     links14 = links14 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_50  or almost_full_50)  
begin  
  if((|data_50 >0) | (almost_full_50)) 
     links15 = links15  + 1;  
  else  
     links15 = links15 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_51  or almost_full_51)  
begin  
  if((|data_51 >0) | (almost_full_51)) 
     links16 = links16  + 1;  
  else  





 always @(data_52  or almost_full_52)  
begin  
  if((|data_52 >0) | (almost_full_52)) 
     links17 = links17  + 1;  
  else  
     links17 = links17 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_53  or almost_full_53)  
begin  
  if((|data_53 >0) | (almost_full_53)) 
     links18 = links18  + 1;  
  else  
     links18 = links18 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_60  or almost_full_60)  
begin  
  if((|data_60 >0) | (almost_full_60)) 
     links19 = links19  + 1;  
  else  





 always @(data_61  or almost_full_61)  
begin  
  if((|data_61 >0) | (almost_full_61)) 
     links20 = links20  + 1;  
  else  
     links20 = links20 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_63  or almost_full_63)  
begin  
  if((|data_63 >0) | (almost_full_63)) 
     links21 = links21  + 1;  
  else  
     links21 = links21 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_70  or almost_full_70)  
begin  
  if((|data_70 >0) | (almost_full_70)) 
     links22 = links22  + 1;  
  else  





 always @(data_71  or almost_full_71)  
begin  
  if((|data_71 >0) | (almost_full_71)) 
     links23 = links23  + 1;  
  else  
     links23 = links23 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_72  or almost_full_72)  
begin  
  if((|data_72 >0) | (almost_full_72)) 
     links24 = links24  + 1;  
  else  
     links24 = links24 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_73  or almost_full_73)  
begin  
  if((|data_73 >0) | (almost_full_73)) 
     links25 = links25  + 1;  
  else  
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     links25 = links25 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_80  or almost_full_80)  
begin  
  if((|data_80 >0) | (almost_full_80)) 
     links26 = links26  + 1;  
  else  
     links26 = links26 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_81  or almost_full_81)  
begin  
  if((|data_81 >0) | (almost_full_81)) 
     links27 = links27  + 1;  
  else  
     links27 = links27 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_82  or almost_full_82)  
begin  
  if((|data_82 >0) | (almost_full_82)) 
     links28 = links28  + 1;  
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  else  
     links28 = links28 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_83  or almost_full_83)  
begin  
  if((|data_83 >0) | (almost_full_83)) 
     links29 = links29  + 1;  
  else  
     links29 = links29 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_91  or almost_full_91)  
begin  
  if((|data_91 >0) | (almost_full_91)) 
     links30 = links30  + 1;  
  else  
     links30 = links30 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_92  or almost_full_92)  
begin  
  if((|data_92 >0) | (almost_full_92)) 
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     links31 = links31  + 1;  
  else  
     links31 = links31 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_101  or almost_full_101)  
begin  
  if((|data_101 >0) | (almost_full_101)) 
     links32 = links32  + 1;  
  else  
     links32 = links32 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_102  or almost_full_102)  
begin  
  if((|data_102 >0) | (almost_full_102)) 
     links33 = links33  + 1;  
  else  
     links33 = links33 ;  
end  
 




  if((|data_103 >0) | (almost_full_103)) 
     links34 = links34  + 1;  
  else  
     links34 = links34 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_111  or almost_full_111)  
begin  
  if((|data_111 >0) | (almost_full_111)) 
     links35 = links35  + 1;  
  else  
     links35 = links35 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_112  or almost_full_112)  
begin  
  if((|data_112 >0) | (almost_full_112)) 
     links36 = links36  + 1;  
  else  
     links36 = links36 ;  
end  
 




  if((|data_113 >0) | (almost_full_113)) 
     links37 = links37  + 1;  
  else  
     links37 = links37 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_120  or almost_full_120)  
begin  
  if((|data_120 >0) | (almost_full_120)) 
     links38 = links38  + 1;  
  else  
     links38 = links38 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_123  or almost_full_123)  
begin  
  if((|data_123 >0) | (almost_full_123)) 
     links39 = links39  + 1;  
  else  





 always @(data_130  or almost_full_130)  
begin  
  if((|data_130 >0) | (almost_full_130)) 
     links40 = links40  + 1;  
  else  
     links40 = links40 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_132  or almost_full_132)  
begin  
  if((|data_132 >0) | (almost_full_132)) 
     links41 = links41  + 1;  
  else  
     links41 = links41 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_133  or almost_full_133)  
begin  
  if((|data_133 >0) | (almost_full_133)) 
     links42 = links42  + 1;  
  else  





 always @(data_140  or almost_full_140)  
begin  
  if((|data_140 >0) | (almost_full_140)) 
     links43 = links43  + 1;  
  else  
     links43 = links43 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_142  or almost_full_142)  
begin  
  if((|data_142 >0) | (almost_full_142)) 
     links44 = links44  + 1;  
  else  
     links44 = links44 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_143  or almost_full_143)  
begin  
  if((|data_143 >0) | (almost_full_143)) 
     links45 = links45  + 1;  
  else  





 always @(data_152  or almost_full_152)  
begin  
  if((|data_152 >0) | (almost_full_152)) 
     links46 = links46  + 1;  
  else  
     links46 = links46 ;  
end  
 
 always @(data_153  or almost_full_153)  
begin  
  if((|data_153 >0) | (almost_full_153)) 
     links47 = links47  + 1;  
  else  







op_file0 = $fopen(filename0, "w"); 
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op_file1 = $fopen(filename1, "w"); 
op_file2 = $fopen(filename2, "w"); 
op_file3 = $fopen(filename3, "w"); 
op_file4 = $fopen(filename4, "w"); 
op_file5 = $fopen(filename5, "w"); 
op_file6 = $fopen(filename6, "w"); 
op_file7 = $fopen(filename7, "w"); 
op_file8 = $fopen(filename8, "w"); 
op_file9 = $fopen(filename9, "w"); 
op_file10 = $fopen(filename10, "w"); 
op_file11 = $fopen(filename11, "w"); 
op_file12 = $fopen(filename12, "w"); 
op_file13 = $fopen(filename13, "w"); 
op_file14 = $fopen(filename14, "w"); 
op_file15 = $fopen(filename15, "w"); 
op_file16 = $fopen(filename16, "w"); 
op_file17 = $fopen(filename17, "w"); 
op_file18 = $fopen(filename18, "w"); 
op_file19 = $fopen(filename19, "w"); 
 
r_file0 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR0.txt","r"); 
r_file1 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR1.txt","r"); 
r_file2 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR2.txt","r"); 
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r_file3 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR3.txt","r"); 
r_file4 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR4.txt","r"); 
r_file5 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR5.txt","r"); 
r_file6 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR6.txt","r"); 
r_file7 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR7.txt","r"); 
r_file8 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR8.txt","r"); 
r_file9 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR9.txt","r"); 
r_file10 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR10.txt","r"); 
r_file11 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR11.txt","r"); 
r_file12 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR12.txt","r"); 
r_file13 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR13.txt","r"); 
r_file14 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR14.txt","r"); 






  CLK = 1'b0; 
  CLK2 = 1'b0; 
 reset = 1'b1; 
 Count = 14'd0; 
 trigger = 1'b0; 
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 NACK_in_E = 1'b0; 
 NACK_in_S = 1'b0; 
 NACK_in_W = 1'b0; 
 NACK_in_N = 1'b0; 
 NACK_in_L = 1'b0; 
 BW = 0; //measures bandwidth x/48 
 ps0 = 0; 
 ps1 = 0; 
 ps2 = 0; 
 ps3 = 0; 
 ps4 = 0; 
 ps5 = 0; 
 ps6 = 0; 
 ps7 = 0; 
 ps8 = 0; 
 ps9 = 0; 
 ps10 = 0; 
 ps11 = 0; 
 ps12 = 0; 
 ps13 = 0; 
 ps14 = 0; 
 ps15 = 0; 
 pstotal = 0;  
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 src0 = 4'b0000; 
 src1 = 4'b0001; 
 src2 = 4'b0010; 
 src3 = 4'b0011; 
 src4 = 4'b0100; 
 src5 = 4'b0101; 
 src6 = 4'b0110; 
 src7 = 4'b0111; 
 src8 = 4'b1000; 
 src9 = 4'b1001; 
 src10 = 4'b1010; 
 src11 = 4'b1011; 
 src12 = 4'b1100; 
 src13 = 4'b1101; 
 src14 = 4'b1110; 
 src15 = 4'b1111;  
 Dest0 = 5'd0; 
 Dest1 = 5'd0; 
 Dest2 = 5'd0; 
 Dest3 = 5'd0; 
 Dest4 = 5'd0; 
 Dest5 = 5'd0; 
 Dest6 = 5'd0; 
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 Dest7 = 5'd0; 
 Dest8 = 5'd0; 
 Dest9 = 5'd0; 
 Dest10 = 5'd0; 
 Dest11 = 5'd0; 
 Dest12 = 5'd0; 
 Dest13 = 5'd0; 
 Dest14 = 5'd0; 
 Dest15 = 5'd0;  
 D0 = 4'd0; 
 D1 = 4'd0; 
 D2 = 4'd0; 
 D3 = 4'd0; 
 D4 = 4'd0; 
 D5 = 4'd0; 
 D6 = 4'd0; 
 D7 = 4'd0; 
 D8 = 4'd0; 
 D9 = 4'd0; 
 D10 = 4'd0; 
 D11 = 4'd0; 
 D12 = 4'd0; 
 D13 = 4'd0; 
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 D14 = 4'd0; 
 D15 = 4'd0;  
 spackets0 = 0; 
 spackets1 = 0; 
 spackets2 = 0; 
 spackets3 = 0; 
 spackets4 = 0; 
 spackets5 = 0; 
 spackets6 = 0; 
 spackets7 = 0; 
 spackets8 = 0; 
 spackets9 = 0; 
 spackets10 = 0; 
 spackets11 = 0; 
 spackets12 = 0; 
 spackets13 = 0; 
 spackets14 = 0; 
 spackets15 = 0;  
 rpackets0 = 0; 
 rpackets1 = 0; 
 rpackets2 = 0; 
 rpackets3 = 0; 
 rpackets4 = 0; 
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 rpackets5 = 0; 
 rpackets6 = 0; 
 rpackets7 = 0; 
 rpackets8 = 0; 
 rpackets9 = 0; 
 rpackets10 = 0; 
 rpackets11 = 0; 
 rpackets12 = 0; 
 rpackets13 = 0; 
 rpackets14 = 0; 
 rpackets15 = 0; 
 inreq0 = 1'b0; 
 inreq1 = 1'b0; 
 inreq2 = 1'b0; 
 inreq3 = 1'b0; 
 inreq4 = 1'b0; 
 inreq5 = 1'b0; 
 inreq6 = 1'b0; 
 inreq7 = 1'b0; 
 inreq8 = 1'b0; 
 inreq9 = 1'b0; 
 inreq10 = 1'b0; 
 inreq11 = 1'b0; 
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 inreq12 = 1'b0; 
 inreq13 = 1'b0; 
 inreq14 = 1'b0; 
 inreq15 = 1'b0;  
 ID0 = 8'h00; 
 ID1 = 8'h00; 
 ID2 = 8'h00; 
 ID3 = 8'h00; 
 ID4 = 8'h00; 
 ID5 = 8'h00; 
 ID6 = 8'h00; 
 ID7 = 8'h00; 
 ID8 = 8'h00; 
 ID9 = 8'h00; 
 ID10 = 8'h00; 
 ID11 = 8'h00; 
 ID12 = 8'h00; 
 ID13 = 8'h00; 
 ID14 = 8'h00; 
 ID15 = 8'h00; 
 Info0 = 10'd0; 
 Info1 = 10'd0; 
 Info2 = 10'd0; 
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 Info3 = 10'd0; 
 Info4 = 10'd0; 
 Info5 = 10'd0; 
 Info6 = 10'd0; 
 Info7 = 10'd0; 
 Info8 = 10'd0; 
 Info9 = 10'd0; 
 Info10 = 10'd0; 
 Info11 = 10'd0; 
 Info12 = 10'd0; 
 Info13 = 10'd0; 
 Info14 = 10'd0; 
 Info15 = 10'd0;  
 corr0 = 0; 
 corr1 = 0; 
 corr2 = 0; 
 corr3 = 0; 
 corr4 = 0; 
 corr5 = 0; 
 corr6 = 0; 
 corr7 = 0; 
 corr8 = 0; 
 corr9 = 0; 
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 corr10 = 0; 
 corr11 = 0; 
 corr12 = 0; 
 corr13 = 0; 
 corr14 = 0; 
 corr15 = 0; 
 corrtotal = 0; 
 rtotal = 0;  
 #900 
 reset = 1'b0; //initialization done, start tests 
 packetsreceived = 0; 
 packetsSent = 0; 
  trigger = 1'b1; 
 #8501000; 
 rtotal = 
rpackets0+rpackets1+rpackets2+rpackets3+rpackets4+rpackets5+rpackets6+rpackets7+rpackets8+
rpackets9+rpackets10+rpackets11+rpackets12+rpackets13+rpackets14+rpackets15; 
 corrtotal = 
corr0+corr1+corr2+corr3+corr4+corr5+corr6+corr7+corr8+corr9+corr10+corr11+corr12+corr13+
corr14+corr15; 
 $fwrite(op_file16, "%d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n 
%d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n  %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n 
%d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n 
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%d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n" ,ps0, ps1, ps2, ps3, ps4, ps5, ps6, 
ps7, ps8, ps9, ps10, ps11, ps12, ps13, ps14, ps15, pstotal, rpackets0, rpackets1, rpackets2, rpackets3, 
rpackets4, rpackets5, rpackets6, rpackets7, rpackets8, rpackets9, rpackets10, rpackets11, rpackets12, 
rpackets13, rpackets14, rpackets15, 
rtotal,corr0,corr1,corr2,corr3,corr4,corr5,corr6,corr7,corr8,corr9,corr10,corr11,corr12,corr13,corr1
4,corr15, corrtotal); 
 $fwrite(op_file19, "%d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n 
%d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n 
%d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n 
%d\n %d\n ",links0, links1, links2, links3, links4, links5, links6, links7, links8, links9, links10, 
links11, links12, links13, links14, links15, links16, links17, links18, links19, links20, links21, 
links22, links23, links24, links25, links26, links27, links28, links29, links30, links31, links32, 
links33, links34, links35, links36, links37, links38, links39, links40, links41, links42, links43, 


















































 code0 = $fscanf(r_file0, "%dddd", Destr0); 
 code0 = $fseek(r_file0, 1, 1); 
 code1 = $fscanf(r_file1, "%dddd", Destr1); 
 code1 = $fseek(r_file1, 1, 1); 
 code2 = $fscanf(r_file2, "%dddd", Destr2); 
 code2 = $fseek(r_file2, 1, 1); 
 code3 = $fscanf(r_file3, "%dddd", Destr3); 
 code3 = $fseek(r_file3, 1, 1); 
 code4 = $fscanf(r_file4, "%dddd", Destr4); 
 code4 = $fseek(r_file4, 1, 1); 
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 code5 = $fscanf(r_file5, "%dddd", Destr5); 
 code5 = $fseek(r_file5, 1, 1); 
 code6 = $fscanf(r_file6, "%dddd", Destr6); 
 code6 = $fseek(r_file6, 1, 1); 
 code7 = $fscanf(r_file7, "%dddd", Destr7); 
 code7 = $fseek(r_file7, 1, 1); 
 code8 = $fscanf(r_file8, "%dddd", Destr8); 
 code8 = $fseek(r_file8, 1, 1); 
 code9 = $fscanf(r_file9, "%dddd", Destr9); 
 code9 = $fseek(r_file9, 1, 1); 
 code10 = $fscanf(r_file10, "%dddd", Destr10); 
 code10 = $fseek(r_file10, 1, 1); 
 code11 = $fscanf(r_file11, "%dddd", Destr11); 
 code11 = $fseek(r_file11, 1, 1); 
 code12 = $fscanf(r_file12, "%dddd", Destr12); 
 code12 = $fseek(r_file12, 1, 1); 
 code13 = $fscanf(r_file13, "%dddd", Destr13); 
 code13 = $fseek(r_file13, 1, 1); 
 code14 = $fscanf(r_file14, "%dddd", Destr14); 
 code14 = $fseek(r_file14, 1, 1); 
 code15 = $fscanf(r_file15, "%dddd", Destr15); 






  begin 
    if((Destr0 > 0)&&(Destr0 !== 100)) 
      begin 
        Dest0 = Destr0/100; 
        case(Dest0) 
        5'd1: begin D0 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0; end 
        5'd2: begin D0 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end 
        5'd3: begin D0 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end 
        5'd4: begin D0 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end 
        5'd5: begin D0 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end 
        5'd6: begin D0 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end 
        5'd7: begin D0 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end 
        5'd8: begin D0 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end 
        5'd9: begin D0 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end 
        5'd10: begin D0 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end 
        5'd11: begin D0 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end 
        5'd12: begin D0 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end 
        5'd13: begin D0 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end 
        5'd14: begin D0 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end 
        5'd15: begin D0 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end 
        5'd16: begin D0 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end 
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        default: D0 = 4'b0000; 
        endcase 
    end 
    else 
      begin 
        Dest0 = 5'd0; 
        D0 = 4'b0000; 
      end 




if((D0 !== 4'b0000)&&(Dest0 !== 5'd0)) 
begin 
@(negedge CLK) 
Info0[9:0] = {D0[3:0], src0[3:0], 2'b01}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info0[9:0] = {D0[3:0], src0[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info0[9:0] = {D0[3:0], src0[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 




Info0[9:0] = {4'b0000, src0[3:0], 2'b00}; 
spackets0 = spackets0 + 1; 
end 
else 




  begin 
    if((Destr1 > 0)&&(Destr1 !== 200)) 
      begin 
        Dest1 = Destr1/100; 
        case(Dest1) 
        5'd1: begin D1 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end 
        5'd2: begin D1 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1; end 
        5'd3: begin D1 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end 
        5'd4: begin D1 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end 
        5'd5: begin D1 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end 
        5'd6: begin D1 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end 
        5'd7: begin D1 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end 
        5'd8: begin D1 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end 
        5'd9: begin D1 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end 
        5'd10: begin D1 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end 
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        5'd11: begin D1 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end 
        5'd12: begin D1 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end 
        5'd13: begin D1 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end 
        5'd14: begin D1 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end 
        5'd15: begin D1 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end 
        5'd16: begin D1 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end 
        default: D1 = 4'b0000; 
        endcase 
    end 
    else 
      begin 
        Dest1 = 5'd0; 
        D1 = 4'b0000; 
      end 




if((D1 !== 4'b0001)&&(Dest1 !== 5'd0)) 
begin 
@(negedge CLK) 




Info1[9:0] = {D1[3:0], src1[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info1[9:0] = {D1[3:0], src1[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info1[9:0] = {D1[3:0], src1[3:0], 2'b10}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info1[9:0] = {4'b0000, src1[3:0], 2'b00}; 
spackets1 = spackets1 + 1; 
end 
else 




  begin 
    if((Destr2 > 0)&&(Destr2 !== 300)) 
      begin 
        Dest2 = Destr2/100; 
        case(Dest2) 
        5'd1: begin D2 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end 
        5'd2: begin D2 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end 
        5'd3: begin D2 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2; end 
        5'd4: begin D2 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end 
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        5'd5: begin D2 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end 
        5'd6: begin D2 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end 
        5'd7: begin D2 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end 
        5'd8: begin D2 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end 
        5'd9: begin D2 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end 
        5'd10: begin D2 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end 
        5'd11: begin D2 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end 
        5'd12: begin D2 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end 
        5'd13: begin D2 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end 
        5'd14: begin D2 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end 
        5'd15: begin D2 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end 
        5'd16: begin D2 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end 
        default: D2 = 4'b0000; 
        endcase 
    end 
    else 
      begin 
        Dest2 = 5'd0; 
        D2 = 4'b0000; 
      end 






if((D2 !== 4'b0010)&&(Dest2 !== 5'd0)) 
begin 
@(negedge CLK) 
Info2[9:0] = {D2[3:0], src2[3:0], 2'b01}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info2[9:0] = {D2[3:0], src2[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info2[9:0] = {D2[3:0], src2[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info2[9:0] = {D2[3:0], src2[3:0], 2'b10}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info2[9:0] = {4'b0000, src2[3:0], 2'b00}; 
spackets2 = spackets2 + 1; 
end 
else 




  begin 
    if((Destr3 > 0)&&(Destr3 !== 400)) 
      begin 
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        Dest3 = Destr3/100; 
        case(Dest3) 
        5'd1: begin D3 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end 
        5'd2: begin D3 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end 
        5'd3: begin D3 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end 
        5'd4: begin D3 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3; end 
        5'd5: begin D3 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end 
        5'd6: begin D3 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end 
        5'd7: begin D3 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end 
        5'd8: begin D3 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end 
        5'd9: begin D3 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end 
        5'd10: begin D3 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end 
        5'd11: begin D3 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end 
        5'd12: begin D3 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end 
        5'd13: begin D3 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end 
        5'd14: begin D3 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end 
        5'd15: begin D3 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end 
        5'd16: begin D3 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end 
        default: D3 = 4'b0000; 
        endcase 
    end 
    else 
      begin 
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        Dest3 = 5'd0; 
        D3 = 4'b0000; 
      end 




if((D3 !== 4'b0011)&&(Dest3 !== 5'd0)) 
begin 
@(negedge CLK) 
Info3[9:0] = {D3[3:0], src3[3:0], 2'b01}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info3[9:0] = {D3[3:0], src3[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info3[9:0] = {D3[3:0], src3[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info3[9:0] = {D3[3:0], src3[3:0], 2'b10}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info3[9:0] = {4'b0000, src3[3:0], 2'b00}; 
spackets3 = spackets3 + 1; 
end 
else 






  begin 
    if((Destr4 > 0)&&(Destr4 !== 500)) 
      begin 
        Dest4 = Destr4/100; 
        case(Dest4) 
        5'd1: begin D4 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end 
        5'd2: begin D4 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end 
        5'd3: begin D4 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end 
        5'd4: begin D4 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end 
        5'd5: begin D4 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4; end 
        5'd6: begin D4 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end 
        5'd7: begin D4 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end 
        5'd8: begin D4 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end 
        5'd9: begin D4 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end 
        5'd10: begin D4 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end 
        5'd11: begin D4 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end 
        5'd12: begin D4 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end 
        5'd13: begin D4 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end 
        5'd14: begin D4 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end 
        5'd15: begin D4 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end 
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        5'd16: begin D4 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end 
        default: D4 = 4'b0000; 
        endcase 
    end 
    else 
      begin 
        Dest4 = 5'd0; 
        D4 = 4'b0000; 
      end 




if((D4 !== 4'b0100)&&(Dest4 !== 5'd0)) 
begin 
@(negedge CLK) 
Info4[9:0] = {D4[3:0], src4[3:0], 2'b01}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info4[9:0] = {D4[3:0], src4[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info4[9:0] = {D4[3:0], src4[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 




Info4[9:0] = {4'b0000, src4[3:0], 2'b00}; 
spackets4 = spackets4 + 1; 
end 
else 




  begin 
    if((Destr5 > 0)&&(Destr5 !== 600)) 
      begin 
        Dest5 = Destr5/100; 
        case(Dest5) 
        5'd1: begin D5 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end 
        5'd2: begin D5 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end 
        5'd3: begin D5 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end 
        5'd4: begin D5 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end 
        5'd5: begin D5 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end 
        5'd6: begin D5 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5; end 
        5'd7: begin D5 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end 
        5'd8: begin D5 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end 
        5'd9: begin D5 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end 
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        5'd10: begin D5 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end 
        5'd11: begin D5 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end 
        5'd12: begin D5 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end 
        5'd13: begin D5 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end 
        5'd14: begin D5 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end 
        5'd15: begin D5 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end 
        5'd16: begin D5 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end 
        default: D5 = 4'b0000; 
        endcase 
    end 
    else 
      begin 
        Dest5 = 5'd0; 
        D5 = 4'b0000; 
      end 




if((D5 !== 4'b0101)&&(Dest5 !== 5'd0)) 
begin 
@(negedge CLK) 




Info5[9:0] = {D5[3:0], src5[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info5[9:0] = {D5[3:0], src5[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info5[9:0] = {D5[3:0], src5[3:0], 2'b10}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info5[9:0] = {4'b0000, src5[3:0], 2'b00}; 




Info5[9:0] = 10'd0; 
end 
//6 
always@((Destr6 > 0)&&(Destr6 !== 700)) 
  begin 
    if(Destr6 > 0) 
      begin 
        Dest6 = Destr6/100; 
        case(Dest6) 
        5'd1: begin D6 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end 
        5'd2: begin D6 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end 
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        5'd3: begin D6 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end 
        5'd4: begin D6 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end 
        5'd5: begin D6 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end 
        5'd6: begin D6 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end 
        5'd7: begin D6 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6; end 
        5'd8: begin D6 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end 
        5'd9: begin D6 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end 
        5'd10: begin D6 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end 
        5'd11: begin D6 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end 
        5'd12: begin D6 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end 
        5'd13: begin D6 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end 
        5'd14: begin D6 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end 
        5'd15: begin D6 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end 
        5'd16: begin D6 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end 
        default: D6 = 4'b0000; 
        endcase 
    end 
    else 
      begin 
        Dest6 = 5'd0; 
        D6 = 4'b0000; 
      end 






if((D6 !== 4'b0110)&&(Dest6 !== 5'd0)) 
begin 
@(negedge CLK) 
Info6[9:0] = {D6[3:0], src6[3:0], 2'b01}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info6[9:0] = {D6[3:0], src6[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info6[9:0] = {D6[3:0], src6[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info6[9:0] = {D6[3:0], src6[3:0], 2'b10}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info6[9:0] = {4'b0000, src6[3:0], 2'b00}; 










  begin 
    if((Destr7 > 0)&&(Destr7 !== 800)) 
      begin 
        Dest7 = Destr7/100; 
        case(Dest7) 
        5'd1: begin D7 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end 
        5'd2: begin D7 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end 
        5'd3: begin D7 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end 
        5'd4: begin D7 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end 
        5'd5: begin D7 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end 
        5'd6: begin D7 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end 
        5'd7: begin D7 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end 
        5'd8: begin D7 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7; end 
        5'd9: begin D7 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end 
        5'd10: begin D7 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end 
        5'd11: begin D7 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end 
        5'd12: begin D7 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end 
        5'd13: begin D7 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end 
        5'd14: begin D7 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end 
        5'd15: begin D7 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end 
        5'd16: begin D7 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end 
        default: D7 = 4'b0000; 
        endcase 
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    end 
    else 
      begin 
        Dest7 = 5'd0; 
        D7 = 4'b0000; 
      end 




if((D7 !== 4'b0111)&&(Dest7 !== 5'd0)) 
begin 
@(negedge CLK) 
Info7[9:0] = {D7[3:0], src7[3:0], 2'b01}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info7[9:0] = {D7[3:0], src7[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info7[9:0] = {D7[3:0], src7[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info7[9:0] = {D7[3:0], src7[3:0], 2'b10}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info7[9:0] = {4'b0000, src7[3:0], 2'b00}; 










  begin 
    if((Destr8 > 0)&&(Destr8 !== 900)) 
      begin 
        Dest8 = Destr8/100; 
        case(Dest8) 
        5'd1: begin D8 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end 
        5'd2: begin D8 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end 
        5'd3: begin D8 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end 
        5'd4: begin D8 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end 
        5'd5: begin D8 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end 
        5'd6: begin D8 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end 
        5'd7: begin D8 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end 
        5'd8: begin D8 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end 
        5'd9: begin D8 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8; end 
        5'd10: begin D8 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end 
        5'd11: begin D8 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end 
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        5'd12: begin D8 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end 
        5'd13: begin D8 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end 
        5'd14: begin D8 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end 
        5'd15: begin D8 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end 
        5'd16: begin D8 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end 
        default: D8 = 4'b0000; 
        endcase 
    end 
    else 
      begin 
        Dest8 = 5'd0; 
        D8 = 4'b0000; 
      end 




if((D8 !== 4'b1000)&&(Dest8 !== 5'd0)) 
begin 
@(negedge CLK) 
Info8[9:0] = {D8[3:0], src8[3:0], 2'b01}; 
@(posedge CLK) 




Info8[9:0] = {D8[3:0], src8[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info8[9:0] = {D8[3:0], src8[3:0], 2'b10}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info8[9:0] = {4'b0000, src8[3:0], 2'b00}; 








  begin 
    if((Destr9 > 0)&&(Destr9 !== 1000)) 
      begin 
        Dest9 = Destr9/100; 
        case(Dest9) 
        5'd1: begin D9 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end 
        5'd2: begin D9 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end 
        5'd3: begin D9 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end 
        5'd4: begin D9 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end 
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        5'd5: begin D9 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end 
        5'd6: begin D9 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end 
        5'd7: begin D9 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end 
        5'd8: begin D9 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end 
        5'd9: begin D9 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end 
        5'd10: begin D9 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9; end 
        5'd11: begin D9 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end 
        5'd12: begin D9 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end 
        5'd13: begin D9 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end 
        5'd14: begin D9 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end 
        5'd15: begin D9 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end 
        5'd16: begin D9 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end 
        default: D9 = 4'b0000; 
        endcase 
    end 
    else 
      begin 
        Dest9 = 5'd0; 
        D9 = 4'b0000; 
      end 






if((D9 !== 4'b1001)&&(Dest9 !== 5'd0)) 
begin 
@(negedge CLK) 
Info9[9:0] = {D9[3:0], src9[3:0], 2'b01}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info9[9:0] = {D9[3:0], src9[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info9[9:0] = {D9[3:0], src9[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info9[9:0] = {D9[3:0], src9[3:0], 2'b10}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info9[9:0] = {4'b0000, src9[3:0], 2'b00}; 








  begin 
    if((Destr10 > 0)&&(Destr10 !== 1100)) 
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      begin 
        Dest10 = Destr10/100; 
        case(Dest10) 
        5'd1: begin D10 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end 
        5'd2: begin D10 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end 
        5'd3: begin D10 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end 
        5'd4: begin D10 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end 
        5'd5: begin D10 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end 
        5'd6: begin D10 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end 
        5'd7: begin D10 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end 
        5'd8: begin D10 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end 
        5'd9: begin D10 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end 
        5'd10: begin D10 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end 
        5'd11: begin D10 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10; end 
        5'd12: begin D10 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end 
        5'd13: begin D10 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end 
        5'd14: begin D10 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end 
        5'd15: begin D10 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end 
        5'd16: begin D10 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end 
        default: D10 = 4'b0000; 
        endcase 
    end 
    else 
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      begin 
        Dest10 = 5'd0; 
        D10 = 4'b0000; 
      end 




if((D10 !== 4'b1010)&&(Dest10 !== 5'd0)) 
begin 
@(negedge CLK) 
Info10[9:0] = {D10[3:0], src10[3:0], 2'b01}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info10[9:0] = {D10[3:0], src10[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info10[9:0] = {D10[3:0], src10[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info10[9:0] = {D10[3:0], src10[3:0], 2'b10}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info10[9:0] = {4'b0000, src10[3:0], 2'b00}; 










  begin 
    if((Destr11 > 0)&&(Destr11 !== 1200)) 
      begin 
        Dest11 = Destr11/100; 
        case(Dest11) 
        5'd1: begin D11 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end 
        5'd2: begin D11 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end 
        5'd3: begin D11 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end 
        5'd4: begin D11 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end 
        5'd5: begin D11 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end 
        5'd6: begin D11 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end 
        5'd7: begin D11 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end 
        5'd8: begin D11 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end 
        5'd9: begin D11 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end 
        5'd10: begin D11 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end 
        5'd11: begin D11 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end 
        5'd12: begin D11 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11; end 
        5'd13: begin D11 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end 
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        5'd14: begin D11 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end 
        5'd15: begin D11 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end 
        5'd16: begin D11 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end 
        default: D11 = 4'b0000; 
        endcase 
    end 
    else 
      begin 
        Dest11 = 5'd0; 
        D11 = 4'b0000; 
      end 




if((D11 !== 4'b1011)&&(Dest11 !== 5'd0)) 
begin 
@(negedge CLK) 
Info11[9:0] = {D11[3:0], src11[3:0], 2'b01}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info11[9:0] = {D11[3:0], src11[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 




Info11[9:0] = {D11[3:0], src11[3:0], 2'b10}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info11[9:0] = {4'b0000, src11[3:0], 2'b00}; 








  begin 
    if((Destr12 > 0)&&(Destr12 !== 1300)) 
      begin 
        Dest12 = Destr12/100; 
        case(Dest12) 
        5'd1: begin D12 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end 
        5'd2: begin D12 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end 
        5'd3: begin D12 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end 
        5'd4: begin D12 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end 
        5'd5: begin D12 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end 
        5'd6: begin D12 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end 
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        5'd7: begin D12 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end 
        5'd8: begin D12 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end 
        5'd9: begin D12 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end 
        5'd10: begin D12 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end 
        5'd11: begin D12 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end 
        5'd12: begin D12 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end 
        5'd13: begin D12 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12; end 
        5'd14: begin D12 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end 
        5'd15: begin D12 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end 
        5'd16: begin D12 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end 
        default: D12 = 4'b0000; 
        endcase 
    end 
    else 
      begin 
        Dest12 = 5'd0; 
        D12 = 4'b0000; 
      end 









Info12[9:0] = {D12[3:0], src12[3:0], 2'b01}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info12[9:0] = {D12[3:0], src12[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info12[9:0] = {D12[3:0], src12[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info12[9:0] = {D12[3:0], src12[3:0], 2'b10}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info12[9:0] = {4'b0000, src12[3:0], 2'b00}; 








  begin 
    if((Destr13 > 0)&&(Destr13 !== 1400)) 
      begin 
        Dest13 = Destr13/100; 
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        case(Dest13) 
        5'd1: begin D13 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end 
        5'd2: begin D13 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end 
        5'd3: begin D13 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end 
        5'd4: begin D13 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end 
        5'd5: begin D13 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end 
        5'd6: begin D13 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end 
        5'd7: begin D13 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end 
        5'd8: begin D13 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end 
        5'd9: begin D13 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end 
        5'd10: begin D13 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end 
        5'd11: begin D13 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end 
        5'd12: begin D13 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end 
        5'd13: begin D13 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end 
        5'd14: begin D13 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13; end 
        5'd15: begin D13 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end 
        5'd16: begin D13 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end 
        default: D13 = 4'b0000; 
        endcase 
    end 
    else 
      begin 
        Dest13 = 5'd0; 
226 
 
        D13 = 4'b0000; 
      end 




if((D13 !== 4'b1101)&&(Dest13 !== 5'd0)) 
begin 
@(negedge CLK) 
Info13[9:0] = {D13[3:0], src13[3:0], 2'b01}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info13[9:0] = {D13[3:0], src13[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info13[9:0] = {D13[3:0], src13[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info13[9:0] = {D13[3:0], src13[3:0], 2'b10}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info13[9:0] = {4'b0000, src13[3:0], 2'b00}; 










  begin 
    if((Destr14 > 0)&&(Destr14 !== 1500)) 
      begin 
        Dest14 = Destr14/100; 
        case(Dest14) 
        5'd1: begin D14 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end 
        5'd2: begin D14 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end 
        5'd3: begin D14 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end 
        5'd4: begin D14 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end 
        5'd5: begin D14 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end 
        5'd6: begin D14 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end 
        5'd7: begin D14 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end 
        5'd8: begin D14 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end 
        5'd9: begin D14 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end 
        5'd10: begin D14 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end 
        5'd11: begin D14 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end 
        5'd12: begin D14 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end 
        5'd13: begin D14 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end 
        5'd14: begin D14 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end 
        5'd15: begin D14 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14; end 
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        5'd16: begin D14 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end 
        default: D14 = 4'b0000; 
        endcase 
    end 
    else 
      begin 
        Dest14 = 5'd0; 
        D14 = 4'b0000; 
      end 




if((D14 !== 4'b1110)&&(Dest14 !== 5'd0)) 
begin 
@(negedge CLK) 
Info14[9:0] = {D14[3:0], src14[3:0], 2'b01}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info14[9:0] = {D14[3:0], src14[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info14[9:0] = {D14[3:0], src14[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 




Info14[9:0] = {4'b0000, src14[3:0], 2'b00}; 








  begin 
    if((Destr15 > 0)&&(Destr15 !== 1600)) 
      begin 
        Dest15 = Destr15/100; 
        case(Dest15) 
        5'd1: begin D15 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end 
        5'd2: begin D15 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end 
        5'd3: begin D15 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end 
        5'd4: begin D15 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end 
        5'd5: begin D15 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end 
        5'd6: begin D15 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end 
        5'd7: begin D15 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end 
        5'd8: begin D15 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end 
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        5'd9: begin D15 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end 
        5'd10: begin D15 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end 
        5'd11: begin D15 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end 
        5'd12: begin D15 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end 
        5'd13: begin D15 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end 
        5'd14: begin D15 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end 
        5'd15: begin D15 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end 
        5'd16: begin D15 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15; end 
        default: D15 = 4'b0000; 
        endcase 
    end 
    else 
      begin 
        Dest15 = 5'd0; 
        D15 = 4'b0000; 
      end 









Info15[9:0] = {D15[3:0], src15[3:0], 2'b01}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info15[9:0] = {D15[3:0], src15[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info15[9:0] = {D15[3:0], src15[3:0], 2'b11}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info15[9:0] = {D15[3:0], src15[3:0], 2'b10}; 
@(posedge CLK) 
Info15[9:0] = {4'b0000, src15[3:0], 2'b00}; 










#200 CLK <= ~CLK; 
end 
 
//Measure total packets sent 
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always@(spackets0 or spackets1 or spackets2 or spackets3 or spackets4 or spackets5 or spackets6 
or spackets7 or spackets8 or spackets9 or spackets10 or spackets11 or spackets12 or spackets13 or 
spackets14 or spackets15) 
begin 
packetsSent = spackets0 + spackets1 + spackets2 + spackets3 + spackets4 + spackets5 + spackets6 
+ spackets7 + spackets8 + spackets9 + spackets10 + spackets11 + spackets12 + spackets13 + 
spackets14 + spackets15; 
end 

















always@(negedge CLK) //capture Bandwidth at Negative edge 
begin 
if(reset) 
BW = 0; 
else 
begin 
BW = ((|data_00) | almost_full_00) + ((|data_01) | almost_full_01) + ((|data_10) | almost_full_10) + 
((|data_11) | almost_full_11) + ((|data_12) | almost_full_12) + ((|data_20) | almost_full_20) + 
((|data_21) | almost_full_21) + ((|data_22) | almost_full_22) + ((|data_30) | almost_full_30) + 
((|data_31) | almost_full_31) + ((|data_33) | almost_full_33) + ((|data_40) | almost_full_40) + 
((|data_41) | almost_full_41) + ((|data_42) | almost_full_42) + ((|data_43) | almost_full_43) + 
((|data_50) | almost_full_50) + ((|data_51) | almost_full_51) + ((|data_52) | almost_full_52) + 
((|data_53) | almost_full_53) + ((|data_60) | almost_full_60) + ((|data_61) | almost_full_61) + 
((|data_63) | almost_full_63) + ((|data_70) | almost_full_70) + ((|data_71) | almost_full_71) + 
((|data_72) | almost_full_72) + ((|data_73) | almost_full_73) + ((|data_80) | almost_full_80) + 
((|data_81) | almost_full_81) + ((|data_82) | almost_full_82) + ((|data_83) | almost_full_83) + 
((|data_91) | almost_full_91) + ((|data_92) | almost_full_92) + ((|data_101) | almost_full_101) + 
((|data_102) | almost_full_102) + ((|data_103) | almost_full_103) + ((|data_111) | almost_full_111) 
+ ((|data_112) | almost_full_112) + ((|data_113) | almost_full_113) + ((|data_120) | almost_full_120) 
+ ((|data_123) | almost_full_123) + ((|data_130) | almost_full_130) + ((|data_132) | almost_full_132) 
+ ((|data_133) | almost_full_133) + ((|data_140) | almost_full_140) + ((|data_142) | almost_full_142) 









always@(ps0 or ps1 or ps2 or ps3 or ps4 or ps5 or ps6 or ps7 or ps8 or ps9 or ps10 or ps11 or ps12 
or ps13 or ps14 or ps15) 
begin 
pstotal = ps0 + ps1 + ps2 + ps3 + ps4 + ps5 + ps6 + ps7 + ps8 + ps9 + ps10 + ps11 + ps12 + ps13 + 





if(data_04[1:0] > 2'b00) 
begin 
 
 if(data_04[1:0] == 2'b10) 
 begin 
 rpackets0 = rpackets0 + 1; 
   if(data_04[17:14] == 4'b0000) begin 
   $fwrite(op_file0,"%d\n", (Count[13:0] - data_04[31:18])); 
     corr0 = corr0 + 1; end 
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     else 
     corr0 = corr0; 
 end 
 else 
 rpackets0 = rpackets0; 
end 
else 





if(data_14[1:0] > 2'b00) 
begin 
 
 if(data_14[1:0] == 2'b10) 
 begin 
 rpackets1 = rpackets1 + 1; 
 if(data_14[17:14] == 4'b0001) 
 begin 
 $fwrite(op_file1, "%d\n", (Count[13:0] - data_14[31:18]));  
     corr1 = corr1 + 1; end 
     else 
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     corr1 = corr1; 
     end 
 else 
 rpackets1 = rpackets1; 
end 
else 





if(data_24[1:0] > 2'b00) 
begin 
 
 if(data_24[1:0] == 2'b10) 
 begin 
 rpackets2 = rpackets2 + 1; 
 if(data_24[17:14] == 4'b0010)begin 
 $fwrite(op_file2, "%d\n",(Count[13:0] - data_24[31:18]));  
     corr2 = corr2 + 1;end 
     else 
     corr2 = corr2; 




 rpackets2 = rpackets2; 
end 
else 





if(data_34[1:0] > 2'b00) 
begin 
 
 if(data_34[1:0] == 2'b10) 
 begin 
 rpackets4 = rpackets4 + 1; 
 if(data_34[17:14] == 4'b0100)begin 
 $fwrite(op_file4,"%d\n",(Count[13:0] - data_34[31:18]));  
     corr4 = corr4 + 1;end 
     else 
     corr4 = corr4; 
 end 
 else 










if(data_44[1:0] > 2'b00) 
begin 
 
 if(data_44[1:0] == 2'b10) 
 begin rpackets5 = rpackets5 + 1; 
 if(data_44[17:14] == 4'b0101) begin 
 $fwrite(op_file5,"%d\n", (Count[13:0] - data_44[31:18]));  
     corr5 = corr5 + 1; end 
     else 
     corr5 = corr5; 
 end 
 else 
 rpackets5 = rpackets5; 
end 
else 







if(data_54[1:0] > 2'b00) 
begin 
 
 if(data_54[1:0] == 2'b10) begin 
 rpackets6 = rpackets6 + 1; 
 if(data_54[17:14] == 4'b0110) 
 begin 
 $fwrite(op_file6,"%d\n", (Count[13:0] - data_54[31:18]));  
     corr6 = corr6 + 1; 
     end 
     else 
     corr6 = corr6; 
 end 
 else 
 rpackets6 = rpackets6; 
end 
else 






if(data_64[1:0] > 2'b00) 
begin 
 if(data_64[1:0] == 2'b10) begin 
 rpackets8 = rpackets8 + 1; 
 if(data_64[17:14] == 4'b1000) 
 begin 
 $fwrite(op_file8, "%d\n",(Count[13:0] - data_64[31:18]));  
     corr8 = corr8 + 1; 
     end 
     else 
     corr8 = corr8; 
 end 
 else 
 rpackets8 = rpackets8; 
end 
else 









 if(data_74[1:0] == 2'b10) begin 
 rpackets9 = rpackets9 + 1; 
 if(data_74[17:14] == 4'b1001) 
 begin 
 $fwrite(op_file9,"%d\n",(Count[13:0] - data_74[31:18]));  
     corr9 = corr9 + 1; 
     end 
     else 
     corr9 = corr9; 
 end 
 else 
 rpackets9 = rpackets9; 
end 
else 










 if(data_84[1:0] == 2'b10) begin 
 rpackets10 = rpackets10 + 1; 
 if(data_84[17:14] == 4'b1010) 
 begin 
 $fwrite(op_file10, "%d\n",(Count[13:0] - data_84[31:18]));  
     corr10 = corr10 + 1; 
     end 
     else 
     corr10 = corr10; 
 end 
 else 
 rpackets10 = rpackets10; 
end 
else 










 if(data_94[1:0] == 2'b10) begin 
 rpackets3 = rpackets3 + 1; 
 if(data_94[17:14] == 4'b0011) 
 begin 
 $fwrite(op_file3,"%d\n", (Count[13:0] - data_94[31:18]));  
  
     corr3 = corr3 + 1;end 
     else 
     corr3 = corr3; 
 end 
 else 
 rpackets3 = rpackets3; 
end 
else 




begin if(data_104[1:0] > 2'b00) 
begin 
 
 if(data_104[1:0] == 2'b10) begin 
 rpackets7 = rpackets7 + 1; 
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 if(data_104[17:14] == 4'b0111) 
 begin 
     corr7 = corr7 + 1; 
     $fwrite(op_file7,"%d\n", (Count[13:0] - data_104[31:18]));  
     end 
     else 
     corr7 = corr7; 
 end 
 else 
 rpackets7 = rpackets7; 
end 
else 




begin if(data_114[1:0] > 2'b00) 
begin 
 
 if(data_114[1:0] == 2'b10) begin 
 rpackets11 = rpackets11 + 1; 




     corr11 = corr11 + 1; 
     $fwrite(op_file11, "%d\n",(Count[13:0] - data_114[31:18]));  
     end 
     else 
     corr11 = corr11; 
 end 
 else 
 rpackets11 = rpackets11; 
end 
else 




begin if(data_124[1:0] > 2'b00) 
begin 
 
 if(data_124[1:0] == 2'b10) begin 
 rpackets12 = rpackets12 + 1; 
 if(data_124[17:14] == 4'b1100) 
 begin 
 $fwrite(op_file12, "%d\n", (Count[13:0] - data_124[31:18]));  
     corr12 = corr12 + 1; 
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     end 
     else 
     corr12 = corr12; 
 end 
 else 
 rpackets12 = rpackets12; 
end 
else 




begin if(data_134[1:0] > 2'b00) 
begin 
 
 if(data_134[1:0] == 2'b10) begin 
 rpackets13 = rpackets13 + 1; 
 if(data_134[17:14] == 4'b1101) 
 begin 
 $fwrite(op_file13,"%d\n", (Count[13:0] - data_134[31:18]));  
     corr13 = corr13 + 1; 
     end 
     else 
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     corr13 = corr13; 
 end 
 else 
 rpackets13 = rpackets13; 
end 
else 




begin if(data_144[1:0] > 2'b00) 
begin 
  
 if(data_144[1:0] == 2'b10) begin 
 rpackets14 = rpackets14 + 1; 
 if(data_144[17:14] == 4'b1110) 
 begin 
 $fwrite(op_file14, "%d\n", (Count[13:0] - data_144[31:18])); 
     corr14 = corr14 + 1; 
     end 
     else 





 rpackets14 = rpackets14; 
end 
else 





if(data_154[1:0] > 2'b00) 
begin 
 
 if(data_154[1:0] == 2'b10) begin 
 rpackets15 = rpackets15 + 1; 
 if(data_154[17:14] == 4'b1111)begin 
 $fwrite(op_file15,"%d\n", (Count[13:0] - data_154[31:18]));  
     corr15 = corr15 + 1; 
     end 
     else 
     corr15 = corr15; 
 end 
 else 











if(data_in0[1:0] > 2'b00) 
inreq0 = 1'b1; 
else 





if(data_in1[1:0] > 2'b00) 
inreq1 = 1'b1; 
else 







if(data_in2[1:0] > 2'b00) 
inreq2 = 1'b1; 
else 





if(data_in3[1:0] > 2'b00) 
inreq3 = 1'b1; 
else 





if(data_in4[1:0] > 2'b00) 
inreq4 = 1'b1; 
else 







if(data_in5[1:0] > 2'b00) 
inreq5 = 1'b1; 
else 





if(data_in6[1:0] > 2'b00) 
inreq6 = 1'b1; 
else 





if(data_in7[1:0] > 2'b00) 
inreq7 = 1'b1; 
else 







if(data_in8[1:0] > 2'b00) 
inreq8 = 1'b1; 
else 





if(data_in9[1:0] > 2'b00) 
inreq9 = 1'b1; 
else 





if(data_in10[1:0] > 2'b00) 
inreq10 = 1'b1; 
else 







if(data_in11[1:0] > 2'b00) 
inreq11 = 1'b1; 
else 





if(data_in12[1:0] > 2'b00) 
inreq12 = 1'b1; 
else 





if(data_in13[1:0] > 2'b00) 









if(data_in14[1:0] > 2'b00) 
inreq14 = 1'b1; 
else 





if(data_in15[1:0] > 2'b00) 
inreq15 = 1'b1; 
else 









b. Five-port router 
`timescale 1ns/1ns 
// Copyright (C) 1991-2009 Altera Corporation 
// Your use of Altera Corporation's design tools, logic functions  
// and other software and tools, and its AMPP partner logic  
// functions, and any output files from any of the foregoing  
// (including device programming or simulation files), and any  
// associated documentation or information are expressly subject  
// to the terms and conditions of the Altera Program License  
// Subscription Agreement, Altera MegaCore Function License  
// Agreement, or other applicable license agreement, including,  
// without limitation, that your use is for the sole purpose of  
// programming logic devices manufactured by Altera and sold by  
// Altera or its authorized distributors.  Please refer to the  
// applicable agreement for further details. 
// PROGRAM              "Quartus II" 
// VERSION              "Version 9.1 Build 222 10/21/2009 SJ Web Edition" 
// CREATED              "Fri Jan 22 14:22:52 2010" 
//Edited by Jonathan Frey 5/26/2015 
module fiveportrouter4(CLK, 
                       reset, 
                       wrreq_E, 
                       wrreq_S, 
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                       wrreq_W, 
                       wrreq_N, 
                       wrreq_L, 
                       NACK_in_E, 
                       NACK_in_S, 
                       NACK_in_W, 
                       NACK_in_N, 
                       NACK_in_L, 
                       AlmostFull_in_E, 
                       AlmostFull_in_S, 
                       AlmostFull_in_W, 
                       AlmostFull_in_N, 
                       AlmostFull_in_L, 
                       CurrentID, 
                       dataino_E, 
                       dataino_L, 
                       dataino_N, 
                       dataino_S, 
                       dataino_W, 
                       valid_in, 
                       wrreq_out_E, 
                       wrreq_out_S, 
                       wrreq_out_W, 
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                       wrreq_out_N, 
                       wrreq_out_L, 
                       almost_full_E, 
                       almost_full_S, 
                       almost_full_W, 
                       almost_full_N, 
                       almost_full_L, 
                       dataout_E, 
                       dataout_L, 
                       dataout_N, 
                       dataout_S, 
                       dataout_W, 
                       empty); 
  parameter INPUTWIDTH = 32; 
  parameter FINALWIDTH = 36; 
  input CLK; 
  input reset; 
  input wrreq_E; 
  input wrreq_S; 
  input wrreq_W; 
  input wrreq_N; 
  input wrreq_L; 
  input NACK_in_E; 
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  input NACK_in_S; 
  input NACK_in_W; 
  input NACK_in_N; 
  input NACK_in_L; 
  input AlmostFull_in_E; 
  input AlmostFull_in_S; 
  input AlmostFull_in_W; 
  input AlmostFull_in_N; 
  input AlmostFull_in_L; 
  input[3 : 0] CurrentID; 
  input[INPUTWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataino_E; 
  input[INPUTWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataino_L; 
  input[INPUTWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataino_N; 
  input[INPUTWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataino_S; 
  input[INPUTWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataino_W; 
  input[4 : 0] valid_in; 
  output wrreq_out_E; 
  output wrreq_out_S; 
  output wrreq_out_W; 
  output wrreq_out_N; 
  output wrreq_out_L; 
  output almost_full_E; 
  output almost_full_S; 
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  output almost_full_W; 
  output almost_full_N; 
  output almost_full_L; 
  output[INPUTWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_E; 
  output[INPUTWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_L; 
  output[INPUTWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_N; 
  output[INPUTWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_S; 
  output[INPUTWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_W; 
  output[4 : 0] empty; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain_E; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain_W; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain_N; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain_S; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain_L; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain_E_Sc_enc; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain_W_Sc_enc; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain_N_Sc_enc; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain_S_Sc_enc; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain_L_Sc_enc; 
  wire[4 : 0] empty_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED; 
  wire[4 : 0] IntendedBufFull; 
  wire[4 : 0] NACK_in; 
  wire[24 : 0] Port_Ad; 
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  wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_0; 
  wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_1; 
  wire[3 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_2; 
  wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_3; 
  wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_4; 
  wire[3 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_5; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_6; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_7; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_8; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_9; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_10; 
  wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_11; 
  wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_12; 
  wire[3 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_13; 
  wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_14; 
  wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_15; 
  wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_16; 
  wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_17; 
  wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_18; 
  wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_19; 
  wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_20; 
  wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_21; 
  wire[3 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_22; 
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  wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_23; 
  wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_24; 
  wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_25; 
  wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_26; 
  wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_27; 
  wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_28; 
  wire[3 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_29; 
  wire[2 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_30; 
  wire[2 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_31; 
  wire[2 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_32; 
  wire[2 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_33; 
  wire[2 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_34; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_35; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_36; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_37; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_38; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_39; 
  wire[24 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_40; 
  wire[24 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_41; 
  wire[2 : 0] select; /////For permutation, from keygen 
  wire ErrEpre, 
       ErrLpre, 
       ErrNpre, 
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       ErrSpre, 
       ErrWpre; 
  wire ErrE, 
       ErrL, 
       ErrN, 
       ErrS, 
       ErrW; 
 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_Epre; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_Lpre; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_Spre; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_Npre; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_Wpre; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_E_enc; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_L_enc; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_S_enc; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_N_enc; 
  wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_W_enc; 
  assign select = 3'b111; 
  ///////////// START ENCODING PROCESS 
  HammingEncoder15_11 E0(.DataIn(dataino_E[31 : 0]), 
                         .DataOut(datain_E_Sc_enc[35 : 0])); 
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  HammingEncoder15_11 E1(.DataIn(dataino_W[31 : 0]), 
                         .DataOut(datain_W_Sc_enc[35 : 0])); 
 
  HammingEncoder15_11 E2(.DataIn(dataino_N[31 : 0]), 
                         .DataOut(datain_N_Sc_enc[35 : 0])); 
 
  HammingEncoder15_11 E3(.DataIn(dataino_S[31 : 0]), 
                         .DataOut(datain_S_Sc_enc[35 : 0])); 
 
  HammingEncoder15_11 E4(.DataIn(dataino_L[31 : 0]), 
                         .DataOut(datain_L_Sc_enc[35 : 0])); 
  //END ENCODING PROCESS 
  //START FLIT SCRAMBLING PROCESS 
  Perm32plus4 p0(.inputa(datain_E_Sc_enc), 
                 .select(select), 
                 .outputb(datain_E)); 
  Perm32plus4 p1(.inputa(datain_W_Sc_enc), 
                 .select(select), 
                 .outputb(datain_W)); 
  Perm32plus4 p2(.inputa(datain_N_Sc_enc), 
                 .select(select), 
                 .outputb(datain_N)); 
  Perm32plus4 p3(.inputa(datain_S_Sc_enc), 
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                 .select(select), 
                 .outputb(datain_S)); 
  Perm32plus4 p4(.inputa(datain_L_Sc_enc), 
                 .select(select), 
                 .outputb(datain_L)); 
  //END FLIT SCRAMBLING PROCESS 
  QYInputFIFO3 EastInFIFO(.clk(CLK), 
                          .reset(reset), 
                          .wrreq(wrreq_E), 
                          .rdreq(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_27), 
                          .full_i(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_28), 
                          .datain(datain_E), 
                          .IndexCounter_i(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_29), 
                          .almost_full(almost_full_E), 
                          .empty(empty_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[0]), 
                          .full_o(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_28), 
                          .dataout(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_35), 
                          .IndexCounter_o(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_29), 
                          .ErrDin(ErrEpre)); 
  defparam EastInFIFO.FLITWIDTH = 36; 
  assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_27 = SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_25 | 
SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_26; 
  assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_26 = Port_Ad[4] | Port_Ad[9] | Port_Ad[14]; 
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  assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_25 = Port_Ad[19] | Port_Ad[24]; 
  QYInputFIFO3 SouthInFIFO(.clk(CLK), 
                           .reset(reset), 
                           .wrreq(wrreq_S), 
                           .rdreq(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_20), 
                           .full_i(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_21), 
                           .datain(datain_S), 
                           .IndexCounter_i(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_22), 
                           .almost_full(almost_full_S), 
                           .empty(empty_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[1]), 
                           .full_o(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_21), 
                           .dataout(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_38), 
                           .IndexCounter_o(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_22), 
                           .ErrDin(ErrSpre)); 
  defparam SouthInFIFO.FLITWIDTH = 36; 
  assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_20 = SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_14 | 
SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_15; 
  assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_15 = Port_Ad[3] | Port_Ad[8] | Port_Ad[13]; 
  assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_14 = Port_Ad[18] | Port_Ad[23]; 
  QYInputFIFO3 WestInFIFO(.clk(CLK), 
                          .reset(reset), 
                          .wrreq(wrreq_W), 
                          .rdreq(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_11), 
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                          .full_i(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_12), 
                          .datain(datain_W), 
                          .IndexCounter_i(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_13), 
                          .almost_full(almost_full_W), 
                          .empty(empty_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[2]), 
                          .full_o(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_12), 
                          .dataout(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_39), 
                          .IndexCounter_o(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_13), 
                          .ErrDin(ErrWpre)); 
  defparam WestInFIFO.FLITWIDTH = 36; 
  assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_11 = SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_16 | 
SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_17; 
  assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_17 = Port_Ad[2] | Port_Ad[7] | Port_Ad[12]; 
  assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_16 = Port_Ad[17] | Port_Ad[22]; 
  QYInputFIFO3 NorthInFIFO(.clk(CLK), 
                           .reset(reset), 
                           .wrreq(wrreq_N), 
                           .rdreq(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_0), 
                           .full_i(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_1), 
                           .datain(datain_N), 
                           .IndexCounter_i(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_2), 
                           .almost_full(almost_full_N), 
                           .empty(empty_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[3]), 
267 
 
                           .full_o(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_1), 
                           .dataout(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_37), 
                           .IndexCounter_o(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_2), 
                           .ErrDin(ErrNpre)); 
  defparam NorthInFIFO.FLITWIDTH = 36; 
  assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_0 = SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_18 | 
SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_19; 
  assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_19 = Port_Ad[1] | Port_Ad[6] | Port_Ad[11]; 
  assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_18 = Port_Ad[16] | Port_Ad[21]; 
  QYInputFIFO3 LocalInFIFO(.clk(CLK), 
                           .reset(reset), 
                           .wrreq(wrreq_L), 
                           .rdreq(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_3), 
                           .full_i(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_4), 
                           .datain(datain_L), 
                           .IndexCounter_i(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_5), 
                           .almost_full(almost_full_L), 
                           .empty(empty_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[4]), 
                           .full_o(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_4), 
                           .dataout(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_36), 
                           .IndexCounter_o(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_5), 
                           .ErrDin(ErrLpre)); 
  defparam LocalInFIFO.FLITWIDTH = 36; 
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  assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_3 = SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_23 | 
SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_24; 
  assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_24 = Port_Ad[0] | Port_Ad[5] | Port_Ad[10]; 
  assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_23 = Port_Ad[15] | Port_Ad[20]; 
  CircularFIFO4 EastOutFIFO(.clk(CLK), 
                            .reset(reset), 
                            .valid_in(valid_in[0]), 
                            .NACK(NACK_in[0]), 
                            .almost_full(IntendedBufFull[0]), 
                            .datain(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_6), 
                            .wrreq(wrreq_out_E), 
                            .select(select), 
                            .dataout(dataout_Epre)); 
  defparam EastOutFIFO.CodedFLITWIDTH = 36; 
  defparam EastOutFIFO.FLITWIDTH = 32; 
  //DP and DE EAST  
  DePerm32plus4 DP0(.inputa(dataout_Epre), 
                    .select(select), 
                    .outputb(dataout_E_enc)); 
  HammingDecoder15_11 DE0(.DataIno(dataout_E_enc[35 : 0]), 
                          .DataOut(dataout_E[31 : 0]), 
                          .ErrDetection(ErrE)); 
  CircularFIFO4 SouthOutFIFO(.clk(CLK), 
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                             .reset(reset), 
                             .valid_in(valid_in[1]), 
                             .NACK(NACK_in[1]), 
                             .almost_full(IntendedBufFull[1]), 
                             .datain(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_7), 
                             .wrreq(wrreq_out_S), 
                             .select(select), 
                             .dataout(dataout_Spre)); 
  defparam SouthOutFIFO.CodedFLITWIDTH = 36; 
  defparam SouthOutFIFO.FLITWIDTH = 32; 
  //DP and DE SOUTH        
  DePerm32plus4 DP1(.inputa(dataout_Spre), 
                    .select(select), 
                    .outputb(dataout_S_enc)); 
  HammingDecoder15_11 DE1(.DataIno(dataout_S_enc[35 : 0]), 
                          .DataOut(dataout_S[31 : 0]), 
                          .ErrDetection(ErrS)); 
  CircularFIFO4 WestOutFIFO(.clk(CLK), 
                            .reset(reset), 
                            .valid_in(valid_in[2]), 
                            .NACK(NACK_in[2]), 
                            .almost_full(IntendedBufFull[2]), 
                            .datain(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_8), 
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                            .wrreq(wrreq_out_W), 
                            .select(select), 
                            .dataout(dataout_Wpre)); 
  defparam WestOutFIFO.CodedFLITWIDTH = 36; 
  defparam WestOutFIFO.FLITWIDTH = 32; 
  //DP and DE WEST         
  DePerm32plus4 DP2(.inputa(dataout_Wpre), 
                    .select(select), 
                    .outputb(dataout_W_enc)); 
  HammingDecoder15_11 DE2(.DataIno(dataout_W_enc[35 : 0]), 
                          .DataOut(dataout_W[31 : 0]), 
                          .ErrDetection(ErrW)); 
  CircularFIFO4 NorthOutFIFO(.clk(CLK), 
                             .reset(reset), 
                             .valid_in(valid_in[3]), 
                             .NACK(NACK_in[3]), 
                             .almost_full(IntendedBufFull[3]), 
                             .datain(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_9), 
                             .wrreq(wrreq_out_N), 
                             .select(select), 
                             .dataout(dataout_Npre)); 
  defparam NorthOutFIFO.CodedFLITWIDTH = 36; 
  defparam NorthOutFIFO.FLITWIDTH = 32; 
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  //DP and DE NORTH 
  DePerm32plus4 DP3(.inputa(dataout_Npre), 
                    .select(select), 
                    .outputb(dataout_N_enc)); 
  HammingDecoder15_11 DE3(.DataIno(dataout_N_enc[35 : 0]), 
                          .DataOut(dataout_N[31 : 0]), 
                          .ErrDetection(ErrN)); 
  CircularFIFO4 LocalOutFIFO(.clk(CLK), 
                             .reset(reset), 
                             .valid_in(valid_in[4]), 
                             .NACK(NACK_in[4]), 
                             .almost_full(IntendedBufFull[4]), 
                             .datain(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_10), 
//errorinject//SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_10[35:25],25'd0}), 
                             .wrreq(wrreq_out_L), 
                             .select(select), 
                             .dataout(dataout_Lpre)); 
  defparam LocalOutFIFO.CodedFLITWIDTH = 36; 
  defparam LocalOutFIFO.FLITWIDTH = 32; 
  //DP and DE LOCAL        
  DePerm32plus4 DP4(.inputa(dataout_Lpre), 
                    .select(select), 
                    .outputb(dataout_L_enc)); 
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  HammingDecoder15_11 DE4(.DataIno(dataout_L_enc[35 : 0]), 
                          .DataOut(dataout_L[31 : 0]), 
                          .ErrDetection(ErrL)); 
  FullCrossbar4 FullCrossbar(.CLK(CLK), 
                             .Reset(reset), 
                             .select(select), 
                             .BufFull_in(IntendedBufFull), 
                             .CurrentID(CurrentID), 
                             .DestPort_pre_E(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_30), 
                             .DestPort_pre_L(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_31), 
                             .DestPort_pre_N(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_32), 
                             .DestPort_pre_S(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_33), 
                             .DestPort_pre_W(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_34), 
                             .FlitIn_E(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_35), 
                             .FlitIn_L(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_36), 
                             .FlitIn_N(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_37), 
                             .FlitIn_S(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_38), 
                             .FlitIn_W(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_39), 
                             .NACK(NACK_in), 
                             .RRReg_pre(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_40), 
                             .TableTag_pre(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_41), 
                             .DestPort_E(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_30), 
                             .DestPort_L(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_31), 
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                             .DestPort_N(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_32), 
                             .DestPort_S(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_33), 
                             .DestPort_W(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_34), 
                             .FlitOut_E(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_6), 
                             .FlitOut_L(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_10), 
                             .FlitOut_N(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_9), 
                             .FlitOut_S(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_7), 
                             .FlitOut_W(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_8), 
                             .Port_Ad(Port_Ad), 
                             .RRReg_cur(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_40), 
                             .TableTag_cur(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_41), 
                             .ErrEpre(ErrEpre), 
                             .ErrLpre(ErrLpre), 
                             .ErrNpre(ErrNpre), 
                             .ErrSpre(ErrSpre), 
                             .ErrWpre(ErrWpre)); 
  defparam FullCrossbar.FLITWIDTH = 36; 
  defparam FullCrossbar.NOCSIZE = 4; 
  assign empty = empty_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED; 
  assign IntendedBufFull[0] = AlmostFull_in_E; 
  assign IntendedBufFull[1] = AlmostFull_in_S; 
  assign IntendedBufFull[2] = AlmostFull_in_W; 
  assign IntendedBufFull[3] = AlmostFull_in_N; 
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  assign IntendedBufFull[4] = AlmostFull_in_L; 
  assign NACK_in[0] = NACK_in_E; 
  assign NACK_in[1] = NACK_in_S; 
  assign NACK_in[2] = NACK_in_W; 
  assign NACK_in[3] = NACK_in_N; 




















c. Input FIFO 
//Use FPGA InputChannel to create a circular FIFO 
`timescale 1ns/1ns 
module QYInputFIFO3(clk, 
                    reset, 
                    wrreq, 
                    rdreq, //connect to Port_Ad 
                    datain, 
                    IndexCounter_i, 
                    full_i, 
                    almost_full, 
                    empty, 
                    dataout, 
                    IndexCounter_o, 
                    full_o, 
                    ErrDin); 
  parameter FLITWIDTH = 36; 
  input clk; 
  input reset; 
  input wrreq; 
  input rdreq; 
  input[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain; 
  input[3 : 0] IndexCounter_i; 
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  input full_i; 
  input ErrDin; 
  output[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout; 
  output almost_full; 
  output empty; 
  output[3 : 0] IndexCounter_o; 
  output full_o; 
  wire clk; 
  wire reset; 
  wire wrreq; 
  wire rdreq; 
  wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain; 
  wire[3 : 0] IndexCounter_i; 
  wire full_i; 
  reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout; 
  reg almost_full; 
  reg empty; 
  reg[3 : 0] IndexCounter_o; 
  reg full_o; 
  //intermediate signals 
  reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s1; 
  reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s2; 
  reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s3; 
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  reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s4; 
  reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s5; 
  reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s6; 
  reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s7; 
  reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s8; 
  wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s1; 
  wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s2; 
  wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s3; 
  wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s4; 
  wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s5; 
  wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s6; 
  wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s7; 
  wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s8; 
  reg[1 : 0] Ctrl_s1; 
  reg[1 : 0] Ctrl_s2; 
  reg[1 : 0] Ctrl_s3; 
  reg[1 : 0] Ctrl_s4; 
  reg[1 : 0] Ctrl_s5; 
  reg[1 : 0] Ctrl_s6; 
  reg[1 : 0] Ctrl_s7; 
  reg[1 : 0] Ctrl_s8; 
  reg[3 : 0] IndexCounter_o_tmp; 
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  //Ctrl =00: write back Q, 01: write zero vector, 10: propagate previous DFF, 11: write new 
data 
  always 
    @(rdreq or 
      wrreq or 
      full_i or 
      datain or 
      IndexCounter_i) 
    begin 
      if (rdreq) 
        if (wrreq) //read and write 
          begin 
            case (IndexCounter_i) 
              4'b0000: 
                begin //the data is read out, but the value should stay in the DFF 
                  Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b11; 
                  Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
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                end 
              4'b0001: 
                begin 
                  Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b11; 
                  Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                end 
              4'b0010: 
                begin 
                  Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b11; 
                  Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                end 
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              4'b0011: 
                begin 
                  Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b11; 
                  Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                end 
              4'b0100: 
                begin 
                  Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b11; 
                  Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                end 
              4'b0101: 
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                begin 
                  Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b11; 
                  Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                end 
              4'b0110: 
                begin 
                  Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b11; 
                  Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                  Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                end 
              4'b0111: 
                begin 
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                  Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b11; 
                  Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                end 
              4'b1000: 
                begin 
                  Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                  Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b11; 
                end 
              default: 
                begin 
                  Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b00; 
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                  Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b00; 
                  Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b00; 
                  Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b00; 
                  Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b00; 
                  Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b00; 
                  Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b00; 
                  Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b00; 
                end 
            endcase 
            IndexCounter_o_tmp <= IndexCounter_i; 
          end 
        else 
          begin //push out and append zeros 
            if (IndexCounter_i == 4'b0000) 
              begin 
                Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
                Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; 
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                IndexCounter_o_tmp <= IndexCounter_i; 
              end 
            else 
              begin 
                Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b10; 
                Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; //the last one is a little different   
                IndexCounter_o_tmp <= IndexCounter_i - 1'b1; 
              end 
          end 
      else 
        if (!full_i & wrreq) //append new data, and other DFFs remain 
          begin 
            if (IndexCounter_i == 4'b0000) 
              Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b11; //write new data 
            else 
              Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b00; //remains 
            if (IndexCounter_i == 4'b0001) 
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              Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b11; 
            else 
              Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b00; 
            if (IndexCounter_i == 4'b0010) 
              Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b11; 
            else 
              Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b00; 
            if (IndexCounter_i == 4'b0011) 
              Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b11; 
            else 
              Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b00; 
            if (IndexCounter_i == 4'b0100) 
              Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b11; 
            else 
              Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b00; 
            if (IndexCounter_i == 4'b0101) 
              Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b11; 
            else 
              Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b00; 
            if (IndexCounter_i == 4'b0110) 
              Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b11; 
            else 
              Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b00; 
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            if (IndexCounter_i == 4'b0111) 
              Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b11; 
            else 
              Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b00; 
            IndexCounter_o_tmp <= IndexCounter_i + 1'b1; //need optimization 
          end 
        else // remains the same data 
          begin 
            Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b0; 
            Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b0; 
            Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b0; 
            Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b0; 
            Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b0; 
            Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b0; 
            Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b0; 
            Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b0; 
            IndexCounter_o_tmp <= IndexCounter_i; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(Ctrl_s1 or 
      Ctrl_s2 or 
      Ctrl_s3 or 
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      Ctrl_s4 or 
      Ctrl_s5 or 
      Ctrl_s6 or 
      Ctrl_s7 or 
      Ctrl_s8 or 
      datain or 
      fifo_output_s1 or 
      fifo_output_s2 or 
      fifo_output_s3 or 
      fifo_output_s4 or 
      fifo_output_s5 or 
      fifo_output_s6 or 
      fifo_output_s7 or 
      fifo_output_s8) 
    begin 
      case (Ctrl_s1) 
        2'b00: 
          fifo_input_s1 <= fifo_output_s1;  
        2'b01: 
          fifo_input_s1 <= 36'b0; 
        2'b10: 
          fifo_input_s1 <= fifo_output_s2; 
        2'b11: 
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          fifo_input_s1 <= datain; 
      endcase 
      case (Ctrl_s2) 
        2'b00: 
          fifo_input_s2 <= fifo_output_s2; 
        2'b01: 
          fifo_input_s2 <= 36'b0; 
        2'b10: 
          fifo_input_s2 <= fifo_output_s3; 
        2'b11: 
          fifo_input_s2 <= datain; 
      endcase 
      case (Ctrl_s3) 
        2'b00: 
          fifo_input_s3 <= fifo_output_s3; 
        2'b01: 
          fifo_input_s3 <= 36'b0; 
        2'b10: 
          fifo_input_s3 <= fifo_output_s4; 
        2'b11: 
          fifo_input_s3 <= datain; 
      endcase 
      case (Ctrl_s4) 
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        2'b00: 
          fifo_input_s4 <= fifo_output_s4; 
        2'b01: 
          fifo_input_s4 <= 36'b0; 
        2'b10: 
          fifo_input_s4 <= fifo_output_s5; 
        2'b11: 
          fifo_input_s4 <= datain; 
      endcase 
      case (Ctrl_s5) 
        2'b00: 
          fifo_input_s5 <= fifo_output_s5; 
        2'b01: 
          fifo_input_s5 <= 36'b0; 
        2'b10: 
          fifo_input_s5 <= fifo_output_s6; 
        2'b11: 
          fifo_input_s5 <= datain; 
      endcase 
      case (Ctrl_s6) 
        2'b00: 
          fifo_input_s6 <= fifo_output_s6; 
        2'b01: 
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          fifo_input_s6 <= 36'b0; 
        2'b10: 
          fifo_input_s6 <= fifo_output_s7; 
        2'b11: 
          fifo_input_s6 <= datain; 
      endcase 
      case (Ctrl_s7) 
        2'b00: 
          fifo_input_s7 <= fifo_output_s7; 
        2'b01: 
          fifo_input_s7 <= 36'b0; 
        2'b10: 
          fifo_input_s7 <= fifo_output_s8; 
        2'b11: 
          fifo_input_s7 <= datain; 
      endcase 
      case (Ctrl_s8) 
        2'b00: 
          fifo_input_s8 <= fifo_output_s8; 
        2'b01: 
          fifo_input_s8 <= 36'b0; 
        2'b10: 
          fifo_input_s8 <= 36'b0; 
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        2'b11: 
          fifo_input_s8 <= datain; 
      endcase 
    end 
  stagereg31_Proposed_EX QYFIFO_s1(.Preset_act_low(1'b1), 
                                   .Clear_act_low(!reset), 
                                   .CLK(clk), 
                                   .DataIn(fifo_input_s1), 
                                   .DataOut(fifo_output_s1)); 
  stagereg31_Proposed_EX QYFIFO_s2(.Preset_act_low(1'b1), 
                                   .Clear_act_low(!reset), 
                                   .CLK(clk), 
                                   .DataIn(fifo_input_s2), 
                                   .DataOut(fifo_output_s2)); 
  stagereg31_Proposed_EX QYFIFO_s3(.Preset_act_low(1'b1), 
                                   .Clear_act_low(!reset), 
                                   .CLK(clk), 
                                   .DataIn(fifo_input_s3), 
                                   .DataOut(fifo_output_s3)); 
  stagereg31_Proposed_EX QYFIFO_s4(.Preset_act_low(1'b1), 
                                   .Clear_act_low(!reset), 
                                   .CLK(clk), 
                                   .DataIn(fifo_input_s4), 
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                                   .DataOut(fifo_output_s4)); 
  stagereg31_Proposed_EX QYFIFO_s5(.Preset_act_low(1'b1), 
                                   .Clear_act_low(!reset), 
                                   .CLK(clk), 
                                   .DataIn(fifo_input_s5), 
                                   .DataOut(fifo_output_s5)); 
  stagereg31_Proposed_EX QYFIFO_s6(.Preset_act_low(1'b1), 
                                   .Clear_act_low(!reset), 
                                   .CLK(clk), 
                                   .DataIn(fifo_input_s6), 
                                   .DataOut(fifo_output_s6)); 
  stagereg31_Proposed_EX QYFIFO_s7(.Preset_act_low(1'b1), 
                                   .Clear_act_low(!reset), 
                                   .CLK(clk), 
                                   .DataIn(fifo_input_s7), 
                                   .DataOut(fifo_output_s7)); 
  stagereg31_Proposed_EX QYFIFO_s8(.Preset_act_low(1'b1), 
                                   .Clear_act_low(!reset), 
                                   .CLK(clk), 
                                   .DataIn(fifo_input_s8), 
                                   .DataOut(fifo_output_s8)); 
 
  always 
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    @(fifo_output_s1)  
    begin 
 
      dataout = fifo_output_s1; 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge clk or 
      posedge reset) 
    begin 
      if (reset) 
        begin 
          almost_full <= 1'b0; 
          empty <= 1'b1; 
          full_o <= 1'b0; 
          IndexCounter_o <= 4'b0000; 
        end 
      else 
        begin 
          //edited by jonathan (almost_full to extend from 6FIFO to 8) 
          almost_full <= (IndexCounter_o_tmp[3] & !IndexCounter_o_tmp[2] & 
!IndexCounter_o_tmp[1] & !IndexCounter_o_tmp[0]); 
          empty <= (IndexCounter_o_tmp == 4'b0000) ? 1'b1 : 1'b0; 
          full_o <= (IndexCounter_o_tmp == 4'b1000) ? 1'b1 : 1'b0; 
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          IndexCounter_o <= IndexCounter_o_tmp; 
        end 























d. Full Crossbar 
`timescale 1ns/1ns 
/* 
The functionality of the full crossbar are 
(1) 
Extract the information contained in each entered flit 
(2) 
Detect whether the intended the output port is available or not 
(3) 
If so, make connection 
otherwise, wait for the available time slot 
*/ 
module FullCrossbar4(CLK, 
                     Reset, 
                     select, 
                     TableTag_pre, 
                     RRReg_pre, 
                     FlitIn_E, 
                     FlitIn_S, 
                     FlitIn_W, 
                     FlitIn_N, 
                     FlitIn_L, 
                     CurrentID, 
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                     DestPort_pre_E, 
                     DestPort_pre_S, 
                     DestPort_pre_W, 
                     DestPort_pre_N, 
                     DestPort_pre_L, 
                     NACK, 
                     BufFull_in, 
                     //output 
                     TableTag_cur, 
                     RRReg_cur, 
                     FlitOut_E, 
                     FlitOut_S, 
                     FlitOut_W, 
                     FlitOut_N, 
                     FlitOut_L, 
                     DestPort_E, 
                     DestPort_S, 
                     DestPort_W, 
                     DestPort_N, 
                     DestPort_L, 
                     Port_Ad, 
                     ErrEpre, 
                     ErrLpre, 
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                     ErrNpre, 
                     ErrSpre, 
                     ErrWpre //Before crossbar, important flit content [10:0] error detection 
                    ); 
  parameter FLITWIDTH = 36; 
  parameter NOCSIZE = 4; 
  input[2 : 0] select; 
  input CLK; 
  input Reset; 
  input[24 : 0] TableTag_pre; 
  input[24 : 0] RRReg_pre; 
  input[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitIn_E; 
  input[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitIn_S; 
  input[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitIn_W; 
  input[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitIn_N; 
  input[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitIn_L; 
  input[3 : 0] CurrentID; 
  input[2 : 0] DestPort_pre_E; 
  input[2 : 0] DestPort_pre_S; 
  input[2 : 0] DestPort_pre_W; 
  input[2 : 0] DestPort_pre_N; 
  input[2 : 0] DestPort_pre_L; 
  input[4 : 0] NACK; 
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  input[4 : 0] BufFull_in; 
  output[24 : 0] TableTag_cur; 
  output[24 : 0] RRReg_cur; 
  output[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_E; 
  output[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_S; 
  output[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_W; 
  output[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_N; 
  output[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_L; 
  output[2 : 0] DestPort_E; 
  output[2 : 0] DestPort_S; 
  output[2 : 0] DestPort_W; 
  output[2 : 0] DestPort_N; 
  output[2 : 0] DestPort_L; 
  output[24 : 0] Port_Ad; 
  wire CLK; 
  wire Reset; 
  wire[24 : 0] TableTag_pre; 
  wire[24 : 0] RRReg_pre; 
  wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitIn_E; 
  wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitIn_S; 
  wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitIn_W; 
  wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitIn_N; 
  wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitIn_L; 
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  wire[2 : 0] DestPort_pre_E; 
  wire[2 : 0] DestPort_pre_S; 
  wire[2 : 0] DestPort_pre_W; 
  wire[2 : 0] DestPort_pre_N; 
  wire[2 : 0] DestPort_pre_L; 
  wire[3 : 0] CurrentID; 
  wire[4 : 0] NACK; 
  wire[4 : 0] BufFull_in; 
  reg[24 : 0] TableTag_cur; 
  reg[24 : 0] RRReg_cur; 
  reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_E; 
  reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_S; 
  reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_W; 
  reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_N; 
  reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_L; 
  reg[2 : 0] DestPort_E; 
  reg[2 : 0] DestPort_S; 
  reg[2 : 0] DestPort_W; 
  reg[2 : 0] DestPort_N; 
  reg[2 : 0] DestPort_L; 
  reg[24 : 0] Port_Ad; 
  //internal signals 
  wire[4 : 0] Req_V_E; 
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  wire[4 : 0] CReq_V_E; 
  wire[4 : 0] Req_V_S; 
  wire[4 : 0] CReq_V_S; 
  wire[4 : 0] Req_V_W; 
  wire[4 : 0] CReq_V_W; 
  wire[4 : 0] Req_V_N; 
  wire[4 : 0] CReq_V_N; 
  wire[4 : 0] Req_V_L; 
  wire[4 : 0] CReq_V_L; 
  wire[2 : 0] DestPort_E_tmp; 
  wire[2 : 0] DestPort_S_tmp; 
  wire[2 : 0] DestPort_W_tmp; 
  wire[2 : 0] DestPort_N_tmp; 
  wire[2 : 0] DestPort_L_tmp; 
  wire[4 : 0] TableTag_pre_oE; 
  wire[4 : 0] TableTag_pre_oS; 
  wire[4 : 0] TableTag_pre_oW; 
  wire[4 : 0] TableTag_pre_oN; 
  wire[4 : 0] TableTag_pre_oL; 
  wire[4 : 0] RRReg_pre_oE; 
  wire[4 : 0] RRReg_pre_oS; 
  wire[4 : 0] RRReg_pre_oW; 
  wire[4 : 0] RRReg_pre_oN; 
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  wire[4 : 0] RRReg_pre_oL; 
  wire NACK_oE; 
  wire NACK_oS; 
  wire NACK_oW; 
  wire NACK_oN; 
  wire NACK_oL; 
  wire BufFull_in_oE; 
  wire BufFull_in_oS; 
  wire BufFull_in_oW; 
  wire BufFull_in_oN; 
  wire BufFull_in_oL; 
  wire[4 : 0] TableTag_new_oE; 
  wire[4 : 0] TableTag_new_oS; 
  wire[4 : 0] TableTag_new_oW; 
  wire[4 : 0] TableTag_new_oN; 
  wire[4 : 0] TableTag_new_oL; 
  wire[4 : 0] RRReg_new_oE; 
  wire[4 : 0] RRReg_new_oS; 
  wire[4 : 0] RRReg_new_oW; 
  wire[4 : 0] RRReg_new_oN; 
  wire[4 : 0] RRReg_new_oL; 
  wire[4 : 0] Port_Ad_oE; 
  wire[4 : 0] Port_Ad_oS; 
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  wire[4 : 0] Port_Ad_oW; 
  wire[4 : 0] Port_Ad_oN; 
  wire[4 : 0] Port_Ad_oL; 
  reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_E_tmp; 
  reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_S_tmp; 
  reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_W_tmp; 
  reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_N_tmp; 
  reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_L_tmp; 
  output ErrEpre, ErrLpre, ErrNpre, ErrSpre, ErrWpre; 
  assign TableTag_pre_oE = TableTag_pre[4 : 0]; 
  assign TableTag_pre_oS = TableTag_pre[9 : 5]; 
  assign TableTag_pre_oW = TableTag_pre[14 : 10]; 
  assign TableTag_pre_oN = TableTag_pre[19 : 15]; 
  assign TableTag_pre_oL = TableTag_pre[24 : 20]; 
  assign RRReg_pre_oE = RRReg_pre[4 : 0]; 
  assign RRReg_pre_oS = RRReg_pre[9 : 5]; 
  assign RRReg_pre_oW = RRReg_pre[14 : 10]; 
  assign RRReg_pre_oN = RRReg_pre[19 : 15]; 
  assign RRReg_pre_oL = RRReg_pre[24 : 20]; 
  assign NACK_oE = NACK[0]; 
  assign NACK_oS = NACK[1]; 
  assign NACK_oW = NACK[2]; 
  assign NACK_oN = NACK[3]; 
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  assign NACK_oL = NACK[4]; 
  assign BufFull_in_oE = BufFull_in[0]; 
  assign BufFull_in_oS = BufFull_in[1]; 
  assign BufFull_in_oW = BufFull_in[2]; 
  assign BufFull_in_oN = BufFull_in[3]; 
  assign BufFull_in_oL = BufFull_in[4]; 
   
  InfoExtract4 FlitBreakE(.Flit(FlitIn_E), 
                          .CurrentID(CurrentID), 
                          .DestPort_pre(DestPort_pre_E), 
                          .select(select), 
                          //output  
                          .DestPort(DestPort_E_tmp), 
                          .Req_V(Req_V_E), 
                          .CReq_V(CReq_V_E), 
                          .ErrDetectionOut(ErrEpre)); 
  InfoExtract4 FlitBreakS(.Flit(FlitIn_S), 
                          .CurrentID(CurrentID), 
                          .DestPort_pre(DestPort_pre_S), 
                          .select(select), 
                          //output  
                          .DestPort(DestPort_S_tmp), 
                          .Req_V(Req_V_S), 
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                          .CReq_V(CReq_V_S), 
                          .ErrDetectionOut(ErrSpre)); 
  InfoExtract4 FlitBreakW(.Flit(FlitIn_W), 
                          .CurrentID(CurrentID), 
                          .DestPort_pre(DestPort_pre_W), 
                          .select(select), 
                          //output  
                          .DestPort(DestPort_W_tmp), 
                          .Req_V(Req_V_W), 
                          .CReq_V(CReq_V_W), 
                          .ErrDetectionOut(ErrWpre)); 
  InfoExtract4 FlitBreakN(.Flit(FlitIn_N), 
                          .CurrentID(CurrentID), 
                          .DestPort_pre(DestPort_pre_N), 
                          .select(select), 
                          //output  
                          .DestPort(DestPort_N_tmp), 
                          .Req_V(Req_V_N), 
                          .CReq_V(CReq_V_N), 
                          .ErrDetectionOut(ErrNpre)); 
  InfoExtract4 FlitBreakL(.Flit(FlitIn_L), 
                          .CurrentID(CurrentID), 
                          .DestPort_pre(DestPort_pre_L), 
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                          .select(select), 
                          //output  
                          .DestPort(DestPort_L_tmp), 
                          .Req_V(Req_V_L), 
                          .CReq_V(CReq_V_L), 
                          .ErrDetectionOut(ErrLpre)); 
  //Round Robin In/Out port connection 
  //Rule-1: no 180 degree transmission (i.e. the data from east input port cannot be transfered 
via east output port immediately) 
  //assign Req_V_oE = {Req_V_E[0], 
Req_V_S[0],Req_V_W[0],Req_V_N[0],Req_V_L[0]}; 
  PortAdmission PortAd_E( 
                         //.Req_V({Req_V_E[0], 
Req_V_S[0],Req_V_W[0],Req_V_N[0],Req_V_L[0]}), 
                         //.CReq_V({CReq_V_E[0], 
CReq_V_S[0],CReq_V_W[0],CReq_V_N[0],CReq_V_L[0]}), 
                         .Req_V({ Req_V_L[0], Req_V_N[0], Req_V_W[0], Req_V_S[0], 
Req_V_E[0] }), 
                         .CReq_V({ CReq_V_L[0], CReq_V_N[0], CReq_V_W[0], CReq_V_S[0], 
CReq_V_E[0] }), 
                         .TableTag_pre(TableTag_pre_oE), 
                         .RRReg_pre(RRReg_pre_oE), 
                         .NACK(NACK_oE), 
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                         .BufFull_in(BufFull_in_oE), 
                         //output 
                         //.Port_Ad({Port_Ad_oE[0], Port_Ad_oS[0], Port_Ad_oW[0], 
Port_Ad_oN[0], Port_Ad_oL[0]}), //the direction with 'o' means that it is the output 
direction 
                         .Port_Ad({ Port_Ad_oL[0], Port_Ad_oN[0], Port_Ad_oW[0], 
Port_Ad_oS[0], Port_Ad_oE[0] }), //Port_Ad_oX[Y]: Y is the output port direction, X is 
the data source direction 
                         .TableTag_new(TableTag_new_oE), 
                         .RRReg_new(RRReg_new_oE)); 
  PortAdmission PortAd_S( 
                         .Req_V({ Req_V_L[1], Req_V_N[1], Req_V_W[1], Req_V_S[1], 
Req_V_E[1] }), 
                         .CReq_V({ CReq_V_L[1], CReq_V_N[1], CReq_V_W[1], CReq_V_S[1], 
CReq_V_E[1] }), 
                         .TableTag_pre(TableTag_pre_oS), 
                         .RRReg_pre(RRReg_pre_oS), 
                         .NACK(NACK_oS), 
                         .BufFull_in(BufFull_in_oS), 
                         //output 
                         .Port_Ad({ Port_Ad_oL[1], Port_Ad_oN[1], Port_Ad_oW[1], 
Port_Ad_oS[1], Port_Ad_oE[1] }), 
                         .TableTag_new(TableTag_new_oS), 
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                         .RRReg_new(RRReg_new_oS)); 
  PortAdmission PortAd_W( 
                         .Req_V({ Req_V_L[2], Req_V_N[2], Req_V_W[2], Req_V_S[2], 
Req_V_E[2] }), 
                         .CReq_V({ CReq_V_L[2], CReq_V_N[2], CReq_V_W[2], CReq_V_S[2], 
CReq_V_E[2] }), 
                         .TableTag_pre(TableTag_pre_oW), 
                         .RRReg_pre(RRReg_pre_oW), 
                         .NACK(NACK_oW), 
                         .BufFull_in(BufFull_in_oW), 
                         //output 
                         .Port_Ad({ Port_Ad_oL[2], Port_Ad_oN[2], Port_Ad_oW[2], 
Port_Ad_oS[2], Port_Ad_oE[2] }), 
                         .TableTag_new(TableTag_new_oW), 
                         .RRReg_new(RRReg_new_oW)); 
  PortAdmission PortAd_N( 
                         .Req_V({ Req_V_L[3], Req_V_N[3], Req_V_W[3], Req_V_S[3], 
Req_V_E[3] }), 
                         .CReq_V({ CReq_V_L[3], CReq_V_N[3], CReq_V_W[3], CReq_V_S[3], 
CReq_V_E[3] }), 
                         .TableTag_pre(TableTag_pre_oN), 
                         .RRReg_pre(RRReg_pre_oN), 
                         .NACK(NACK_oN), 
308 
 
                         .BufFull_in(BufFull_in_oN), 
                         //output 
                         .Port_Ad({ Port_Ad_oL[3], Port_Ad_oN[3], Port_Ad_oW[3], 
Port_Ad_oS[3], Port_Ad_oE[3] }), 
                         .TableTag_new(TableTag_new_oN), 
                         .RRReg_new(RRReg_new_oN)); 
  PortAdmission PortAd_L( 
                         .Req_V({ Req_V_L[4], Req_V_N[4], Req_V_W[4], Req_V_S[4], 
Req_V_E[4] }), 
                         .CReq_V({ CReq_V_L[4], CReq_V_N[4], CReq_V_W[4], CReq_V_S[4], 
CReq_V_E[4] }), 
                         .TableTag_pre(TableTag_pre_oL), 
                         .RRReg_pre(RRReg_pre_oL), 
                         .NACK(NACK_oL), 
                         .BufFull_in(BufFull_in_oL), 
                         //output 
                         .Port_Ad({ Port_Ad_oL[4], Port_Ad_oN[4], Port_Ad_oW[4], 
Port_Ad_oS[4], Port_Ad_oE[4] }), 
                         .TableTag_new(TableTag_new_oL), 
                         .RRReg_new(RRReg_new_oL)); 
  //use Port_Ad_oE,S,W,N,L to make connection 
  always 
    @(Port_Ad_oE or 
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      Port_Ad_oS or 
      Port_Ad_oW or 
      Port_Ad_oN or 
      Port_Ad_oL or 
      FlitIn_E or 
      FlitIn_S or 
      FlitIn_W or 
      FlitIn_N or 
      FlitIn_L) 
    begin 
      case ({ Port_Ad_oE[0], Port_Ad_oS[0], Port_Ad_oW[0], Port_Ad_oN[0], 
Port_Ad_oL[0] }) 
        5'b00001: 
          FlitOut_E_tmp <= FlitIn_L; 
        5'b00010: 
          FlitOut_E_tmp <= FlitIn_N; 
        5'b00100: 
          FlitOut_E_tmp <= FlitIn_W; 
        5'b01000: 
          FlitOut_E_tmp <= FlitIn_S; 
        5'b10000: 
          FlitOut_E_tmp <= FlitIn_E; 
        default: 
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          FlitOut_E_tmp <= 0; 
      endcase 
      case ({ Port_Ad_oE[1], Port_Ad_oS[1], Port_Ad_oW[1], Port_Ad_oN[1], 
Port_Ad_oL[1] }) 
        5'b00001: 
          FlitOut_S_tmp <= FlitIn_L; 
        5'b00010: 
          FlitOut_S_tmp <= FlitIn_N; 
        5'b00100: 
          FlitOut_S_tmp <= FlitIn_W; 
        5'b01000: 
          FlitOut_S_tmp <= FlitIn_S; 
        5'b10000: 
          FlitOut_S_tmp <= FlitIn_E; 
        default: 
          FlitOut_S_tmp <= 0; 
      endcase 
      case ({ Port_Ad_oE[2], Port_Ad_oS[2], Port_Ad_oW[2], Port_Ad_oN[2], 
Port_Ad_oL[2] }) 
        5'b00001: 
          FlitOut_W_tmp <= FlitIn_L; 
        5'b00010: 
          FlitOut_W_tmp <= FlitIn_N; 
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        5'b00100: 
          FlitOut_W_tmp <= FlitIn_W; 
        5'b01000: 
          FlitOut_W_tmp <= FlitIn_S; 
        5'b10000: 
          FlitOut_W_tmp <= FlitIn_E; 
        default: 
          FlitOut_W_tmp <= 0; 
      endcase 
      case ({ Port_Ad_oE[3], Port_Ad_oS[3], Port_Ad_oW[3], Port_Ad_oN[3], 
Port_Ad_oL[3] }) 
        5'b00001: 
          FlitOut_N_tmp <= FlitIn_L; 
        5'b00010: 
          FlitOut_N_tmp <= FlitIn_N; 
        5'b00100: 
          FlitOut_N_tmp <= FlitIn_W; 
        5'b01000: 
          FlitOut_N_tmp <= FlitIn_S; 
        5'b10000: 
          FlitOut_N_tmp <= FlitIn_E; 
        default: 
          FlitOut_N_tmp <= 0; 
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      endcase 
      case ({ Port_Ad_oE[4], Port_Ad_oS[4], Port_Ad_oW[4], Port_Ad_oN[4], 
Port_Ad_oL[4] }) 
        5'b00001: 
          FlitOut_L_tmp <= FlitIn_L; 
        5'b00010: 
          FlitOut_L_tmp <= FlitIn_N; 
        5'b00100: 
          FlitOut_L_tmp <= FlitIn_W; 
        5'b01000: 
          FlitOut_L_tmp <= FlitIn_S; 
        5'b10000: 
          FlitOut_L_tmp <= FlitIn_E; 
        default: 
          FlitOut_L_tmp <= 0; 
      endcase 
    end 
  always 
    @(Reset or 
      Port_Ad_oE or 
      Port_Ad_oS or 
      Port_Ad_oW or 
      Port_Ad_oN or 
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      Port_Ad_oL) 
    begin 
      if (Reset) 
        Port_Ad <= 25'b0; 
      else 
        begin 
          Port_Ad[4 : 0] <= { Port_Ad_oE[0], Port_Ad_oS[0], Port_Ad_oW[0], 
Port_Ad_oN[0], Port_Ad_oL[0] }; 
          Port_Ad[9 : 5] <= { Port_Ad_oE[1], Port_Ad_oS[1], Port_Ad_oW[1], 
Port_Ad_oN[1], Port_Ad_oL[1] }; 
          Port_Ad[14 : 10] <= { Port_Ad_oE[2], Port_Ad_oS[2], Port_Ad_oW[2], 
Port_Ad_oN[2], Port_Ad_oL[2] }; 
          Port_Ad[19 : 15] <= { Port_Ad_oE[3], Port_Ad_oS[3], Port_Ad_oW[3], 
Port_Ad_oN[3], Port_Ad_oL[3] }; 
          Port_Ad[24 : 20] <= { Port_Ad_oE[4], Port_Ad_oS[4], Port_Ad_oW[4], 
Port_Ad_oN[4], Port_Ad_oL[4] }; 
        end 
    end 
  /* */ 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK) 
    begin 
      if (Reset) 
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        begin 
          DestPort_E <= 3'b0; 
          DestPort_S <= 3'b0; 
          DestPort_W <= 3'b0; 
          DestPort_N <= 3'b0; 
          DestPort_L <= 3'b0; 
          TableTag_cur <= 25'b0; 
          RRReg_cur <= 25'b0; 
          //Port_Ad <= 25'b0; 
          FlitOut_E <= 0; 
          FlitOut_S <= 0; 
          FlitOut_W <= 0; 
          FlitOut_N <= 0; 
          FlitOut_L <= 0; 
        end 
      else 
        begin 
          DestPort_E <= DestPort_E_tmp; 
          DestPort_S <= DestPort_S_tmp; 
          DestPort_W <= DestPort_W_tmp; 
          DestPort_N <= DestPort_N_tmp; 
          DestPort_L <= DestPort_L_tmp; 
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          TableTag_cur <= { TableTag_new_oL, TableTag_new_oN, TableTag_new_oW, 
TableTag_new_oS, TableTag_new_oE }; 
          RRReg_cur <= { RRReg_new_oL, RRReg_new_oN, RRReg_new_oW, 
RRReg_new_oS, RRReg_new_oE }; 
          FlitOut_E <= FlitOut_E_tmp; 
          FlitOut_S <= FlitOut_S_tmp; 
          FlitOut_W <= FlitOut_W_tmp; 
          FlitOut_N <= FlitOut_N_tmp; 
          FlitOut_L <= FlitOut_L_tmp; 
        end 















e. Info Extraction 
`timescale 1ns/1ns 
module InfoExtract4(Flit, 
                    CurrentID, 
                    DestPort_pre, 
                    select, 
                    //output  
                    DestPort, 
                    Req_V, 
                    CReq_V, 
                    ErrDetectionOut); 
  parameter FLITWIDTH = 36; 
  parameter NOCSIZE = 16; 
  input[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] Flit; 
  input[3 : 0] CurrentID; 
  input[2 : 0] DestPort_pre; 
  input[2 : 0] select; 
  output[2 : 0] DestPort; 
  output[4 : 0] Req_V; 
  output[4 : 0] CReq_V; 
  wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] Flit; 
  wire[3 : 0] CurrentID; 
  wire[2 : 0] DestPort_pre; 
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  reg[2 : 0] DestPort; 
  reg[4 : 0] Req_V; 
  reg[4 : 0] CReq_V; 
  wire[14 : 0] Info_enc; 
  wire[10 : 0] Info; 
  //internal signal 
  reg Req; 
  reg CReq; 
  reg[3 : 0] DestID; 
  reg[1 : 0] X_C; 
  reg[1 : 0] X_D; 
  reg[1 : 0] Y_C; 
  reg[1 : 0] Y_D; 
  output ErrDetectionOut; 
  PFDS p0(.inputa(Flit[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0]), 
          .select(select), 
          .outputb(Info_enc[14 : 0])); 
  HammingDecoder15_11_Partial D0(.DataIno(Info_enc[14 : 0]), 
                                 .DataOut(Info[10 : 0]), 
                                 .ErrDetection(ErrDetectionOut)); 
 
  always 
    @(Info or 
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      Flit) 
    begin 
      if ((Info[0] == 1'b1) & (Info[1] == 1'b0)) 
        begin 
          Req = 1'b1; 
          CReq = 1'b0; 
          DestID = Info[9 : 6]; 
        end 
      else 
        if ((Info[0] == 1'b0) & (Info[1] == 1'b1)) 
          begin 
            Req = 1'b0; 
            CReq = 1'b1; 
            DestID = 4'b0; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            Req = 1'b0; 
            CReq = 1'b0; 
            DestID = 4'b0; 
          end 
    end 
  //Compute Destport 
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  always 
    @(CurrentID or 
      DestID) //X_C[0] is gMSB, same with Y_C[0] 
    begin 
      //NoC size 4x4 
      if (NOCSIZE == 9) 
        begin 
          case (CurrentID) 
            4'b0000: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b00; 
                X_C = 2'b00; 
              end 
            4'b0001: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b00; 
                X_C = 2'b01; 
              end 
            4'b0010: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b00; 
                X_C = 2'b10; 
              end 
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            4'b0011: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b01; 
                X_C = 2'b00; 
              end 
            4'b0100: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b01; 
                X_C = 2'b01; 
              end 
            4'b0101: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b01; 
                X_C = 2'b10; 
              end 
            4'b0110: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b10; 
                X_C = 2'b00; 
              end 
            4'b0111: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b10; 
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                X_C = 2'b01; 
              end 
            4'b1000: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b10; 
                X_C = 2'b10; 
              end 
            default: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b00; 
                X_C = 2'b00; 
              end 
          endcase 
          case (DestID) 
            4'b0000: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b00; 
                X_D = 2'b00; 
              end 
            4'b0001: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b00; 
                X_D = 2'b01; 
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              end 
            4'b0010: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b00; 
                X_D = 2'b10; 
              end 
            4'b0011: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b01; 
                X_D = 2'b00; 
              end 
            4'b0100: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b01; 
                X_D = 2'b01; 
              end 
            4'b0101: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b01; 
                X_D = 2'b10; 
              end 
            4'b0110: 
              begin 
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                Y_D = 2'b10; 
                X_D = 2'b00; 
              end 
            4'b0111: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b10; 
                X_D = 2'b01; 
              end 
            4'b1000: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b10; 
                X_D = 2'b10; 
              end 
            default: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b00; 
                X_D = 2'b00; 
              end 
          endcase 
        end 
      else //NOCSIZE==16 
        begin 
          case (CurrentID) 
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            4'b0000: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b00; 
                X_C = 2'b00; 
              end 
            4'b0001: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b00; 
                X_C = 2'b01; 
              end 
            4'b0010: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b00; 
                X_C = 2'b10; 
              end 
            4'b0011: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b00; 
                X_C = 2'b11; 
              end 
            4'b0100: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b01; 
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                X_C = 2'b00; 
              end 
            4'b0101: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b01; 
                X_C = 2'b01; 
              end 
            4'b0110: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b01; 
                X_C = 2'b10; 
              end 
            4'b0111: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b01; 
                X_C = 2'b11; 
              end 
            4'b1000: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b10; 
                X_C = 2'b00; 
              end 
            4'b1001: 
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              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b10; 
                X_C = 2'b01; 
              end 
            4'b1010: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b10; 
                X_C = 2'b10; 
              end 
            4'b1011: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b10; 
                X_C = 2'b11; 
              end 
            4'b1100: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b11; 
                X_C = 2'b00; 
              end 
            4'b1101: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b11; 
                X_C = 2'b01; 
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              end 
            4'b1110: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b11; 
                X_C = 2'b10; 
              end 
            4'b1111: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b11; 
                X_C = 2'b11; 
              end 
            default: 
              begin 
                Y_C = 2'b00; 
                X_C = 2'b00; 
              end 
          endcase 
          case (DestID) 
            4'b0000: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b00; 
                X_D = 2'b00; 
              end 
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            4'b0001: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b00; 
                X_D = 2'b01; 
              end 
            4'b0010: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b00; 
                X_D = 2'b10; 
              end 
            4'b0011: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b00; 
                X_D = 2'b11; 
              end 
            4'b0100: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b01; 
                X_D = 2'b00; 
              end 
            4'b0101: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b01; 
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                X_D = 2'b01; 
              end 
            4'b0110: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b01; 
                X_D = 2'b10; 
              end 
            4'b0111: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b01; 
                X_D = 2'b11; 
              end 
            4'b1000: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b10; 
                X_D = 2'b00; 
              end 
            4'b1001: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b10; 
                X_D = 2'b01; 
              end 
            4'b1010: 
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              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b10; 
                X_D = 2'b10; 
              end 
            4'b1011: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b10; 
                X_D = 2'b11; 
              end 
            4'b1100: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b11; 
                X_D = 2'b00; 
              end 
            4'b1101: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b11; 
                X_D = 2'b01; 
              end 
            4'b1110: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b11; 
                X_D = 2'b10; 
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              end 
            4'b1111: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b11; 
                X_D = 2'b11; 
              end 
            default: 
              begin 
                Y_D = 2'b00; 
                X_D = 2'b00; 
              end 
          endcase 
        end 
        end 
  always 
    @(X_C or 
      Y_C or 
      X_D or 
      Y_D or 
      Req or 
      DestPort_pre) 
    begin 
      if (Req) 
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        if (X_C == X_D) //move on y-direction, 3'b100, local port. DestPort[2] is MSB 
          begin 
            if (Y_C == Y_D) 
              DestPort = 3'b100; 
            else 
              begin 
                 
                case ({ Y_C, Y_D }) //design for 3x3 
                  /*4'b0001, 4'b0110,*/ 
                  4'b1000, 4'b0100, 4'b1001, 4'b1100, 4'b1101, 4'b1110: 
                    DestPort = 3'b011; //go through north 
                  /*4'b0100, 4'b1001,*/ 
                  4'b0010, 4'b0001, 4'b0110, 4'b0011, 4'b1011, 4'b0111: 
                    DestPort = 3'b001; //go through south 
                  default: 
                    DestPort = 3'b100; //go through local                                           
                endcase 
               
              end 
          end 
        else //move on x-direction 
          begin 
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            case ({ X_C, X_D }) 
              4'b0001, 4'b0110, 4'b0010, 4'b0011, 4'b0111, 4'b1011: 
                DestPort = 3'b000; //go through east 
              4'b0100, 4'b1001, 4'b1000, 4'b1100, 4'b1101, 4'b1110: 
                DestPort = 3'b010; //go through west 
              default: 
                DestPort = 3'b100; // go through local 
            endcase 
          end 
      else 
        DestPort = DestPort_pre; 
    end 
  always 
    @(DestPort or 
      DestPort_pre or 
      Req or 
      CReq) 
    begin 
      if (Req) 
        case (DestPort) 
          3'b000: 
            Req_V = { 4'b0, 1'b1 }; 
          3'b001: 
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            Req_V = { 3'b0, 1'b1, 1'b0 }; 
          3'b010: 
            Req_V = { 2'b0, 1'b1, 2'b0 }; 
          3'b011: 
            Req_V = { 1'b0, 1'b1, 3'b0 }; 
          3'b100: 
            Req_V = { 1'b1, 4'b0 }; 
          default: 
            Req_V = { 4'b0, 1'b1 }; 
        endcase 
      else 
        Req_V = 5'b00000; 
      if (CReq) 
        case (DestPort_pre) 
          3'b000: 
            CReq_V = { 4'b0, 1'b1 }; 
          3'b001: 
            CReq_V = { 3'b0, 1'b1, 1'b0 }; 
          3'b010: 
            CReq_V = { 2'b0, 1'b1, 2'b0 }; 
          3'b011: 
            CReq_V = { 1'b0, 1'b1, 3'b0 }; 
          3'b100: 
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            CReq_V = { 1'b1, 4'b0 }; 
          default: 
            CReq_V = { 4'b0, 1'b1 }; 
        endcase 
      else 
        CReq_V = 5'b00000; 



















f. Port Admission 
`timescale 1ns/1ns 
module PortAdmission(Req_V, 
                     CReq_V, 
                     TableTag_pre, 
                     RRReg_pre, 
                     NACK, 
                     BufFull_in, 
                     //output 
                     Port_Ad, //the direction with 'o' means that it is the output direction 
                     TableTag_new, 
                     RRReg_new); 
  input[4 : 0] Req_V; //changed msb 
  input[4 : 0] CReq_V; //changed msb 
  input[4 : 0] TableTag_pre; 
  input[4 : 0] RRReg_pre; 
  input NACK; 
  input BufFull_in; 
  output[4 : 0] Port_Ad; 
  output[4 : 0] TableTag_new; 
  output[4 : 0] RRReg_new; 
  wire[4 : 0] Req_V; //changed msb 
  wire[4 : 0] CReq_V; //changed msb 
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  wire[4 : 0] TableTag_pre; 
  wire[4 : 0] RRReg_pre; 
  wire NACK; 
  wire BufFull_in; 
  reg[4 : 0] Port_Ad; 
  reg[4 : 0] TableTag_new; 
  reg[4 : 0] RRReg_new; 
  //internal signals 
  wire[4 : 0] RR_Port_Ad; 
  wire[4 : 0] RR_RRReg; 
  wire[4 : 0] RR_TableTag; 
  RoundRobin RR(.Req_V(Req_V), 
                .RRReg_in(RRReg_pre), 
                .TableTag_in(TableTag_pre), 
                //output 
                .RRReg_out(RR_RRReg), 
                .TableTag_out(RR_TableTag), 
                .Port_Ad(RR_Port_Ad)); 
  always 
    @(NACK or 
      BufFull_in or 
      TableTag_pre or 
      RRReg_pre or 
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      CReq_V or 
      RR_Port_Ad or 
      RR_RRReg or 
      RR_TableTag) 
    begin 
      if (NACK | BufFull_in) 
        begin 
          TableTag_new <= TableTag_pre; 
          RRReg_new <= RRReg_pre; 
          Port_Ad <= 5'b0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (TableTag_pre[0] | TableTag_pre[1] | TableTag_pre[2] | TableTag_pre[3] | 
TableTag_pre[4]) 
          begin 
            Port_Ad <= RRReg_pre; 
            RRReg_new <= RRReg_pre; 
            if (CReq_V[0] | CReq_V[1] | CReq_V[2] | CReq_V[3] | CReq_V[4]) 
              TableTag_new <= 5'b0; 
            else 
              TableTag_new <= TableTag_pre; 
          end 
        else 
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          begin 
            Port_Ad <= RR_Port_Ad; 
            RRReg_new <= RR_RRReg; 
            TableTag_new <= RR_TableTag; 
          end 




















g. Hamming Decoder 
`timescale 1ns/1ns 
module HammingDecoder15_11(DataIno, 
                           DataOut, 
                           ErrDetection); 
  input[35 : 0] DataIno; 
  output[31 : 0] DataOut; 
  wire[35 : 0] DataIno; 
  wire[3 : 0] ECC; 
  reg[31 : 0] DataOut; 
  output reg ErrDetection; 
  //internal reg 
  reg[3 : 0] syndrome; 
  assign ECC[3 : 0] = DataIno[14 : 11]; 
  always 
    @(DataIno or 
      ECC) 
    begin 
      syndrome[0] <= ECC[0] ^ DataIno[0] ^ DataIno[3] ^ DataIno[4] ^ DataIno[6] ^ 
DataIno[8] ^ DataIno[9] ^ DataIno[10]; 
      syndrome[1] <= ECC[1] ^ DataIno[0] ^ DataIno[1] ^ DataIno[3] ^ DataIno[5] ^ 
DataIno[6] ^ DataIno[7] ^ DataIno[8]; 
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      syndrome[2] <= ECC[2] ^ DataIno[1] ^ DataIno[2] ^ DataIno[4] ^ DataIno[6] ^ 
DataIno[7] ^ DataIno[8] ^ DataIno[9]; 
      syndrome[3] <= ECC[3] ^ DataIno[2] ^ DataIno[3] ^ DataIno[5] ^ DataIno[7] ^ 
DataIno[8] ^ DataIno[9] ^ DataIno[10]; 
    end 
  always 
    @(syndrome or 
      DataIno) 
    begin 
      ErrDetection <= (syndrome[3] | syndrome[2] | syndrome[1] | syndrome[0]); 
      DataOut[10] <= DataIno[10] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (~syndrome[1]) & (~syndrome[2]) & 
(syndrome[3])); //1001 syn[0]-->syn[3] 
      DataOut[9] <= DataIno[9] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (~syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) & 
(syndrome[3])); //1011 
      DataOut[8] <= DataIno[8] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) & 
(syndrome[3])); //1111 
      DataOut[7] <= DataIno[7] ^ ((~syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) & 
(syndrome[3])); //0111 
      DataOut[6] <= DataIno[6] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) & 
(~syndrome[3])); //1110 




      DataOut[4] <= DataIno[4] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (~syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) & 
(~syndrome[3])); //1010 
      DataOut[3] <= DataIno[3] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (~syndrome[2]) & 
(syndrome[3])); //1101 
      DataOut[2] <= DataIno[2] ^ ((~syndrome[0]) & (~syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) & 
(syndrome[3])); //0011 
      DataOut[1] <= DataIno[1] ^ ((~syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) & 
(~syndrome[3])); //0110 
      DataOut[0] <= DataIno[0] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (~syndrome[2]) & 
(~syndrome[3])); //1100 
      DataOut[31 : 11] <= DataIno[35 : 15]; 














h. Hamming Encoder 
`timescale 1ns/1ns 
module HammingEncoder15_11(DataIn, 
                           DataOut); 
  input[31 : 0] DataIn; 
  output[35 : 0] DataOut; 
  reg[35 : 0] DataOut; 
  always 
    @(DataIn) 
    begin 
      DataOut[10 : 0] <= DataIn[10 : 0]; 
      DataOut[35 : 15] <= DataIn[31 : 11]; 
      DataOut[11] <= DataIn[0] ^ DataIn[3] ^ DataIn[4] ^ DataIn[6] ^ DataIn[8] ^ DataIn[9] 
^ DataIn[10]; 
      DataOut[12] <= DataIn[0] ^ DataIn[1] ^ DataIn[3] ^ DataIn[5] ^ DataIn[6] ^ DataIn[7] 
^ DataIn[8]; 
      DataOut[13] <= DataIn[1] ^ DataIn[2] ^ DataIn[4] ^ DataIn[6] ^ DataIn[7] ^ DataIn[8] 
^ DataIn[9]; 
      DataOut[14] <= DataIn[2] ^ DataIn[3] ^ DataIn[5] ^ DataIn[7] ^ DataIn[8] ^ DataIn[9] 
^ DataIn[10]; 








            d, 
            q); 
  input[2 : 0] select; 
  input[7 : 0] d; 
  output q; 
  reg q; 
  wire[2 : 0] select; 
  wire[7 : 0] d; 
  always 
    @(select or 
      d) 
    begin 
      case (select) 
        3'b000: 
          q = d[0]; 
        3'b001: 
          q = d[1]; 
        3'b010: 
          q = d[2]; 
        3'b011: 
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          q = d[3]; 
        3'b100: 
          q = d[4]; 
        3'b101: 
          q = d[5]; 
        3'b110: 
          q = d[6]; 
        3'b111: 
          q = d[7]; 
      endcase 















j. Partial Flit De-Permutation 
`timescale 1ns/1ns 
module PFDS(inputa, 
            select, 
            outputb); 
  input[35 : 0] inputa; 
  input[2 : 0] select; 
  output[14 : 0] outputb; 
  wire[7 : 0] mux0input, 
              mux1input, 
              mux2input, 
              mux3input, 
              mux4input, 
              mux5input, 
              mux6input, 
              mux7input, 
              mux8input, 
              mux9input, 
              mux10input, 
              mux11input, 
              mux12input, 
              mux13input, 
              mux14input; 
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  assign mux0input = { inputa[0], inputa[34], inputa[19], inputa[20], inputa[10], inputa[2], 
inputa[1], inputa[10] }; 
  assign mux1input = { inputa[1], inputa[35], inputa[0], inputa[21], inputa[11], inputa[3], 
inputa[2], inputa[19] }; 
  assign mux2input = { inputa[2], inputa[0], inputa[20], inputa[22], inputa[12], inputa[4], 
inputa[0], inputa[12] }; 
  assign mux3input = { inputa[3], inputa[1], inputa[1], inputa[23], inputa[13], inputa[5], 
inputa[35], inputa[17] }; 
  assign mux4input = { inputa[4], inputa[2], inputa[21], inputa[24], inputa[14], inputa[6], 
inputa[34], inputa[14] }; 
  assign mux5input = { inputa[5], inputa[3], inputa[2], inputa[25], inputa[15], inputa[7], 
inputa[33], inputa[15] }; 
  assign mux6input = { inputa[6], inputa[4], inputa[22], inputa[26], inputa[16], inputa[8], 
inputa[32], inputa[16] }; 
  assign mux7input = { inputa[7], inputa[5], inputa[3], inputa[27], inputa[17], inputa[9], 
inputa[31], inputa[13] }; 
  assign mux8input = { inputa[8], inputa[6], inputa[23], inputa[28], inputa[18], inputa[10], 
inputa[30], inputa[18] }; 
  assign mux9input = { inputa[9], inputa[7], inputa[4], inputa[29], inputa[19], inputa[11], 
inputa[29], inputa[11] }; 
  assign mux10input = { inputa[10], inputa[8], inputa[24], inputa[30], inputa[20], 
inputa[12], inputa[28], inputa[0] }; 
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  assign mux11input = { inputa[11], inputa[9], inputa[5], inputa[1], inputa[29], inputa[13], 
inputa[27], inputa[9] }; 
  assign mux12input = { inputa[12], inputa[10], inputa[25], inputa[32], inputa[30], 
inputa[14], inputa[26], inputa[2] }; 
  assign mux13input = { inputa[13], inputa[11], inputa[6], inputa[3], inputa[31], inputa[15], 
inputa[25], inputa[7] }; 
  assign mux14input = { inputa[14], inputa[12], inputa[26], inputa[34], inputa[32], 
inputa[16], inputa[24], inputa[4] }; 
  mux8 dm0(.select(select), 
           .d(mux0input), 
           .q(outputb[0])); 
  mux8 dm1(.select(select), 
           .d(mux1input), 
           .q(outputb[1])); 
  mux8 dm2(.select(select), 
           .d(mux2input), 
           .q(outputb[2])); 
  mux8 dm3(.select(select), 
           .d(mux3input), 
           .q(outputb[3])); 
  mux8 dm4(.select(select), 
           .d(mux4input), 
           .q(outputb[4])); 
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  mux8 dm5(.select(select), 
           .d(mux5input), 
           .q(outputb[5])); 
  mux8 dm6(.select(select), 
           .d(mux6input), 
           .q(outputb[6])); 
  mux8 dm7(.select(select), 
           .d(mux7input), 
           .q(outputb[7])); 
  mux8 dm8(.select(select), 
           .d(mux8input), 
           .q(outputb[8])); 
  mux8 dm9(.select(select), 
           .d(mux9input), 
           .q(outputb[9])); 
  mux8 dm10(.select(select), 
            .d(mux10input), 
            .q(outputb[10])); 
  mux8 dm11(.select(select), 
            .d(mux11input), 
            .q(outputb[11])); 
  mux8 dm12(.select(select), 
            .d(mux12input), 
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            .q(outputb[12])); 
  mux8 dm13(.select(select), 
            .d(mux13input), 
            .q(outputb[13])); 
  mux8 dm14(.select(select), 
            .d(mux14input), 



















k. Partial Hamming Decoder 
`timescale 1ns/1ns 
module HammingDecoder15_11_Partial(DataIno, 
                                   DataOut, 
                                   ErrDetection); 
  input[14 : 0] DataIno; 
  output[10 : 0] DataOut; 
  wire[14 : 0] DataIno; 
  wire[3 : 0] ECC; 
  reg[10 : 0] DataOut; 
  output reg ErrDetection; 
  //internal reg 
  reg[3 : 0] syndrome; 
  //assign DataIn[10:0] = DataIno[10:0]; 
  assign ECC[3 : 0] = DataIno[14 : 11]; 
  always 
    @(DataIno or 
      ECC) 
    begin 
      syndrome[0] <= ECC[0] ^ DataIno[0] ^ DataIno[3] ^ DataIno[4] ^ DataIno[6] ^ 
DataIno[8] ^ DataIno[9] ^ DataIno[10]; 
      syndrome[1] <= ECC[1] ^ DataIno[0] ^ DataIno[1] ^ DataIno[3] ^ DataIno[5] ^ 
DataIno[6] ^ DataIno[7] ^ DataIno[8]; 
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      syndrome[2] <= ECC[2] ^ DataIno[1] ^ DataIno[2] ^ DataIno[4] ^ DataIno[6] ^ 
DataIno[7] ^ DataIno[8] ^ DataIno[9]; 
      syndrome[3] <= ECC[3] ^ DataIno[2] ^ DataIno[3] ^ DataIno[5] ^ DataIno[7] ^ 
DataIno[8] ^ DataIno[9] ^ DataIno[10]; 
    end 
  always 
    @(syndrome or 
      DataIno) 
    begin 
      ErrDetection <= (syndrome[3] | syndrome[2] | syndrome[1] | syndrome[0]); 
      DataOut[10] <= DataIno[10] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (~syndrome[1]) & (~syndrome[2]) & 
(syndrome[3])); //1001 syn[0]-->syn[3] 
      DataOut[9] <= DataIno[9] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (~syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) & 
(syndrome[3])); //1011 
      DataOut[8] <= DataIno[8] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) & 
(syndrome[3])); //1111 
      DataOut[7] <= DataIno[7] ^ ((~syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) & 
(syndrome[3])); //0111 
      DataOut[6] <= DataIno[6] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) & 
(~syndrome[3])); //1110 




      DataOut[4] <= DataIno[4] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (~syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) & 
(~syndrome[3])); //1010 
      DataOut[3] <= DataIno[3] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (~syndrome[2]) & 
(syndrome[3])); //1101 
      DataOut[2] <= DataIno[2] ^ ((~syndrome[0]) & (~syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) & 
(syndrome[3])); //0011 
      DataOut[1] <= DataIno[1] ^ ((~syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) & 
(~syndrome[3])); //0110 
      DataOut[0] <= DataIno[0] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (~syndrome[2]) & 
(~syndrome[3])); //1100 















l. Round Robin 
 
`timescale 1ns/1ns //edited by Jonathan to remove Branch for FPGA 
module RoundRobin(Req_V, 
                  RRReg_in, 
                  TableTag_in, 
                  //output 
                  RRReg_out, 
                  TableTag_out, 
                  Port_Ad); 
  input[4 : 0] Req_V; 
  input[4 : 0] RRReg_in; 
  input[4 : 0] TableTag_in; 
  output[4 : 0] RRReg_out; 
  output[4 : 0] TableTag_out; 
  output[4 : 0] Port_Ad; 
  wire[4 : 0] Req_V; 
  wire[4 : 0] RRReg_in; 
  wire[4 : 0] TableTag_in; 
  reg[4 : 0] RRReg_out; 
  reg[4 : 0] TableTag_out; 
  reg[4 : 0] Port_Ad; 
  //internal signals 
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  reg[4 : 0] Req_priority; 
  reg[4 : 0] Port_ad_tmp0; 
  reg[4 : 0] Port_ad_tmp1; 
  reg[4 : 0] Port_ad_tmp2; 
  reg[4 : 0] Port_ad_tmp3; 
  reg[4 : 0] Port_ad_tmp4; 
  always 
    @(RRReg_in or 
      Req_V) 
    begin 
      /*East output port*/ 
      /*round robin prioirty*/ 
      Port_ad_tmp0[1] <= RRReg_in[0] & Req_V[1]; 
      Port_ad_tmp0[2] <= !(RRReg_in[0] & Req_V[1]) & Req_V[2]; 
      Port_ad_tmp0[3] <= !(RRReg_in[0] & Req_V[1]) & (!Req_V[2]) & Req_V[3]; 
      Port_ad_tmp0[4] <= !(RRReg_in[0] & Req_V[1]) & (!Req_V[2]) & (!Req_V[3]) & 
Req_V[4]; 
      Port_ad_tmp0[0] <= !(RRReg_in[0] & Req_V[1]) & (!Req_V[2]) & (!Req_V[3]) & 
(!Req_V[4]) & Req_V[0]; 
      /*South output port*/ 
      Port_ad_tmp1[2] <= RRReg_in[1] & Req_V[2]; 
      Port_ad_tmp1[3] <= !(RRReg_in[1] & Req_V[2]) & Req_V[3]; 
      Port_ad_tmp1[4] <= !(RRReg_in[1] & Req_V[2]) & (!Req_V[3]) & Req_V[4]; 
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      Port_ad_tmp1[0] <= !(RRReg_in[1] & Req_V[2]) & (!Req_V[3]) & (!Req_V[4]) & 
Req_V[0]; 
      Port_ad_tmp1[1] <= !(RRReg_in[1] & Req_V[2]) & (!Req_V[3]) & (!Req_V[4]) & 
(!Req_V[0]) & Req_V[1]; 
      /*West output port*/ 
      Port_ad_tmp2[3] <= RRReg_in[2] & Req_V[3]; 
      Port_ad_tmp2[4] <= !(RRReg_in[2] & Req_V[3]) & Req_V[4]; 
      Port_ad_tmp2[0] <= !(RRReg_in[2] & Req_V[3]) & (!Req_V[4]) & Req_V[0]; 
      Port_ad_tmp2[1] <= !(RRReg_in[2] & Req_V[3]) & (!Req_V[4]) & (!Req_V[0]) & 
Req_V[1]; 
      Port_ad_tmp2[2] <= !(RRReg_in[2] & Req_V[3]) & (!Req_V[4]) & (!Req_V[0]) & 
(!Req_V[1]) & Req_V[2]; 
      /*North output port*/ 
      Port_ad_tmp3[4] <= RRReg_in[3] & Req_V[4]; 
      Port_ad_tmp3[0] <= !(RRReg_in[3] & Req_V[4]) & Req_V[0]; 
      Port_ad_tmp3[1] <= !(RRReg_in[3] & Req_V[4]) & (!Req_V[0]) & Req_V[1]; 
      Port_ad_tmp3[2] <= !(RRReg_in[3] & Req_V[4]) & (!Req_V[0]) & (!Req_V[1]) & 
Req_V[2]; 
      Port_ad_tmp3[3] <= !(RRReg_in[3] & Req_V[4]) & (!Req_V[0]) & (!Req_V[1]) & 
(!Req_V[2]) & Req_V[3]; 
      /*Local output port*/ 
      Port_ad_tmp4[0] <= RRReg_in[4] & Req_V[0]; 
      Port_ad_tmp4[1] <= !(RRReg_in[4] & Req_V[0]) & Req_V[1]; 
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      Port_ad_tmp4[2] <= !(RRReg_in[4] & Req_V[0]) & (!Req_V[1]) & Req_V[2]; 
      Port_ad_tmp4[3] <= !(RRReg_in[4] & Req_V[0]) & (!Req_V[1]) & (!Req_V[2]) & 
Req_V[3]; 
      Port_ad_tmp4[4] <= !(RRReg_in[4] & Req_V[0]) & (!Req_V[1]) & (!Req_V[2]) & 
(!Req_V[3]) & Req_V[4]; 
    end 
  always 
    @(Req_V) 
    /*priority: Local, East, South, West, North. The reason to make local input port the 
highest priority is to inject flits to network as soon as possible. Alternatively, we can put the 
request from the local input port the lowest priority to prevent increasing network 
congestion*/ 
    begin 
      Req_priority[4] = Req_V[4]; 
      Req_priority[0] = !Req_V[4] & Req_V[0]; 
      Req_priority[1] = !Req_V[4] & !Req_V[0] & Req_V[1]; 
      Req_priority[2] = !Req_V[4] & !Req_V[0] & !Req_V[1] & Req_V[2]; 
      Req_priority[3] = !Req_V[4] & !Req_V[0] & !Req_V[1] & !Req_V[2] & Req_V[3]; 
    end 
  always 
    @(RRReg_in or 
      TableTag_in or 
      Port_ad_tmp0 or 
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      Port_ad_tmp1 or 
      Port_ad_tmp2 or 
      Port_ad_tmp3 or 
      Port_ad_tmp4 or 
      Req_priority or 
      Req_V) 
    begin 
      case (RRReg_in) //the output port is only occupied  by input port at one time, so all 
possible non-zero RRReg_in  listed are five. 
        5'b00001: 
          begin 
            Port_Ad <= Port_ad_tmp0; 
            RRReg_out <= Port_ad_tmp0; 
            TableTag_out <= Port_ad_tmp0; 
          end  
        5'b00010: 
          begin 
            Port_Ad <= Port_ad_tmp1; 
            RRReg_out <= Port_ad_tmp1; 
            TableTag_out <= Port_ad_tmp1; 
          end  
        5'b00100: 
          begin 
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            Port_Ad <= Port_ad_tmp2; 
            RRReg_out <= Port_ad_tmp2; 
            TableTag_out <= Port_ad_tmp2; 
          end  
        5'b01000: 
          begin 
            Port_Ad <= Port_ad_tmp3; 
            RRReg_out <= Port_ad_tmp3; 
            TableTag_out <= Port_ad_tmp3; 
          end  
        5'b10000: 
          begin 
            Port_Ad <= Port_ad_tmp4; 
            RRReg_out <= Port_ad_tmp4; 
            TableTag_out <= Port_ad_tmp4; 
          end  
        default: 
          begin 
            case (Req_priority) 
              5'b00001: 
                begin 
                  Port_Ad <= Port_ad_tmp0; 
                  RRReg_out <= Port_ad_tmp0; 
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                  TableTag_out <= Port_ad_tmp0; 
                end  
              5'b00010: 
                begin 
                  Port_Ad <= Port_ad_tmp1; 
                  RRReg_out <= Port_ad_tmp1; 
                  TableTag_out <= Port_ad_tmp1; 
                end  
              5'b00100: 
                begin 
                  Port_Ad <= Port_ad_tmp2; 
                  RRReg_out <= Port_ad_tmp2; 
                  TableTag_out <= Port_ad_tmp2; 
                end  
              5'b01000: 
                begin 
                  Port_Ad <= Port_ad_tmp3; 
                  RRReg_out <= Port_ad_tmp3; 
                  TableTag_out <= Port_ad_tmp3; 
                end  
              5'b10000: 
                begin 
                  Port_Ad <= Port_ad_tmp4; 
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                  RRReg_out <= Port_ad_tmp4; 
                  TableTag_out <= Port_ad_tmp4; 
                end  
              default: 
                begin 
                  Port_Ad <= 5'b0; 
                  RRReg_out <= RRReg_in; 
                  TableTag_out <= TableTag_in; 
                end  
            endcase 
          end //the intended output port is not occupied by any packet yet 
      endcase 













m. Circular Output FIFO 
`timescale 1ns/1ns 
//Use FPGA InputChannel to create a circular FIFO 
module CircularFIFO4(clk, 
                     reset, 
                     valid_in, 
                     datain, 
                     NACK, 
                     almost_full, 
                     dataout, 
                     wrreq, 
                     select); 
  parameter FLITWIDTH = 32; 
  parameter CodedFLITWIDTH = 36; 
  input[2 : 0] select; 
  input clk; 
  input reset; 
  input valid_in; 
  input[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain; 
  input NACK; 
  input almost_full; 
  output[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout; 
  output wrreq; 
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  wire clk; 
  wire reset; 
  wire valid_in; 
  wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain; 
  wire NACK; 
  wire almost_full; 
  reg[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout; 
  reg wrreq; 
  //added to fix problem with wrreq 
  wire[10 : 0] Info; 
  wire[14 : 0] fifo_output_s1_enc; 
  wire ErrDetection; 
  //reg[FLITWIDTH-1:0]  dataout_uncoded; 
  //intermediate signals 
  wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s1; 
  wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s2; 
  wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s3; 
  wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s4; 
  wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s1; 
  wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s2; 
  wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s3; 
  wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s4; 
  wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s5; 
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  wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s6; 
  wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s7; 
  wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s8; 
  wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s5; 
  wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s6; 
  wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s7; 
  wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s8; 
  //assign fifo_input_s1 = 
almost_full?(fifo_output_s1&ErrDetection):(NACK?fifo_output_s2:datain); detection 
method, changed 10/7/2015 for correction 
  assign fifo_input_s1 = almost_full ? fifo_output_s1 : (NACK ? fifo_output_s2 : datain); 
  assign fifo_input_s2 = almost_full ? fifo_output_s2 : fifo_output_s3; 
  assign fifo_input_s3 = almost_full ? fifo_output_s3 : fifo_output_s4; //if insert more 
stages, follow this rule. Just make the first and last stages different 
  assign fifo_input_s4 = almost_full ? fifo_output_s4 : fifo_output_s5; 
  assign fifo_input_s5 = almost_full ? fifo_output_s5 : fifo_output_s6; 
  assign fifo_input_s6 = almost_full ? fifo_output_s6 : fifo_output_s7; 
  assign fifo_input_s7 = almost_full ? fifo_output_s7 : fifo_output_s8; 
  assign fifo_input_s8 = almost_full ? fifo_output_s8 : fifo_output_s1; 
  stagereg31_Proposed_EX circular_s1(.Preset_act_low(1'b1), 
                                     .Clear_act_low(!reset), 
                                     .CLK(clk), 
                                     .DataIn(fifo_input_s1), 
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                                     .DataOut(fifo_output_s1)); 
  stagereg31_Proposed_EX circular_s2(.Preset_act_low(1'b1), 
                                     .Clear_act_low(!reset), 
                                     .CLK(clk), 
                                     .DataIn(fifo_input_s2), 
                                     .DataOut(fifo_output_s2)); 
  stagereg31_Proposed_EX circular_s3(.Preset_act_low(1'b1), 
                                     .Clear_act_low(!reset), 
                                     .CLK(clk), 
                                     .DataIn(fifo_input_s3), 
                                     .DataOut(fifo_output_s3)); 
  stagereg31_Proposed_EX circular_s4(.Preset_act_low(1'b1), 
                                     .Clear_act_low(!reset), 
                                     .CLK(clk), 
                                     .DataIn(fifo_input_s4), 
                                     .DataOut(fifo_output_s4)); 
  stagereg31_Proposed_EX circular_s5(.Preset_act_low(1'b1), 
                                     .Clear_act_low(!reset), 
                                     .CLK(clk), 
                                     .DataIn(fifo_input_s5), 
                                     .DataOut(fifo_output_s5)); 
  stagereg31_Proposed_EX circular_s6(.Preset_act_low(1'b1), 
                                     .Clear_act_low(!reset), 
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                                     .CLK(clk), 
                                     .DataIn(fifo_input_s6), 
                                     .DataOut(fifo_output_s6)); 
  stagereg31_Proposed_EX circular_s7(.Preset_act_low(1'b1), 
                                     .Clear_act_low(!reset), 
                                     .CLK(clk), 
                                     .DataIn(fifo_input_s7), 
                                     .DataOut(fifo_output_s7)); 
  stagereg31_Proposed_EX circular_s8(.Preset_act_low(1'b1), 
                                     .Clear_act_low(!reset), 
                                     .CLK(clk), 
                                     .DataIn(fifo_input_s8), 
                                     .DataOut(fifo_output_s8)); 
  always 
    @(fifo_output_s1)  
    begin 
      dataout <= fifo_output_s1; 
    end 
  PFDS p0(.inputa(fifo_output_s1[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0]), 
          .select(select[2 : 0]), 
          .outputb(fifo_output_s1_enc[14 : 0])); 
  HammingDecoder15_11_Partial D0(.DataIno(fifo_output_s1_enc[14 : 0]), 
                                 .DataOut(Info[10 : 0]), 
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                                 .ErrDetection(ErrDetection)); 
   
  always 
    @(reset or 
      Info[0] or 
      Info[1] or 
      almost_full) //or ErrDetection) 10/7/2015 
    begin 
      if (reset) //| ErrDetection)//or ErrDetection 
        wrreq <= 1'b0; 
      else 
        if ((Info[0] | Info[1]) & (~almost_full)) //changed from fifo_output_s1 since 
scrambling etc. added almost full fix //added almost_full to fix stuck data on links  
          wrreq <= 1'b1; 
        else 
          wrreq <= 1'b0; 
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module stagereg31_Proposed_EX(Preset_act_low, 
                              Clear_act_low, 
                              CLK, 
                              DataIn, 
                              DataOut); 
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  input Preset_act_low; 
  input Clear_act_low; 
  input CLK; 
  input[35 : 0] DataIn; 
  output[35 : 0] DataOut; 
  reg[35 : 0] DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED; 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[23] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[23] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[23] = DataIn[23]; 
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          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[22] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[22] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[22] = DataIn[22]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
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      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[21] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[21] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[21] = DataIn[21]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
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        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[20] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[20] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[20] = DataIn[20]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[15] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
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        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[15] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[15] = DataIn[15]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[14] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[14] = 1; 
          end 
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        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[14] = DataIn[14]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[13] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[13] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[13] = DataIn[13]; 
          end 
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    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[12] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[12] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[12] = DataIn[12]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
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      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[7] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[7] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[7] = DataIn[7]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
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          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[6] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[6] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[6] = DataIn[6]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[5] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
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          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[5] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[5] = DataIn[5]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[4] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[4] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
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          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[4] = DataIn[4]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[19] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[19] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[19] = DataIn[19]; 
          end 
    end 
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  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[18] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[18] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[18] = DataIn[18]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
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    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[17] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[17] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[17] = DataIn[17]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[16] = 0; 
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        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[16] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[16] = DataIn[16]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[11] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
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            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[11] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[11] = DataIn[11]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[10] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[10] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
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            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[10] = DataIn[10]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[9] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[9] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[9] = DataIn[9]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
385 
 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[8] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[8] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[8] = DataIn[8]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
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      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[3] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[3] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[3] = DataIn[3]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[2] = 0; 
        end 
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      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[2] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[2] = DataIn[2]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[1] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[1] = 1; 
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          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[1] = DataIn[1]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[0] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[0] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[0] = DataIn[0]; 
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          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[24] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[24] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[24] = DataIn[24]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
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      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[31] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[31] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[31] = DataIn[31]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
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        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[30] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[30] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[30] = DataIn[30]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[29] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
392 
 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[29] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[29] = DataIn[29]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[28] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[28] = 1; 
          end 
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        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[28] = DataIn[28]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[27] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[27] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[27] = DataIn[27]; 
          end 
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    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[26] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[26] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[26] = DataIn[26]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
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      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[25] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[25] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[25] = DataIn[25]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
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          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[35] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[35] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[35] = DataIn[35]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[34] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
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          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[34] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[34] = DataIn[34]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[33] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[33] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
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          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[33] = DataIn[33]; 
          end 
    end 
  always 
    @(posedge CLK or 
      negedge Clear_act_low or 
      negedge Preset_act_low) 
    begin 
      if (!Clear_act_low) 
        begin 
          DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[32] = 0; 
        end 
      else 
        if (!Preset_act_low) 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[32] = 1; 
          end 
        else 
          begin 
            DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[32] = DataIn[32]; 
          end 
    end 
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                   //inputs 
                   inputa, 
                   select, 
                   //outputs 
                   outputb); 
  input[35 : 0] inputa; 
  wire[7 : 0] mux0input, 
              mux1input, 
              mux2input, 
              mux3input, 
              mux4input, 
              mux5input, 
              mux6input, 
              mux7input, 
              mux8input, 
              mux9input, 
              mux10input, 
              mux11input, 
              mux12input, 
              mux13input, 
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              mux14input, 
              mux15input, 
              mux16input, 
              mux17input, 
              mux18input, 
              mux19input, 
              mux20input, 
              mux21input, 
              mux22input, 
              mux23input, 
              mux24input, 
              mux25input, 
              mux26input, 
              mux27input, 
              mux28input, 
              mux29input, 
              mux30input, 
              mux31input, 
              mux32input, 
              mux33input, 
              mux34input, 
              mux35input; 
  input[2 : 0] select; 
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  wire[2 : 0] select; 
  reg[35 : 0] q; 
  output[35 : 0] outputb; 
  wire[35 : 0] inputa; 
  //reg[38:0] outputb; 
  assign mux0input = { inputa[0], inputa[2], inputa[1], inputa[20], inputa[20], inputa[34], 
inputa[2], inputa[10] }; 
  assign mux1input = { inputa[1], inputa[3], inputa[3], inputa[11], inputa[21], inputa[35], 
inputa[0], inputa[19] }; 
  assign mux2input = { inputa[2], inputa[4], inputa[5], inputa[22], inputa[22], inputa[0], 
inputa[1], inputa[12] }; 
  assign mux3input = { inputa[3], inputa[5], inputa[7], inputa[13], inputa[23], inputa[1], 
inputa[35], inputa[17] }; 
  assign mux4input = { inputa[4], inputa[6], inputa[9], inputa[24], inputa[24], inputa[2], 
inputa[34], inputa[14] }; 
  assign mux5input = { inputa[5], inputa[7], inputa[11], inputa[15], inputa[25], inputa[3], 
inputa[33], inputa[15] }; 
  assign mux6input = { inputa[6], inputa[8], inputa[13], inputa[26], inputa[26], inputa[4], 
inputa[32], inputa[16] }; 
  assign mux7input = { inputa[7], inputa[9], inputa[15], inputa[17], inputa[27], inputa[5], 
inputa[31], inputa[13] }; 
  assign mux8input = { inputa[8], inputa[10], inputa[17], inputa[28], inputa[28], inputa[6], 
inputa[30], inputa[18] }; 
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  assign mux9input = { inputa[9], inputa[11], inputa[19], inputa[19], inputa[29], inputa[7], 
inputa[29], inputa[11] }; 
  assign mux10input = { inputa[10], inputa[12], inputa[21], inputa[30], inputa[0], inputa[8], 
inputa[28], inputa[0] }; 
  assign mux11input = { inputa[11], inputa[13], inputa[23], inputa[31], inputa[1], inputa[9], 
inputa[27], inputa[9] }; 
  assign mux12input = { inputa[12], inputa[14], inputa[25], inputa[32], inputa[2], 
inputa[10], inputa[26], inputa[2] }; 
  assign mux13input = { inputa[13], inputa[15], inputa[27], inputa[33], inputa[3], 
inputa[11], inputa[25], inputa[7] }; 
  assign mux14input = { inputa[14], inputa[16], inputa[29], inputa[34], inputa[4], 
inputa[12], inputa[24], inputa[4] }; 
  assign mux15input = { inputa[15], inputa[17], inputa[31], inputa[35], inputa[5], 
inputa[13], inputa[23], inputa[5] }; 
  assign mux16input = { inputa[16], inputa[18], inputa[33], inputa[29], inputa[6], 
inputa[14], inputa[22], inputa[6] }; 
  assign mux17input = { inputa[17], inputa[19], inputa[35], inputa[27], inputa[7], 
inputa[15], inputa[21], inputa[3] }; 
  assign mux18input = { inputa[18], inputa[20], inputa[34], inputa[16], inputa[8], 
inputa[16], inputa[20], inputa[8] }; 
  assign mux19input = { inputa[19], inputa[21], inputa[0], inputa[18], inputa[9], inputa[17], 
inputa[19], inputa[1] }; 
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  assign mux20input = { inputa[20], inputa[22], inputa[2], inputa[0], inputa[10], inputa[18], 
inputa[18], inputa[30] }; 
  assign mux21input = { inputa[21], inputa[23], inputa[4], inputa[1], inputa[31], inputa[19], 
inputa[17], inputa[29] }; 
  assign mux22input = { inputa[22], inputa[24], inputa[6], inputa[2], inputa[32], inputa[20], 
inputa[16], inputa[35] }; 
  assign mux23input = { inputa[23], inputa[25], inputa[8], inputa[3], inputa[33], inputa[21], 
inputa[15], inputa[33] }; 
  assign mux24input = { inputa[24], inputa[26], inputa[10], inputa[4], inputa[34], 
inputa[22], inputa[14], inputa[34] }; 
  assign mux25input = { inputa[25], inputa[27], inputa[12], inputa[5], inputa[35], 
inputa[23], inputa[13], inputa[24] }; 
  assign mux26input = { inputa[26], inputa[28], inputa[14], inputa[6], inputa[18], 
inputa[24], inputa[12], inputa[27] }; 
  assign mux27input = { inputa[27], inputa[29], inputa[16], inputa[7], inputa[19], 
inputa[25], inputa[11], inputa[22] }; 
  assign mux28input = { inputa[28], inputa[30], inputa[18], inputa[8], inputa[30], 
inputa[26], inputa[10], inputa[32] }; 
  assign mux29input = { inputa[29], inputa[31], inputa[20], inputa[9], inputa[11], 
inputa[27], inputa[9], inputa[31] }; 
  assign mux30input = { inputa[30], inputa[32], inputa[22], inputa[10], inputa[12], 
inputa[28], inputa[8], inputa[20] }; 
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  assign mux31input = { inputa[31], inputa[33], inputa[24], inputa[21], inputa[13], 
inputa[29], inputa[7], inputa[21] }; 
  assign mux32input = { inputa[32], inputa[34], inputa[26], inputa[12], inputa[14], 
inputa[30], inputa[6], inputa[28] }; 
  assign mux33input = { inputa[33], inputa[35], inputa[28], inputa[23], inputa[15], 
inputa[31], inputa[5], inputa[23] }; 
  assign mux34input = { inputa[34], inputa[0], inputa[30], inputa[14], inputa[16], 
inputa[32], inputa[4], inputa[26] }; 
  assign mux35input = { inputa[35], inputa[1], inputa[32], inputa[25], inputa[17], 
inputa[33], inputa[3], inputa[25] }; 
  mux8 m0(.select(select), 
          .d(mux0input), 
          .q(outputb[0])); 
  mux8 m1(.select(select), 
          .d(mux1input), 
          .q(outputb[1])); 
  mux8 m2(.select(select), 
          .d(mux2input), 
          .q(outputb[2])); 
  mux8 m3(.select(select), 
          .d(mux3input), 
          .q(outputb[3])); 
  mux8 m4(.select(select), 
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          .d(mux4input), 
          .q(outputb[4])); 
  mux8 m5(.select(select), 
          .d(mux5input), 
          .q(outputb[5])); 
  mux8 m6(.select(select), 
          .d(mux6input), 
          .q(outputb[6])); 
  mux8 m7(.select(select), 
          .d(mux7input), 
          .q(outputb[7])); 
  mux8 m8(.select(select), 
          .d(mux8input), 
          .q(outputb[8])); 
  mux8 m9(.select(select), 
          .d(mux9input), 
          .q(outputb[9])); 
  mux8 m10(.select(select), 
           .d(mux10input), 
           .q(outputb[10])); 
  mux8 m11(.select(select), 
           .d(mux11input), 
           .q(outputb[11])); 
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  mux8 m12(.select(select), 
           .d(mux12input), 
           .q(outputb[12])); 
  mux8 m13(.select(select), 
           .d(mux13input), 
           .q(outputb[13])); 
  mux8 m14(.select(select), 
           .d(mux14input), 
           .q(outputb[14])); 
  mux8 m15(.select(select), 
           .d(mux15input), 
           .q(outputb[15])); 
  mux8 m16(.select(select), 
           .d(mux16input), 
           .q(outputb[16])); 
  mux8 m17(.select(select), 
           .d(mux17input), 
           .q(outputb[17])); 
  mux8 m18(.select(select), 
           .d(mux18input), 
           .q(outputb[18])); 
  mux8 m19(.select(select), 
           .d(mux19input), 
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           .q(outputb[19])); 
  mux8 m20(.select(select), 
           .d(mux20input), 
           .q(outputb[20])); 
  mux8 m21(.select(select), 
           .d(mux21input), 
           .q(outputb[21])); 
  mux8 m22(.select(select), 
           .d(mux22input), 
           .q(outputb[22])); 
  mux8 m23(.select(select), 
           .d(mux23input), 
           .q(outputb[23])); 
  mux8 m24(.select(select), 
           .d(mux24input), 
           .q(outputb[24])); 
  mux8 m25(.select(select), 
           .d(mux25input), 
           .q(outputb[25])); 
  mux8 m26(.select(select), 
           .d(mux26input), 
           .q(outputb[26])); 
  mux8 m27(.select(select), 
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           .d(mux27input), 
           .q(outputb[27])); 
  mux8 m28(.select(select), 
           .d(mux28input), 
           .q(outputb[28])); 
  mux8 m29(.select(select), 
           .d(mux29input), 
           .q(outputb[29])); 
  mux8 m30(.select(select), 
           .d(mux30input), 
           .q(outputb[30])); 
  mux8 m31(.select(select), 
           .d(mux31input), 
           .q(outputb[31])); 
  mux8 m32(.select(select), 
           .d(mux32input), 
           .q(outputb[32])); 
  mux8 m33(.select(select), 
           .d(mux33input), 
           .q(outputb[33])); 
  mux8 m34(.select(select), 
           .d(mux34input), 
           .q(outputb[34])); 
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  mux8 m35(.select(select), 
           .d(mux35input), 


























                     //inputs  
                     inputa, 
                     select, 
                     //outputs 
                     outputb); 
  input[35 : 0] inputa; 
  wire[7 : 0] mux0input, 
              mux1input, 
              mux2input, 
              mux3input, 
              mux4input, 
              mux5input, 
              mux6input, 
              mux7input, 
              mux8input, 
              mux9input, 
              mux10input, 
              mux11input, 
              mux12input, 
              mux13input, 
412 
 
              mux14input, 
              mux15input, 
              mux16input, 
              mux17input, 
              mux18input, 
              mux19input, 
              mux20input, 
              mux21input, 
              mux22input, 
              mux23input, 
              mux24input, 
              mux25input, 
              mux26input, 
              mux27input, 
              mux28input, 
              mux29input, 
              mux30input, 
              mux31input, 
              mux32input, 
              mux33input, 
              mux34input, 
              mux35input; 
  input[2 : 0] select; 
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  wire[2 : 0] select; 
  reg[35 : 0] q; 
  output[35 : 0] outputb; 
  wire[35 : 0] inputa; 
  //reg[38:0] outputb; 
  assign mux0input = { inputa[0], inputa[34], inputa[19], inputa[20], inputa[10], inputa[2], 
inputa[1], inputa[10] }; 
  assign mux1input = { inputa[1], inputa[35], inputa[0], inputa[21], inputa[11], inputa[3], 
inputa[2], inputa[19] }; 
  assign mux2input = { inputa[2], inputa[0], inputa[20], inputa[22], inputa[12], inputa[4], 
inputa[0], inputa[12] }; 
  assign mux3input = { inputa[3], inputa[1], inputa[1], inputa[23], inputa[13], inputa[5], 
inputa[35], inputa[17] }; 
  assign mux4input = { inputa[4], inputa[2], inputa[21], inputa[24], inputa[14], inputa[6], 
inputa[34], inputa[14] }; 
  assign mux5input = { inputa[5], inputa[3], inputa[2], inputa[25], inputa[15], inputa[7], 
inputa[33], inputa[15] }; 
  assign mux6input = { inputa[6], inputa[4], inputa[22], inputa[26], inputa[16], inputa[8], 
inputa[32], inputa[16] }; 
  assign mux7input = { inputa[7], inputa[5], inputa[3], inputa[27], inputa[17], inputa[9], 
inputa[31], inputa[13] }; 
  assign mux8input = { inputa[8], inputa[6], inputa[23], inputa[28], inputa[18], inputa[10], 
inputa[30], inputa[18] }; 
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  assign mux9input = { inputa[9], inputa[7], inputa[4], inputa[29], inputa[19], inputa[11], 
inputa[29], inputa[11] }; 
  assign mux10input = { inputa[10], inputa[8], inputa[24], inputa[30], inputa[20], 
inputa[12], inputa[28], inputa[0] }; 
  assign mux11input = { inputa[11], inputa[9], inputa[5], inputa[1], inputa[29], inputa[13], 
inputa[27], inputa[9] }; 
  assign mux12input = { inputa[12], inputa[10], inputa[25], inputa[32], inputa[30], 
inputa[14], inputa[26], inputa[2] }; 
  assign mux13input = { inputa[13], inputa[11], inputa[6], inputa[3], inputa[31], inputa[15], 
inputa[25], inputa[7] }; 
  assign mux14input = { inputa[14], inputa[12], inputa[26], inputa[34], inputa[32], 
inputa[16], inputa[24], inputa[4] }; 
  assign mux15input = { inputa[15], inputa[13], inputa[7], inputa[5], inputa[33], inputa[17], 
inputa[23], inputa[5] }; 
  assign mux16input = { inputa[16], inputa[14], inputa[27], inputa[18], inputa[34], 
inputa[18], inputa[22], inputa[6] }; 
  assign mux17input = { inputa[17], inputa[15], inputa[8], inputa[7], inputa[35], inputa[19], 
inputa[21], inputa[3] }; 
  assign mux18input = { inputa[18], inputa[16], inputa[28], inputa[19], inputa[26], 
inputa[20], inputa[20], inputa[8] }; 
  assign mux19input = { inputa[19], inputa[17], inputa[9], inputa[9], inputa[27], inputa[21], 
inputa[19], inputa[1] }; 
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  assign mux20input = { inputa[20], inputa[18], inputa[29], inputa[0], inputa[0], inputa[22], 
inputa[18], inputa[30] }; 
  assign mux21input = { inputa[21], inputa[19], inputa[10], inputa[31], inputa[1], 
inputa[23], inputa[17], inputa[31] }; 
  assign mux22input = { inputa[22], inputa[20], inputa[30], inputa[2], inputa[2], inputa[24], 
inputa[16], inputa[27] }; 
  assign mux23input = { inputa[23], inputa[21], inputa[11], inputa[33], inputa[3], 
inputa[25], inputa[15], inputa[33] }; 
  assign mux24input = { inputa[24], inputa[22], inputa[31], inputa[4], inputa[4], inputa[26], 
inputa[14], inputa[25] }; 
  assign mux25input = { inputa[25], inputa[23], inputa[12], inputa[35], inputa[5], 
inputa[27], inputa[13], inputa[35] }; 
  assign mux26input = { inputa[26], inputa[24], inputa[32], inputa[6], inputa[6], inputa[28], 
inputa[12], inputa[34] }; 
  assign mux27input = { inputa[27], inputa[25], inputa[13], inputa[17], inputa[7], 
inputa[29], inputa[11], inputa[26] }; 
  assign mux28input = { inputa[28], inputa[26], inputa[33], inputa[8], inputa[8], inputa[30], 
inputa[10], inputa[32] }; 
  assign mux29input = { inputa[29], inputa[27], inputa[14], inputa[16], inputa[9], 
inputa[31], inputa[9], inputa[21] }; 
  assign mux30input = { inputa[30], inputa[28], inputa[34], inputa[10], inputa[28], 
inputa[32], inputa[8], inputa[20] }; 
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  assign mux31input = { inputa[31], inputa[29], inputa[15], inputa[11], inputa[21], 
inputa[33], inputa[7], inputa[29] }; 
  assign mux32input = { inputa[32], inputa[30], inputa[35], inputa[12], inputa[22], 
inputa[34], inputa[6], inputa[28] }; 
  assign mux33input = { inputa[33], inputa[31], inputa[16], inputa[13], inputa[23], 
inputa[35], inputa[5], inputa[23] }; 
  assign mux34input = { inputa[34], inputa[32], inputa[32], inputa[14], inputa[24], 
inputa[0], inputa[4], inputa[24] }; 
  assign mux35input = { inputa[35], inputa[33], inputa[17], inputa[15], inputa[25], 
inputa[1], inputa[3], inputa[22] }; 
  mux8 dm0(.select(select), 
           .d(mux0input), 
           .q(outputb[0])); 
  mux8 dm1(.select(select), 
           .d(mux1input), 
           .q(outputb[1])); 
  mux8 dm2(.select(select), 
           .d(mux2input), 
           .q(outputb[2])); 
  mux8 dm3(.select(select), 
           .d(mux3input), 
           .q(outputb[3])); 
  mux8 dm4(.select(select), 
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           .d(mux4input), 
           .q(outputb[4])); 
  mux8 dm5(.select(select), 
           .d(mux5input), 
           .q(outputb[5])); 
  mux8 dm6(.select(select), 
           .d(mux6input), 
           .q(outputb[6])); 
  mux8 dm7(.select(select), 
           .d(mux7input), 
           .q(outputb[7])); 
  mux8 dm8(.select(select), 
           .d(mux8input), 
           .q(outputb[8])); 
  mux8 dm9(.select(select), 
           .d(mux9input), 
           .q(outputb[9])); 
  mux8 dm10(.select(select), 
            .d(mux10input), 
            .q(outputb[10])); 
  mux8 dm11(.select(select), 
            .d(mux11input), 
            .q(outputb[11])); 
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  mux8 dm12(.select(select), 
            .d(mux12input), 
            .q(outputb[12])); 
  mux8 dm13(.select(select), 
            .d(mux13input), 
            .q(outputb[13])); 
  mux8 dm14(.select(select), 
            .d(mux14input), 
            .q(outputb[14])); 
  mux8 dm15(.select(select), 
            .d(mux15input), 
            .q(outputb[15])); 
  mux8 dm16(.select(select), 
            .d(mux16input), 
            .q(outputb[16])); 
  mux8 dm17(.select(select), 
            .d(mux17input), 
            .q(outputb[17])); 
  mux8 dm18(.select(select), 
            .d(mux18input), 
            .q(outputb[18])); 
  mux8 dm19(.select(select), 
            .d(mux19input), 
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            .q(outputb[19])); 
  mux8 dm20(.select(select), 
            .d(mux20input), 
            .q(outputb[20])); 
  mux8 dm21(.select(select), 
            .d(mux21input), 
            .q(outputb[21])); 
  mux8 dm22(.select(select), 
            .d(mux22input), 
            .q(outputb[22])); 
  mux8 dm23(.select(select), 
            .d(mux23input), 
            .q(outputb[23])); 
  mux8 dm24(.select(select), 
            .d(mux24input), 
            .q(outputb[24])); 
  mux8 dm25(.select(select), 
            .d(mux25input), 
            .q(outputb[25])); 
  mux8 dm26(.select(select), 
            .d(mux26input), 
            .q(outputb[26])); 
  mux8 dm27(.select(select), 
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            .d(mux27input), 
            .q(outputb[27])); 
  mux8 dm28(.select(select), 
            .d(mux28input), 
            .q(outputb[28])); 
  mux8 dm29(.select(select), 
            .d(mux29input), 
            .q(outputb[29])); 
  mux8 dm30(.select(select), 
            .d(mux30input), 
            .q(outputb[30])); 
  mux8 dm31(.select(select), 
            .d(mux31input), 
            .q(outputb[31])); 
  mux8 dm32(.select(select), 
            .d(mux32input), 
            .q(outputb[32])); 
  mux8 dm33(.select(select), 
            .d(mux33input), 
            .q(outputb[33])); 
  mux8 dm34(.select(select), 
            .d(mux34input), 
            .q(outputb[34])); 
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  mux8 dm35(.select(select), 
            .d(mux35input), 
            .q(outputb[35])); 
endmodule 
 
